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POLITICAL STABILITY AND THE DIVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Timothy M. Kuehnlein, Jr., M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996
Utilizing the historical development of relations
between Czechs and Slovaks for a century and more, the
following thesis contends that Czechoslovakia has exhib
ited a propensity for dissolution and the lack of a sound
basis for stable order.

Socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural vari

ables have traditionally characterized Czechoslovak soci
ety as highly bifurcated, and with negative implications
for a stable political union, especially within the post
revolutionary period.

This thesis argues that the division of Czechoslova

kia need not be lamented.

Rather, division may be viewed

less negatively than other examples of modern state devo
lution in post-revolutionary Europe.

Indeed, the divi

sion of Czechoslovakia has positive implications for

stability, especially when viewed in light of the his
torical relations between Czechs and Slovaks, the peace
ful process by which dissolution occurred, and counter
vailing trends in inter-state cooperation and suprana
tional development throughout the continent.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

A Perspective
Revolution gripped France and the entire European

continent over two hundred years ago.

With the ideals of

liberty, equality and fraternity as a moral basis upon
which revolution emerged and evolved in the wake of the

Enlightenment era, the French Revolution completely over
threw all vestiges of established order.

The absence of

durable legitimate authority of any sort led France
through at least four successive forms of government
within a ten year revolutionary period.

Order became

something short of a civic virtue in France to say the
least, and with telling consequences for France's Euro
pean neigh�ors for over a century and more as well.
Likewise, the scope of events which have characterized
revolution in Central and Eastern Europe during the late
twentieth century will undoubtedly reveal their effects
over the coming century.

Invariably, potential threats

to state and continental stability, rivaling the effects
of the French Revolution, present themselves with no less
optimistic certainty.
1
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Truth and freedom from oppression were the trumpet

sounds of the revolution in Central and Eastern Europe,

ideals which may very well parallel liberty, equality and
fraternity.

The object of the French Revolution, while a

consequence of the frustration and discontent of the

masses, was a calculated event of the out-elite and Third
Estate.

Similarly, revolution in Central and Eastern

Europe emanated from glasnost and perestroika, and it too
is characterized as a revolution from the top and bottom
of society simultaneously.

In this instance, the

establishment tried to preserve its power by reforming
internally while the out-elite and the masses challenged

and overturned the existing order when opportunity arose.
Indeed, revolution in the Balkans, Central and Eastern
Europe is similar to the French experiences of 1789 and

their aftermath in many respects, but it is also distinct
in many ways.

Revolution in Eastern Europe is character

ized more deliberate than its French predecessor.

Events

therein were considerably more peaceful due mostly to the
various stages and locations at which they occurred.
Specific examples pertaining to Romania and Lithuania, of

course, deserve recognition for their displays of extreme
revolutionary fervor and subsequent hardship as the revo
lution developed; but the overthrow of communist govern
ment in six countries and eventually the Soviet Union
came from within established institutions and primarily
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at the summons of dysfunctional economic structures
throughout the Soviet sphere of influence.

The demon

strations in Gdansk, Bucharest, Leipzig, Dresden, Prague
and the various other locations were expressions of in
tense social discontent from the masses, and each suc
ceeded independently, yet with respect to the other, in

discrediting the authority and legitimacy of specific
regimes.
Keeping in mind that the revolution in eastern

Europe is characteristically unique to the various states

in which it occurred, one must consider the consequences
of revolution as they pertain to each experience.

From

another perspective, however, a vast ideological empire
collapsed entirely, and much as monarchy collapsed, com
munism's demise and its far reaching institutional disin
tegration has singularly sweeping ramifications for sta
ble order within individual states and the continent as a
whole.

Indeed, the revolution in Central and Eastern

Europe raised the very foundations on which societies
have been governed for decades and, in one regard at
least, almost a century.

Governments were overthrown

with often dramatic events.

Entire regimes, institutions

and classes of people have become disenfranchised as a
result of revolution, and this inevitably has immeasur
able consequences.

The French Revolution succeeded in overthrowing an

established government, and instability for France and
Europe were the outcome of this objective.

By April of

1793, Austria, Great Britain, Holland and Spain were
immersed in war with France.

Monarchy was also restored

by 1815 and a considerable degree of internal stability
returned to France as a result, but history indicates

nevertheless that the remainder of Europe suffered at the
dawn of the Napoleonic era.

Is it possible that a sce

nario similar to that of post-revolutionary France will
reveal itself in Central and Eastern Europe?

Although

conditions as of yet seem to preclude the onset of a

Reign of Terror and its Thermidore in most cases, one
still wonders where the effects of revolution in Central
and Eastern Europe might lead.

France's internal poli

tics was shaped by decades of revolution and counter

revolution well into the late nineteenth century, and the
entire continent acted and reacted to those developments
several times over.

Likewise, degrees of instability

have resulted along with the systematic overthrow of
government in Central and Eastern Europe and with impli

cation for individual states, the continent and the world
as a whole.

Yet, the course of post-revolutionary devel

opments and their affects on state and continental sta
bility have yet to be revealed in their entirety.

Sta-
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bility continues to hinge on the nature and success of
Central and East European post-revolutionary develop
ments, developments which are a direct result of, and in
direct response to, revolution.
While one may indeed envision a resurgence of con
servative forces in Central and Eastern Europe, the ac
tual restoration of communist rule, similar to the resto
ration of traditional monarchy in the French experience,
is highly unlikely.

Authoritarianism of another sort is

possible, and this serves as only one example of the many
potential outcomes and consequences for the independent
states and the region at large.

The outcome of revolu

tion in Central and Eastern Europe and its affect on both
state and continental stability overall, however, will be
revealed only over the course of time.

Most importantly,

the outcome of revolution in Central and Eastern Europe
depends on the delicate interrelationship and balance of
independent states and their ability to maintain stable
order within themselves and within the scope of regional,
continental developments, especially in light of and in
response to the effects of revolution as a whole. 1

Refer to Bauman for elaboration on the extent
outcome of revolution in Central and Eastern Europe,
especially as it pertains to orthodox views on the nature
of revolution and its consequences from both a theoreti
cal and an historical perspective.
1
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The Thesis Stated in Outline
While on the surface this may seem to be a topic of

consideration for students of international relations or
revolutions, the role of revolution and its affect on
stability merely set the framework for a comparative
study on state stability in and among the successor
states of the former Czechoslovakia.

More specifically,

the framework is set for analysis of state stability in

terms of maintaining stable order in itself and within a
larger geopolitical context based on impending circum
stances - circumstances caused by revolution.

The ef

fects of revolution in France dramatically reshaped the
order of states in Europe and set new criteria for main
taining stability.

Likewise, revolution in the twentieth

century has reshaped the terms of stability for modern
Europe and its interdependent states.
The revolution of Central and Eastern Europe begins
with the evolutionary internal and external reorganization of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. 2
Moreover, the progression of events are such that fifteen
new states have emerged in the area of the former Soviet
Union alone, possibly four in the area of the former
Refer to Valdez and Daniels for a succinct and
thorough account of the various stages of revolution in
Eastern Europe.
2

state of Yugoslavia and two from the former Czechoslova

A burgeoning process of political devolution pres

kia.

ents itself with alarming suddenness, and this devolution

stands in stark contrast to German unification and the

proliferating reorganization and growth of supranational
structures such as the European Union and the North At
lantic Treaty Organization.

Each represents the effects

of a revolutionary, post-Cold War era and the essence of

establishing identity and maintaining survival in light
of changing circumstances.
At the apex of this dichotomous relationship, how

ever, a relationship defined in terms of the simultaneous
devolution and centralization of power in terms of Euro
pean geopolitics, is the delicate concept of stability
with its multiple variables and nuances, whether it be
from an internal perspective of individual states, or
from interdependent regions on a continental, geopoliti
cal level.
other. 3

Each aspect is integrally related to the

At the center of post-communist Europe and the

nucleus of the centripetal and centrifugal forces operat
ing in tandem in this respect is the former state of
Czechoslovakia.

Refer to Ziring for elaboration on the centripetal
and centrifugal forces operating in tandem throughout
Europe.
3
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Czechoslovakia experienced its own dissolution as a

surprisingly orderly process, especially with comparison

to similar processes in other areas, for example, in the

Balkan and Caucuses regions.

Currently, and in accor

dance with the dichotomous relationship just briefly
described, the successor states of Czechoslovakia seek an
increased union with the established West European super

structures such as the European Union and the North At
lantic Treaty Organization, and with evidence for less
mutual animosity than is found elsewhere.'
Czechoslovakia's role in post-revolutionary Europe,
therefore, is such that it stands as a primary example of
the process of state dissolution that at least in the

short-run was peacefully negotiated.

The former Czecho

slovakia and its successor states have indeed been con
fronted with a great array of those problems that chal
lenge efforts at political reconstruction throughout
Central and Eastern Europe.

They have been confronted

with the expected political and economic complications of
throwing off an authoritarian yoke in favor of liberal
democracy, and displacing a command economy with a free
market-economic structure.

Additionally and as a conse

quence of revolution, the region of the former CzechosloRefer to Illner 1-13 for a succinct perspective on
the transformation, its success and the process of disso
lution in Czechoslovakia.
4
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vakia has experienced the prevalent circumstances of

restless nationalism, shifting regional associations and

state structures, each of which threaten the general

fabric of European order in this post-revolutionary pe
riod in their own respect.

Indeed, the process of disso

lution and transformation performed its purpose in the
former Czechoslovakia.

The overthrow of the establish

ment and disenfranchisement of the ancien regime is
nearly complete, at least in tangible terms, but along
with the success of non-violent revolution comes a pleth
ora of problems which have affected all sense of order
and stability in one manner or another. 5
The most significant post-revolutionary development
regarding Czechoslovakia is the very demise of the fed
eral state and its society, leaving the process of trans
posing communism with democracy and a command economy
with free markets surrounded by entirely new and complex
circumstances.

Subsequently, the instabilities caused by

the 1989 revolution have persisted, making the nature of
political stability surrounding the successor states, not
to mention the region, an even more arduous topic for
consideration.

We are presented with the need to address

primary questions.

How and why did the dissolution of

Refer to Illner 8 for an elaboration of the diffi
culties associated with the cognitive transformation.
5
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Czechoslovakia arise?

Further, what do the reasons for

the new dispensation?

In explaining such issues, we

Czechoslovakia's dissolution imply for the stability of
approach the condition that permitted, at least in this

instance, a process of peaceful state dissolution, one of
the few such examples at our disposal.

The objective of this thesis is to establish that

the division of Czechoslovakia, unlike the process of
deconstruction elsewhere, does not necessarily mean
greater instability for each successor state or the re
gion at large.

Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that

stability in Czechia, Slovakia and the region may have

been enhanced by the division of the Czechoslovak state.
The most important point from which this argument is
posited concerns the inherent weakness of the
"Czechoslovak" associational identity and its implica
tions for the social and political organization of the
Czechoslovak state.

In essence, there has never been a

significant degree of social or political cohesion be
tween Czechs and Slovaks, and this condition has implica
tions for stability in both historical and contemporary
terms.
Throughout their history, Czechs and Slovaks, coming
from two separate spheres of influence, have struggled
with their individual and mutual identities.

Czechs were

strongly connected to the Habsburg throne since the sev-
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enteenth century, whereas Slovaks were closely associated
with the Magyars and the Crown of St. Stephen from as
earlier as the tenth and eleventh centuries.

As well,

Czechs have traditionally been very progressive both
socially and economically, while the Slovaks have had,
and continue to have, a delayed pace of modernization and
a more provincial and conservative outlook on national
questions.

Czechs and Slovaks did not begin to look to

one another for the realization of their shared identity
as Slavs until the national revival of the mid-nineteenth
century.

Ironically, this occurred in the wake of the

French Revolution.

Even then, however, this shared iden

tity and the desire for national realization was con
fronted with an array of impediments toward achieving a
more inclusive, common identity which has itself been
highly inhospitable to shared social and political rela
tions - an essential point for this analysis and one to
which considerable attention is given.
It is essential that we examine the various socio
political, economic and ethno-cultural influences in
historical terms as they have affected political rela
tions between Czechs and Slovaks, the nature of the
state, and most assuredly, the basis of the state's sta
bility.

It is the foundation of the argument in Chapters

II, III and IV, that the federal arrangement of Czecho
slovakia was unstable in light of both these historical
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circumstances and the exacerbating circumstances of the
post-revolutionary, reform period.
The first three chapters, in effect, describe the
socio-political, ethno-cultural and economic discrepan
cies between Czechs and Slovaks which have inhibited the
solidification of a true Czechoslovak identity and a
sound basis of political unity and stability, especially
within the context of a centralized Czechoslovak state
from 1918-1939 and the federal, communist state, particu
larly after 1968.

Chapter IV, in particular, looks at

the contemporary circumstances which surrounded the revo
lution and its after-affects leading to Czechoslovakia's
dissolution.

The concluding chapter, Chapter

v,

then

explains why, in light of both these historical predispo
sitions and the troublesome circumstances created by the
post-revolutionary period, Czechs and Slovaks are un
likely to have successfully maintained a stable, demo
cratic political union.
The primary point of the analysis is that the divi
sion of the federation, while probably inevitable due to
its inherent instability based on socio-political, eco
nomic and ethno-cultural reasons, may be viewed posi
tively overall; albeit, no less, to the varying benefit
of each successor state.

In other words, as stated ear

lier, stability in the region overall is enhanced by two
independent states with mutually exclusive identities
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rather than with a Czechoslovak state where two exclusive

identities increasingly vied for self-interest as post

revolutionary circumstances distanced their individual

needs and drew greater distinctions between them; for the

consequences of two such exclusive entities within the
context of a federal arrangement as it existed until 1993
had drastic ramifications for the success of consolidat

ing the post-revolutionary reforms, reforms which are an
essential element of any sort of stable order in both
republics and the region at large.
The hypothesis relies heavily on a basic understand
ing of the nature of stability in the context of a plural
society:

especially useful is Arend Lijphart's theory of

consociational democracy.

While such theories are dis

cussed in the succeeding portion of this Introduction for
their general structural significance, an elaboration of
their relationship to practical conditions in Czechoslo
vakia is more than less reserved for Chapter

of this thesis.

v, the heart

When they are integrated with specifics

of Czechoslovakia's demise, these theoretical constructs
help substantiate the hypothesis.

A larger theoretical aspect of this thesis' consid

eration entails the exceptional experience of the Czech
and Slovak division in the context of trends toward mod
ern state decentralization and exclusive nationalism.
Surely, this context presents itself with portentous
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prospects for the European continent. 6

While analyzing

the psychological and practical elements which have ulti
mately prevented any considerable cohesion between Czechs
and Slovaks, at least to form an overwhelming sense of
Czechoslovak nationhood, this larger theoretical consid
eration proposes and argues that the division of Czecho
slovakia, while having been probable, is a primary exam

ple for qualifying the traditionally negative conception
of modern state devolution, that deconstruction is not
always to be lamented. 7 Division should be viewed as a
vital contribution towards reestablishing stability

within the republics of the former Czechoslovakia and
indeed the region.

Decentralization of states, as most clearly exempli
fied by the breakup of the Soviet Union and the threat of
continued decentralization in the Russian federation, not
to mention the effects of such a trend in the former
Yugoslavia, does present an array of potential dangers.
Indeed, extreme nationalism and the question of exclusiv
ity and territorial claims present a whole series of
perplexing concerns and problems.

Yet national identi-

Refer to Dahbour, Brown and Ritchie for a consid
eration of rising nationalist and separatist sentiments
and their impact on the world order.
7 Refer to Rothschild, Ritchie, Waltzer, Habsbawrn
and Brecher for a framework of the general lamentation of
modern state decentralization.
6
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ties and their claims for self-realization and determina
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tion deserve a conscientious understanding, especially in

light of the need for stable and effective democratic

government as it pertains to Czechoslovakia and the con
tinent.

The basis of the argument in this larger and more

audacious theoretical consideration is that stability in
the region of the former Czechoslovakia has probably been
enhanced by the occurrence of division along traditional
socio-political, economic and ethno-cultural boundaries;
In other words, a truer national identity expressed

through independent statehood.

In more idealistic terms,

however, this thesis is fundamentally arguing that by
allowing the long established identity of Slovaks, for
example, an opportunity for self-determination - the role
that Slovakia plays as a sovereign entity, especially in
light of the countervailing trends in inter-state coop
eration in Europe and the nature of Czech and Slovak
relations, may very well enhance the prospects for both
inner-state, inter-state and regional stability. a

Refer to Waltzer for a general discussion of the
need for small nations to develop within themselves; also
refer to Implementation of the Helsinki Accords.
8
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The Theoretical Foundations and Direction of the Argument
Edmund Burke wrote skeptically of the French Revolu

tion in 1790 and criticized revolution because of its
effects.

He argued that revolution created chaos and

threatened stability by discrediting the institutions of
government and society and the traditions upon which they
have developed and matured over time.

He criticized the

French for debasing all forms of established order and

warned the English by example of the French of the im
pending consequences from blatant disregard for order,
authority and tradition.
Burke's commentary outlines the principles of a
stable political and social order and the manner in which
each may be challenged during an age of revolution.

His

commentary also, therefore, provides unparalleled per

spective on the events which helped shape the Romantic

era - the aftermath of revolution.

This in turn provides

useful perspective for revolution and its aftermath in
Central and Eastern Europe.
The following excerpt from Reflections on the Revo
lution in France provides a general outline of Burke's

convictions on the issue of social order and stability,
primarily the dialectical functioning of political soci
ety.

He writes:

By a constitutional policy, working after the
pattern of nature, we receive, we hold, we

transmit our government and our privileges, in
the same manner in which we transmit our property and lives. The institutions of policy,
the goods of fortune, the gifts of providence,
are handed down to us, and from us, in the same
course and order. Our political system is
placed in a just correspondence and symmetry
with the order of the world, and with the mode
of existence decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts; wherein, by the dis
position of a stupendous wisdom, molding together the great mysterious incorporation of
the human race, the whole, at one time, is
never old, or middle-aged, or young, but, in a
condition of unchangeable constancy, moves on
through the varied tenor of perpetual decay,
fall, renovation, and progression. Thus by
preserving the method of nature in the conduct
of the state, in what we improve, we are never
wholly new; in what we retain, we are never
wholly obsolete. By adhering in this manner
and on those principles to our forefathers, we
are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the spirit of philosophic
analogy. In this choice of inheritance we have
given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood; binding up the constitution of
our country with the dearest domestic ties;
adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of
our family affections; keeping inseparable, and
cherishing with the warmth of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our
state, our hearths, our sepulchers, and our altars (Burke 29-31).
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Constitutionalism, in its broadest sense one might con
clude, is the basis of all order for Burke, and an under
standing of this constitutional order is an essential

stepping stone for understanding some necessary prerequi
sites for a stable social and political order, especially
within the very context of revolution and its conse
quences in Czechoslovakia.

Roy C. Macridis writes in reference to political

18

society and the conservatism of early British thought;
NSociety thus consists of interdependent parts - and all
the parts are equally conscious of the interdependence.
Each one does its own work, but what it does makes sense

only when the whole is understood and valued" (Macridis
87).

Regarding an organic constitution he continues:
The 'whole' - this society that consists of the
harmonious interdependence of many parts - is
formalized in the Constitution. This is not a
written document, and in fact there is no way,
according to conservative thinkers, a constitu
tion can be set down. The Constitution is a
set of customs, understandings, rules, and es
pecially traditions, that define political
power and set the limits upon its exercise.
Power thus enshrined by habit, custom, and tra
dition becomes authority; that is, it is ac
cepted and respected. In this way, it is the
Constitution that binds the whole of the citi
zenry to its rulers and the rulers to the citi
zenry within the nation (88).
Burke, however, concerns himself first and foremost

with a reasoned perspective on the essentials of civil
society and established order by way of institutions,
including reasons why tradition and established institu
tions should not be wantlessly discarded in the face of
change and reform - revolution to be exact.

Nonetheless, Burke is not always opposed to change
and he is not opposed to reform, according to John H.
Hallowell, a leading American conservative scholar of the
last generation:

"He is opposed to the radical presump

tion that it is possible to start de novo without concern

for history and tradition,

ground, N he insists,

N

no less.

N between

"There is a middle

'absolute destruction' and

'unreformed existence' and it is the task of the states

man to find the middle ground N (Hallowell 194).

Hallow-

ell continues:

Political problems are not like problems in ge
ometry nor can we proceed to construct a social
order from a set of a priori assumptions. The
materials with which the statesman must work
are not counters which can be pushed this way
and that in accordance with some preconceived
plan but are passionate human beings, capable
of cooperation with the good but capable also
of rebelling against it. Sentiment, or love,
therefore, must always be reckoned with and it
is only by inculcating habits of veneration
through institutions that the passions of men
can be channelized into socially beneficent ac
tion (196).
Revolution in France on this set of presumptions

neglected these principles, the crux of Burke's revul
sion.

Civil society, based on a traditional constitution

and rule of law, was abandoned for and challenged by
liberty with no prudent regard for order, according to
Burke; the consequences of which were predictable.
N Unlike

Rousseau, Burke argued that 'without ••• civil

society man could not by any possibility arrive at the
perfection of which his nature is capable, nor even make
a remote and faint approach to it'" (189).

French soci

ety was shortsighted and their government unable to en
dure the extraordinary strains which self-inflicted revo
lution placed upon its constitutional countenance as

19

might any government or society under such circumstances
(Ayling 206).

Unlike the "social revolution" in France however,
revolution in much of Eastern Europe, and particularly
revolution in Czechoslovakia, did not disdain existing
civil society and the rule of law, and in this sense, one
may argue that the middle ground was found in the events
of 1989.· Civil society in Czechoslovakia helped shape

the nature of revolution therein by forging it in a be

neficent direction.

In earnest, stability and order

remained more than less intact as a consequence.

Giuseppe Di Palma argues in his analysis of legiti

macy in communist Europe that "civil society of sorts
survived in Eastern Europe, not just as a conventional
clandestine adversary but as a visible cultural and exis
tential counterimage of communism's unique hegemonic
project" (Di Palma 49).

"As communism lost faith,"

writes Di Palma, "social resistance to its dogmatic and

historical baseless claims turned the transitions in
Eastern Europe into true revolutions of citizenship,
underscored by an extraordinary mobilization of civic
identities and expectations" (50).
Among a number of other accounts, Samuel Huntington
supports these claims in The Third Wave where he high
lights the uniqueness of revolution and its aftermath in
Czechoslovakia particularly by demonstrating Czechoslova-
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kia's regard for finding the middle ground between

"absolute destruction" and "unreformed existence," a
location central to Burke's sense of traditional, consti

tutional order and stability.

Huntington terms Czecho

slovakia's revolution and its immediate aftermath a proc
ess of "transplacement," a concept he defines as an in

cremental but surely complete overturn of the existing
order (Huntington 1990, 156).

Negotiation and compromise

among political elites were at the heart of the demo
cratic process in November of 1989 when Vaclav Havel met
with leaders of the communist party, and the transition

agreements between the communist regime and its societal

opposition, Civic Forum and Public Against Violence, are
proof that revolution in Czechoslovakia remained civil
(166).

Social forces did indeed overthrow the communist

establishment in Eastern Europe, but not in the same

manner as the French experience where an entire social
and political order was discarded with no prudent regard
for order, tradition or what would take its place outside
of liberty.

This scenario is a direct contradiction to

the facts which surround "revolution" in Czechoslovakia,
to which any basic account of the events will attest.
Rather, there was a sound rationale for overthrowing the
institutions of government throughout the region, but
especially in Czechoslovakia where the communists seized
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power by illegitimate means in 1948.

One could also

argue that the divergence of the institutions of govern

ment from the basic tenants of society, especially in

light of the severe infractions committed by the commu
nist regime towards the populace at large, warranted the
overthrow of such an order; for that order was, in its
own right, highly unstable and increasingly distanced
from the more natural order of society, an order to which
virtually everyone outside of the ancien regime, and many
of those within it, ascribed - democratic legitimacy.
The legitimacy and, therefore, the stability of the re

gime was, in fact, already diminished by the point of the

velvet revolution, if in fact it ever truly existed, and
the revolutionaries merely sought to resurrect a govern
ment based on the principles of constitutional democracy.
Furthermore, the truest Burkian constitution, that which
is not written but woven throughout the basic tenants of
society, was not altered by the immediate revolution.

If

anything, its bonds were strengthened in order to achieve
the immediate goals of the revolution - the overthrow of
the communist regime.

This was not a social revolution

in the traditional sense of the term.

It was more pre

cisely a revolution of the communist political order and
its social elements carried through by a subjected social
order, or civil society if you will, as a whole.

Only

the formal constitution between the people and its gov-
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ernment was discarded, and for just reasons one might

argue.

Revolution in Czechoslovakia, nevertheless, becomes

troublesome and must answer to Burke's primary concerns
precisely at the second and final phase of its completion
- the point at which constitutional democracy is institu
tionalized in leu of the old order and the realization of
the necessary consensus among varying interests within
society - that harmonious interdependence to which Mac
ridis refers so eloquently - for establishing the frame

work of a new order.

It is at this point that the events

become particularly important to the interests and focus
of this thesis.
Along with the complete revolution in Czechoslova
kia, a divergence of social interests developed respond

ing to deep historical precedents, and this in turn di
minished those vestiges of stability which withstood the
immediacy of revolutionary events.

Civil society became

affected by revolution to the point that, in the end,
society and the state both dissolved.

Indeed, Burke's

warnings about revolution radiate an haunting echo from

the eighteenth century.

Bearing its weight, revolution

really does have consequences for stability regardless of
merit.

A social order was discarded in its entirety for

change and reform, revolution to be exact, and this con-

ceives consequences which extend far beyond the immediacy

of the revolution itself.
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It is from this perspective

that the most fundamental concerns of this thesis are

elicited - those being the basis of stability and the
likely prospects for achieving it in post-revolutionary

Czechoslovakia in light of both historical and contempo
rary circumstances relative to the revolution and its
affects.

Sir Ralph Dahrendorf has extended Edmund Burke's

reflections with a contemplation of his own in the form
of a letter to a gentleman in Warsaw entitled, Reflec
tions on the Revolution in Europe.

With considerable

optimistic concern for the direction of revolutionary
developments in post-1989 Europe, Dahrendorf contemplates
the same sort of issues which Burke addressed, regarding
constitutionalism, civil society and socio-political
stability in light of a revolutionary experience.
The particulars of Dahrendorf's discussion of estab
lishing a stable constitution of freedom are quite perti
nent as they comprise the basis of present reform efforts
in most countries of Central and Eastern Europe, includ
ing the reform and consolidation programs of the former
Czechoslovakia and its successor states.

They also pro

vide a starting point at which reform becomes institu

tionalized for the sake of stability.

Dahrendorf looks to Burke, among others such as

Freidrich von Hayek and Karl Popper, as a defender of
civil society, and he concerns himself with expounding on
the essentials of an open society as it applies particu

larly to Poland, but also universally to all of eastern
Europe in the post-revolutionary context (Dahrendorf 31).

He posits the ideas of basic rights, the rule of law, and
as much democracy as possible as the basis of a just
order in which stability may endure.

In other words,

Dahrendorf is concerned with keeping power from the hands
of the few and establishing a constitution of liberty
(86-87 and 78).

In this sense, he too extends merit to

the revolution of 1989, but the complete transformation
of political, economic and social organization to meet
these ends, Dahrendorf warns, is not an easy task and not

one without considerable risk.

In light of the revolution's immediate success,
Dahrendorf elaborates on the merits of constitutional
liberalism in contrast to socialism and a third way,
warning of its radical tendencies and questionable conse

quences for conservative post-revolutionary communist
Europe.

He states that "the old politics is spent".

"Constitutional liberalism and social reform need to
build a new alliance," (77) what Burke has called a rec
onciliation of liberty and authority (Hallowell 190).
"We are all embarked upon a journey into an uncertain
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future and have to work by trial and error within insti-
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tutions which make it possible to bring about change
without bloodshed" (Dahrendorf 41).

Quoting Edmund Burke, Dahrendorf elaborates on the

complexity of political development and institutionaliza
tion.

"Society is indeed a contract and cannot be ob

tained in many generations.

It becomes a partnership not

only of those who are living, those who are dead, and
those who are to be born, it is also a clause in the
great primaevil contract of eternal society" (101).

The

issue before us, states Dahrendorf, is how to establish
the constitution of liberty and order and anchor it
firmly within the current circumstances.

The heart of

the problem, he concludes, lies in the incongruent time
scales of the political, economic and social reforms
needed to this end (78).

Continuing with the words of

Timothy Garton Ash, Dahrendorf reminds his readers that
somehow communism "did not manage to poison the words
'citizen' and 'civic' and that citizenship and civil
society are, therefore, guiding lights in the new march
to freedom" (27).
More precisely, therefore, it is within this context
that stability itself has been and continues to be
equivocal and of most relevance to Czechoslovakia's divi
sion.

Not only are the political, economic and social

reforms for establishing a constitution of liberty and
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order incongruent with one another with respect to

Dahrendorf's concerns, but the very relationship between
Czechs and Slovaks and their endogenous constitution

provide even deeper elements of incongruency which per

tain to stability within Czechoslovakia.

stability and the Essence of a constitution
There is little doubt that one of stability's great
est threats is revolution.

Revolution and structural

reform, while two separate issues, are similar in effect
on stability because they both seek to fundamentally

change an existing order, and this in itself can have a
significant impact on stability.

Modernization or re

form, "in practice always involves change and usually the
disintegration of a traditional political system, but it
does not necessarily involve significant movement toward
a modern political system" (Huntington 1969, 35).

Fur

thermore, political modernization, an alluvious form of
structural reform, involves the extension of political
consciousness to new social groupings and the mobiliza
tion of these groups into politics.

A complete revolu

tion, however, that which is at issue here, is by defini
tion, violent and compressed in its time of operation.
What Theda Skocpol terms social revolution also involves
a second phase:

The creation and institutionalization of

new political order, the success of which entails a com-
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bined rapid political mobilization and rapid political

institutionalization.

Thus the full scale revolution

involves the rapid and often violent destruction of ex

isting institutions, the mobilization of new groups into

politics, and the creation of new political institutions
(see also Huntington 1969, 266).

It is, in fact, within the full scale revolution as

defined by the destruction of existing institutions and
the creation of new ones that the context for achieving
stability within Czechoslovakia is established.

Looking

beyond the direct effects of revolution, however, one is
forced to correlate basic theory of stability with

Czechoslovakia's particular circumstances in order to
discern a foundation for stable order both in terms of
theory and circumstances.

Hence, my discussion of sta

bility arises from and is limited to the Czechoslovakian

experience and a few brief theoretical propositions which
involve the institutions of government and politics,
civil society and elites, all within the framework of

informal constitutionalism and the revolutionary context
portrayed heretofore.

Following Harry Eckstein's con

cerns, I am most particularly interested in the requisite
conditions of stability (refer to Eckstein 179-86).
Considerable emphasis, therefore, is placed on theory
relating to plural society and particularly Arend Li
jphart's theory of democracy in plural society due to the

fact that elements of it most directly address the cir
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cumstances and framework under which stability is most

probable.

Historically, it is precisely with the very

nature of Czechoslovakia's endogenous social and politi

cal constitution that stability has been most dubious,

and while Czechoslovakia has, in the past, experienced a
considerable degree of stability based on democratic

principles, it has had its share of problems related to
its rivined political culture, despite these principles.
The post-revolutionary period is no exception.

The fol

lowing paragraphs, therefore, first present the theoreti

cal points which aid in defining stability, and then draw

a sufficient degree of practical relevance to Czechoslo
vakia before going into the historical development of

social and political relations between Czechs and Slovaks
in Chapters II-IV.

Stability is a difficult and ambiguous concept to

define in part due to the many necessary variables upon
which it depends and the many factors which invariably
affect the conditions by which it is achieved (Lijphart
1-5; Eckstein 223-24).

Of this array of conditions, as

various scholars contend, stability hinges on the extent
of democracy contained in a political and social system
primarily for the part which democracy plays in both
providing and maintaining prolonged legitimacy.

Others

suggest the integral importance of effective government

30

as well, not to mention external variables (Eckstein
184).

This thesis is solely concerned with the internal

variables of stability due to the fact that within the
revolutionary context, the internal variables of stabil
ity have been the most challenging for the Czechoslovak
context.

Stability naturally involves the formal organization

of governmental structures and how these structures re
late to one another in terms of a political process.

For

the early philosophers, the success of institutions,
indeed the success of the polity as a whole, depended
heavily on the character of the citizenry.

"Civic vir

tue," the "spirit of the laws" as Montesquieu put it, and
its relationship to institutions has indeed been the
subject of inquiry since antiquity, notably discussed in
Plato's Republic.

Stability also depends heavily on the

nature of elites and elite interaction within a pro
scribed constitutional order; for the direction of elite
interests and political activity has a profound effect on
the populace at large and visa versa.

Elites also play a

significant part in defining the parameters by which
stability itself may endure.

Hans-Ulrich Derlien and

George J. Szablowski, for example, highlight the crucial
role of inter-elite consensus in achieving a stable demo
cratic order.

"Elite actors make strategic decisions to

promote their individual or institutional interests, to

build or destroy inter-party coalitions, to increase
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their chances for re-election, and to discredit their
rivals and opponents." "Such pursuit of 'subjective

rationality,'" they claim, "may produce unintended conse

quences in the context of specific socio-economic and
international constraints, and may contribute to the

regime's stability or instability" (Derlien 317).

Seymore Martin Lipset argues that stability is de
termined by "certain supporting institutions and values,
as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining
process".

This, he argues, relates to conditions within

a particular context which, by necessity, must entail
democratic principles (Lipset 69).

Outside of the spe

cific rules of the political game however, Lipset argues
that the variables which explain stability are interre
lated and involve, first and foremost, securing legiti
macy (acceptance of a regime as right for society); gar
nering support from conservative groups (loyal versus
disloyal opposition), particularly as it concerns socie
tal cleavages; the historical development of legitimacy
and the effectiveness of government and democracy; and
finally, the means to temper cleavages for the purpose of
continuity in social and political order as it relates to
democracy (Eckstein 217; Lipset 70-72 and 86-103; Li
jphart 10).
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Gabriel Almond, however, hits at the heart of sta

bility as it concerns plural society and the interests of

this project by emphasizing political homogeneity as an
element of stability.

The homogeneity of a political

culture, he argues, has a direct bearing on stability as

defined by a typology of four socio-political systems,
two of which pertain to democracy.

The first, known as

the Anglo-American type, is characterized by a homoge
nous, secular political culture and a highly differenti
ated role structure.

The other, known as the Continental

European type, is characterized by a fragmented political
culture which is, in the words of Almond, "embedded in
the subcultures and tends to constitute separate subsys
tems of roles" (Lijphart 6).

The former - in terms of

relating to homogenous culture, with its autonomous par

ties, interest groups and communications media - epito
mizes stability.

The later type epitomizes instability

because of its fragmented political culture and mutual
dependence of parties and groups, not to mention the
inherent immobilism of its nature (7-12).

Almond high

lights the significance of role structure and political
culture, arguing that each is linked as a condition of
political stability (7).

He argues that the degree to

which governmental and societal institutions are autono
mous or separate and maintain their proper boundaries -

paralleling separation of powers doctrine - has a direct
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impact on the stability of democratic political systems
(8-10).

This applies to the organization of government

and political institutions into separate spheres of in

fluence (i.e. executive, legislative and judicial; par
ties, interest groups and media communications).
It should be mentioned that Almond's theoretical

propositions place considerable emphasis on input struc
tures of society and government due to their affect on

stability in terms of "checks and balances" (9), and he
is also concerned with political development and party

systems (12-13). Notwithstanding their importance, these
aspects of Almond's views are not addressed.

Almond's

typology is extremely useful, however, for deducing the
extent to which stability in Czechoslovakia is likely,
based on the nature of its fragmented political culture.
A plural society, according to Harry Eckstein, is
one which is divided into segmental cleavages based on
religion, ideology, language, region, culture, race, and
ethnic identity (3-4).

Eckstein argues that political

parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools
and voluntary associations tend to be organized along
these lines of segmental cleavages as well.

Indeed, for

Eckstein, the nature of authority patterns found in these
associations relative to the authority pattern of govern
ment is an important factor for continuity in legitimat-

ing authority.

The manner in which these segments are
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organized, however, is the primary concern here; for the
manner in which cleavages are organized in relationship

to one another and their government weighs heavily on the
nature of constitutional order and, therefore, stability.
In a sense, this correlates with Macridis' contention
with respect to the consciousness of society's harmonious

interdependent parts (Macridis 89).

Cleavages do indeed create problems for the continu
ity of a general constitution, and stable democratic
government is difficult to achieve in a plural society
for reasons that pertain mostly to political consensus
and cultural homogeneity in socio-political terms
(Eckstein 180; refer also to Lijphart 1 and 48).

Almond,

for example, places great emphasis on the need for a
secular political culture, one in which differences
within society's socio-political composition are not so
extensive so as to threaten mutual respect and adherence
to authority.

In contrast, Almond's Continental type

highlights the inherent nature of instability.

Great

degrees of fragmentation and their correspondence with
subcultures diminish continuity in plural society and,
therefore, make stability less achievable.

This stands

to reason, if there are divergent views on what is just
or who may have authority in a certain situation, con

flict will arise unless there are proper formal and/or

informal constitutional measures in place or within the
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political culture itself particularly which may resolve

or temper the differences for the sake of stability, but

Almond suggests that in the fragmented political culture,

role structures are usually mixed and the segments polar
ized.

Consequently, the political process is troubled

with immobilism.

Indeed, in reference to Almond, Arend

Lijphart concludes that deep social divisions and politi
cal differences within plural societies are responsible
for instability and the breakdown of democracy (Lijphart
1).

Lipset's concerns with legitimacy and perceptions of

government effectiveness are also directly related to the
nature of social cleavage.

There are problems with seg

mentation of society in terms of legitimacy, defining
loyal opposition and maintaining legitimacy by effective
ness in government (Lipset 89).

One main source of le

gitimacy lies in the continuity of primary conservative
and integrative institutions, particularly during transi
tion periods, but where historical antagonisms have de

veloped weltanschaung politics, the institutions of inte
gration are useless and the political atmosphere polar
izes, leaving society immersed in partisan battles (88
and 95).

Conflict among cleavages threatens social dis

integration (91).

36

In terms of societal organization, Lipset states

that "the extent to which contemporary democratic politi

cal systems are legitimate depends in large measure upon
the ways in which the key issues which have historically

divided society have been resolved (86).

He too argues

that stability is enhanced by what Gabriel Almond calls
secular political culture (89).

In this sense, Lipset is

particularly concerned with defining loyal opposition and
creating cross pressures, concepts which are addressed in

the coming paragraphs.

Societal cleavages and the way

they relate to one another dramatically influence stabil
ity.

Lipset argues that the stability of a democratic

system depends on the system's efficiency in moderniza
tion, but also the effectiveness and legitimacy of the
political system in terms of the nature and effects of

social cleavages; for much like legitimacy, effectiveness
is determined by the performance of a political system to

the extent that it satisfies the basic functions of gov
ernment as defined by the expectations of most members of
society, and the expectations of powerful groups within
it which might threaten the system (86).

The crux of

Lipset's concerns entail maximizing political cosmopol
itanism with such variables as urbanization, education,
communications media and increased wealth (97).
Indeed, Lipset's main theoretical argument in con
junction with legitimacy, is that stable democracy de-

pends on levels of economic development and the propor
tional distribution of wealth (74 and 83).
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High levels

of development mean greater stability, but rapid economic
development is inimical to stability while gradual eco

nomic development supports it (Eckstein 180, refer also
to 216-20; Lipset 75-78).

Of course, this is a conten

tious issue with which scholars diverge for reasons that
are too numerous and detailed to expound upon here or,
for that matter, within the context of this thesis
(Eckstein 219).

Nonetheless, Lipset argues that the

level of industrialization, urbanization and educational

development in a society bears significantly on the sup

port of a democratic order and its stability (Lipset 7891).

He argues that together factors of economic devel

opment and modernization are linked closely to the his
toric institutionalization of the values of legitimacy
and tolerance (78-91).
Furthermore, in addition to the effectiveness of
government and its policies over a period of time, condi
tions which serve to moderate the intensity of partisan
battle are among the key requirements for a plural, demo
cratic political system (91-92).

Lipset argues that the

chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent
to which groups and individuals have a number of cross
cutting, politically relevant affiliations (96-97; Li
jphart 11).

Almond and Lipset both believe, for example,
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that when individuals belong to a number of
different organized or unorganized groups with
diverse interests and outlooks, their attitudes
will tend to moderate as a result of these psy
chological cross-pressures. Moreover, leaders
of organizations with heterogeneous memberships
will be subject to the cross-pressures of this
situation and will also tend to assume moder
ate, middle of the road positions. Such mod
eration is essential to political stability.
Conversely, when a society is riven with sharp
cleavages and when memberships and loyalties do
not overlap but are concentrated exclusively
within each separate segment of society, the
cross-pressures that are vital to political
moderation and stability will be absent
(Lijphart 10).
Nin practical political terminology," Arend Lijphart
states, Noverlapping memberships are characteristic of a
homogenous political culture, whereas a fragmented cul
ture has little or no overlapping between its distinct
subcultures" (11).
Each of these propositions about the nature of sta
bility is extensive and quite elaborate, not to mention
cumbersome.

For now, however, these ideas provide a

basic foundation from which to proceed.

Stability in

volves institutions, elites, civil society and economic
success, all within the a formal and informal constitu
tion based upon a cohesive political culture.

External

variables, of course, also influence stability, but as
already stated, this thesis concerns primarily the inter
nal variables which contribute to social cohesion.
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constitutional stability; Ibe Argument Applied
With the initial success of the revolution in 1989,

a provisional government was established in Czechoslova
kia followed by the election of a legitimate government
in the summer of 1990.

Each contributed to organizing a

new constitution based on democratic pluralism and the
rule of law, in essence reforming the state's legal

framework to conform with the likes of a free-market
democracy (Ulc 21-22; Wolchik 1991,

so and 60-61). The

very continuity of Czechoslovakia unraveled with such
action however.

Divergences of opinion from vested in

terests in society - Czech, Moravian and Slovak - sur

faced over the political equation in terms of unifica
tion.

Along with the reforms came questions of how power

was to be distributed between the republics and between
the republics and the central government.

Czechs and the

predominance of their representative political parties
advocated a centralized government.

Slovaks, on the

other hand, advocated a decentralized government with
greater powers to the republics. 9
With particular resonance to Lipset, rapid economic
reforms and their distinct effects on Czechs and Slovaks
9 See Wolchik 1994; refer also to Illner for elabo
ration about the divergence of attitudes between Czechs
and Slovaks towards reforms.

helped fuel the divergence in political interests.

In a
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sense, they were the primary cause of political diver

From the earliest stages of the revolutionary

gences.

period, government policy advocated and initiated a rapid

economic transformation from a planned economy to one of
markets.

So-called shock therapy made the currency con

vertible, broke monopolies, lifted price controls and

instituted the privatization of the state-owned economy.
Also, a great deal of emphasis was placed on fiscal and
monetary policy, including heavy doses of fiscal re
straint, in order to bring supply and demand into har
mony.

The effects influenced Czechs and Slovaks differ

ently from one another.

Slovaks experienced the brunt of

the hardship as a result of their sharply underdeveloped
economic structure.

In contrast, Czechs witnessed a

revival of economic dynamism and optimism for the future
condition seen only in the days before communism.

As a

result, the Czechs took a progressive position and Slo
vaks took a more conservative position with regard to
revolutionary and post-revolutionary reforms.

Ethnic

nationalist sentiments increased and elite interests

directed the post-revolutionary period along divergent
and contentious lines.

Czech politicians generally advo

cated a highly centralized state apparatus and a quick
move to the market economy via market principles while

Slovak politicians advocated the decentralization of

state structures and a slower pace of economic reform
with limited privatization and strong state intervention
(Islam 75).

In the end, the complete revolution had

consequences for both the stable order of society, and
subsequently the very existence of Czechoslovakia as a
modern "nation-state".
Why the sudden deterioration of mutual relations,
and the threat of complete dissolution?

The process of

deterioration took a remarkably short period of time some three years.

The revolution occurred in November

1989, and the state was completely dissolved by January
1, 1993.
Saul Newman is particularly concerned with finding
out what causes and directs ethnic conflict by determin
ing why and how certain ethnic identities become politi
cized and why some succeed where others fail.

Newman

concludes that shortcomings in conflictual modernization
theory are evident, and he stresses the need for under
standing the ethnic component in order to understand the
extent and viability of such conflict; how and why, for
instance, relations between Czechs and Slovaks could
deteriorate at such a catastrophic rate.
Newman stresses the manner in which modernization
politicizes ethnic identification, emphasizing the idea
tional aspects of ethnic movements rather than just the
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economic and political changes that precede such move-

ment's formation.

He states; "By emphasizing the ideo

logical component of ethnicity, [the argument] addresses
the reasons for mass participation in ethnic movements,

brings an ethnic component to the study of ethnic poli

tics, and expands on the purview of the conflictual mod
ernization approach" (478).

Commenting further on typi

cal conflictual modernization theory, Newman states that
it avoids "a detailed study of the ideological, strategic
and organizational apparatus of ethnic movements.

Also,

in emphasizing the economic and political interests of

elites, theorists have avoided discussing the role of

ethnic boundaries and ethnic cultural and ideological

markers for determining the depth and breadth of movement
support" (467).
Newman's extension of conflictual modernization
theory, therefore, provides a strong theoretical frame
work from which to analyze the ethno-cultural and socio

political premise for Czechoslovakia's demise.

It

stresses the importance of understanding the social com
position of Czechoslovakia in the context of state disso
lution.

Hence, his theoretical clarification serves as a

guideline for structuring Chapters II-IV.
Corresponding with Almond's Continental type,
Czechoslovakia has, in fact, been traditionally divided
along distinct ethnic, geographic, linguistic, economic,
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and political lines since its establishment, and these

lines of distinction correspond with very little signifi

cant, if any, crosscutting or overlapping segmentation,

in Lipset's sense.

Carol Skalnik Leff argues that, in

fact, two separate and self-sufficient societies have

developed, mocking the Czechoslovak ideal and this in

spite of its virtuous chase of composite unity over the
years (1992).

Additionally, role structures have tradi

tionally been truncated into two separate subsystems with
separate role structures relative to each segment of
society suggestive of Almond's propositions.

Indeed,

Czechoslovakia consisted of a deeply fragmented political
culture, and the nature of such fragmentation has and
continues to have implications for the common government
of Czechs and Slovaks.

Every major period of Czechoslo

vak history has been troubled by deep ethnic conflict

involving perceptions of equitable distribution of power
and resources among the most prevalent segments of soci
ety, most predominantly Czechs, Slovaks and Germans.

The

antagonisms are evident and well documented throughout
the course of the state's seventy-five year history.

Expounding upon Gabriel Almond's Continental Euro

pean type, however, and the limited prospects for stabil
ity which it places on fragmented political cultures, the
likes of which Czechoslovakia resembles, Arend Lijphart
argues in Democracy in Plural Societies that democratic

stability is achievable in highly fragmented political

cultures.

44

He argues that small states with diverse sub

cultures such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and

Switzerland, for example, have proven through the prac

tice of consociationalism that stability is, in fact,
feasible within plural societies (Lijphart 14-16).

The

question is, however, how such a solution could be found
in Czechoslovakia under the current circumstances.

Acknowledging that it may be difficult, but not at

all impossible, to achieve and maintain stable democratic
government in a plural society, Lijphart puts forth three

interlocked solutions to the political problems of plural
society while maintaining a democratic order.

One is to

eliminate or substantially reduce the plural character
through assimilatory means based on centralized govern

ment.

A second alternative, and this the crux of Li

jphart's theory, is to accept the plural divisions as
basic building blocs of a stable democratic regime - the
essence of consociationalism.

Finally, Lijphart states,

"lf the second solution should be unlikely to succeed or
if it was tried and failed, the remaining logical alter
native is to reduce the pluralism by dividing the state

into two or more separate and more homogenous states"
(44-45).

These strategies will be expounded upon in the

detail necessary in Chapter V because one may indeed be
tempted to argue that consociationalism is a possible

framework for political union between Czechs and Slovaks.
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In fact, elements of consociationalism have historically

been a factor in achieving stability throughout Czecho

slovakia's history, only under the centralist and assimi
latory practices of various governments - democratic and
authoritarian alike.

After disbarring centralism because of its histori

cal significance in creating much of the adverse senti
ments between Czechs and Slovaks within both the First

Republic and communist authoritarianism, I argue in Chap

ter v, that the political and economic divides of Czecho
slovakia are not conducive to consociationalism, and this
is primarily reflected in the nature of elite interaction
and the problems associated with societal segmentation
and the lack of a secular, or at least cohesive, social
order and political culture.

Indeed, the circumstances

of the post-revolutionary period and the conditions of
Czech and Slovak relations, especially in terms of elite
interests and overall social dispositions, do not lend
themselves to consociational democracy as a means of
fashioning an endurable stability.
Helga A. Welsh analyzes the political transition
processes in Central and Eastern Europe by emphasizing
the changing modes of conflict resolution responding to
revolutionary and post-revolutionary developments (379).
Her analysis contains important implications for the

stability of a newly emerging political order by describ-
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ing the manner in which order and stability are achieved

at various stages during a transition process, be it

revolutionary or post-revolutionary reform.

Welsh's

specific sense of transition is directed at that interval
between the decay of an authoritarian political regime

and the arrival of a democratic one.

She highlights the

fact that such transitions attempt to address crucial
issues under urgent time constraints, they present great
uncertainty with regard to the process and the results of
the transition, and they involve a rapidly expanding

range of political actors and forms of communication
among them.

They are also elite centered and involve

bargaining.
Welsh identifies three stages in which successful
transitions move toward democratic political rule.

First, a liberalization of the authoritarian regime is

accompanied by a decline in the use of command and impo
sition methods for conflict resolution.

Secondly, bar

gaining and compromise emerge as the key features in
decision-making as the transition proceeds to extricate

the old regime and institutionalize a new political sys
tem.

And finally, she states that increasing competition

and cooperation as methods of conflict resolution distin
guish the consolidation process of a transition and ulti-

mately become institutionalized in the newly established
social and political framework (380).

Much as Huntington describes Czechoslovakia's revo

lutionary experience as a transplacement (1990, 156),

Welsh categorizes it as a process of liberalization
through negotiation and power-sharing.

The liberaliza

tion process was started by the communists as popular
mobilization gave them few choices.

However, with round

table negotiations, opposition gained the necessary
status and visibility needed to become a shareholder of
power in a coalition government with the communists,

ultimately transferring power before the democratic elec
tion in June 1990 (387).

The process was peaceful, con

sisting of negotiation and compromise which in turn es
tablished a sound level of stability for the extension
and consolidation of further political and economic re
forms.
Welsh comments, however, that "while bargaining and
compromise contributed to the peaceful and orderly trans
fer of power and the institutionalization of pluralist
political structures in Central and Eastern Europe, fur

ther progress toward the consolidation of these emerging

democracies was hampered by unresolved issues of power
distribution and by conflictual elite attitudes (391).
Supporting arguments made earlier in this regard,
those very same prospects which provided great success
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and optimism for the Czechoslovak transition began to
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present themselves in a different light as the conse

quences of post-revolutionary reforms and their consoli
dation grew deeper and wider.

The prospects for stabil

ity in a united Czechoslovakia became increasingly more
guarded, and the smooth consolidation of reforms less

likely.

The basic reform, consisting of elaborate po

litical and economic initiatives, played itself out in

the Czech lands and Slovakia in very different ways for
which negotiation and compromise were afforded little
opportunity by the newly placed political elites.

Refer

ring to Samuel B. Bachrach and Edward J. Lawler, Welsh

states, "independent of the mode of transition, the con

cept of bargaining is crucial in understanding transition
processes.

The argument is based on the assumption that

the 'bargainers need to reach some settlement but, at the
same time, wish to settle on terms favorable to them
selves'" (379).

Of course this had considerable signifi

cance for negotiations between the communist government
of Czechoslovakia and its successful opposition, but its
relevance to a later period in the transition process,
especially the basis for state dissolution, is ironic.
Negotiations between the Czech and Slovak prime ministers
served as the means by which reform and its consolidation
could proceed in light of heightening tensions between

the federated republics.

Each side, however, chose to

insist on terms primarily favorable to itself.

Little

compromise was extended by either side, and the federa

tion collapsed as a result.

The conditions for conflict

resolution became dim at the very least, and this, of
course, has implications for stable democratic govern
ment, not to mention the very basis of consociational

democracy and the fate of the federal republic.

I will argue in conclusion that circumstances were
so adverse to the continuation of a federated union that
Lijphart's third option, disassociation, was the most

reasonable outcome.

The division of Czechoslovakia has,

in fact, created two more or less homogenous political

entities within which stability currently exists, abliet
to varying levels for each state.

Stability within a

unified state would have been a formidable status to
achieve in light of the diverging level of stability
within each republic.

Not only would the Czech Repub

lic's increased pace of reform have affected Slovaks
adversely as a whole, the political volatility currently
experienced in Slovakia would have most emphatically had

adverse affects for the stability of each republic, the
union itself and the region overall.

It is from this

perspective that this thesis is argued.

The division of

Czechoslovakia is not to be lamented; rather, the divi-
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sion of Czechoslovakia is an inevitable and even positive

example of modern state devolution.

so

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK IDEAL AND ITS PROPENSITY
FOR DISSOLUTION
There are ethno-cultural, socio-political and eco

nomic variables of prolonged historical significance

which have defined the Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak
conceptions of a national identity separately from one
another.

These distinctions provide significant insight

into the complexity of the "Czechoslovak" concept of

associational identity and subsequently the delicate

nature of mutual political relations between Czechs and
Slovaks defined in terms of the modern state of Czecho
slovakia.

They are also an essential point from which to

understand the circumstances and causes relative to
Czechoslovakia's dissolution.
Czechs and Slovaks have long shared a strong common
history.

Indeed, they were tied closely to one another

within the Great Moravian Empire (c. 833-907), but ever
since its collapse at the close of the tenth century,
Czechs and Slovaks diverged from one another.

Czechs

(Bohemians and Moravians) coalesced within the Bohemian
Empire and later the Holy Roman Empire since its earliest
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stages of development in the twelfth century.

Then in
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1620, the Czech Crownlands were slowly absorbed by the

Habsburg dynasty with their defeat by Bavarian Emperor

Maximillian at the Battle of White Mountain during the

Thirty Years' war.

Slovaks, on the other hand, became

the tenth century.

With millions of other ethnic Slavs,

associated with the Crown of St. Stephan from as early as
both Czechs and Slovaks emerged from the Middle Ages

under the vassalage of Austrian Germans and Magyars re

spectively, striving incessantly throughout their accent
to the modern age to resurrect a distinct, yet shared

sense of identity.

The mid-nineteenth century is a natural starting
point for understanding the complexities of a conceived
"Czechoslovak" identity and state.

By this time, the

Czech lands and Slovakia were integral parts of the Aus
trian Empire and the Habsburg crown.

The national iden

tities of Czechs and Slovaks reemerged from centuries of
quietude with increasing intensity during this period of
intense national revival which began throughout Europe
and within the Empire at the turn of the eighteenth cen
tury in the wake of the French Revolution.

In response

to the rooted traditions of German and Hungarian aristoc
racy and the slowing reforms toward a parity of nation
alities within the Austrian Empire, nationalist spirits
of Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slo-

venes, Croatians, and Serbs were revived and developed as
Pan-Slavism swept the Empire's peripheral regions.
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From

the turn of the century and for the first half of the

nineteenth century, following the Enlightenment Reforms

and abolition of serfdom initiated by Maria Theresa and
her son, Joseph II, national sentiments were augmented
(Leff 1988, 28).

After squelching the revolutionary

events of 1848 however, the Habsburg crown attempted to
curtail rising nationalist sentiments by centralizing its
administration of the Empire.

Despite such efforts, the

nationalist resurgence persisted with moderate progress

and the internal quest for national rights; this and the

external threats from various Prussian and French mili
tary encounters earlier in the century worked at chal
lenging the Austrian conundrum's delicate nature.
The realization of Czech and Slovak national identi
ties had been stifled considerably by the administrative
organization and cultural superiority of the imperial
powers.

Language and culture were dominated by German

and Magyar, and the administration of political and eco
nomic affairs were based strictly according to imperial
spheres of Austrian and Hungarian influence, especially
after the formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Czechs and Slovaks, in effect, lay subject to Austrian
and Hungarian administration respectively until the Em
pire's dissolution.

And while each sphere had distinct

socio-political and economic characteristics, endogenous

54

nationalities were subject to and dramatically influenced
by their centralized bureaucratic apparatus.

The reorganization of administration in the Austrian
Empire began as early as 1774 in response to external
threats and the attraction of Enlightenment principles

from the French philosphes.

Enlightened absolutism was

the means by which the Habsburgs addressed nationalist
sentiments, but even after the 1867 Ausgleich, the po
litical and administrative organization of the Empire
remained heavily centralized, becoming a sort of "masked
absolutism" (Skilling 1994, 156).

Austria-Hungary was

based on a federalist principle of the Dual Monarchy
which left the Habsburg throne residing independently,
although simultaneously, over both Austria and Hungary.
This arrangement, of course, lent credence to Magyar
demands for internal autonomy and-national parity with
the Germans, and it is evidence of the monarchy's need to
disperse authority to its nationalist constituencies,
especially the more influential Magyars, as a result of
mounting political pressure from nationalist resurgences.
While various organs of democratic and provincial
government existed at regional levels within each king
dom, legislative power remained primarily in the hands of
the Austrian central government and the monarchy based in
Vienna.

In a sense, a dual system existed in more ways

than one.

There was not only a dual monarchy, but also a
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mockery of federalist principles; a type of federalism

that was limited horizontally to Austria and Hungary and

vertically to the seventeen Crownlands and their virtu
ally powerless representative bodies.

This truncated

form of federation provided limited integrative potential
for the Empire's various governmental segments based
primarily on nationality.

The local organs of government

- communes and districts based on provinces and lands were completely subordinate to the centralized monarchy.

The Empire's executive power was based almost entirely in
the hands of the Monarch, the ministries, bureaucracies
and administrative offices of which were vested with
governors and provincial committees with no responsibil
ity to the various imperial and provincial diets to which
all nationalities within the Austrian sphere at least,
including Bohemia and Moravia, were represented with
limited residual powers.

There was no territorial admin

istrative autonomy within the Empire outside of that
granted to Hungary (147).

Slovaks, therefore, also had

no political autonomy within the Hungarian sphere of the
Empire, and they received only very limited national
representation in the Hungarian parliament (65).

With

minority nationalities, Czechs and Slovaks alike having
little access to the centralized administrative struc-
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tures, their attempts for greater parity with Germans and
Magyars were often either overlooked or stifled. 10

The Empire also adapted economically with the loss
of Silecia to Prussian expansionism in the mid-eighteenth
century.

Replacing Silecia as the industrial sector of

the Empire, the Czech lands quickly developed specializa
tion in sugar refining, smelting, coal mining, machine
tool production, and glass and textile manufacturing.
Slovakia developed industrially as well, but as it fell

subject to Hungarian administration, its economy remained
predominantly based in agricultural production
1988,

12-23; Cornej 34 and 36).

(Leff

Economically, the impe

rial spheres developed distinctively for the duration of
the Empire's existence, subsequently presenting a basis

for perplexing consequences with regard to political

relations between Czechs and Slovaks as time passed and
new circumstances evolved (Leff 1988, 11-26).
Czechs had slowly accumulated wealth as a result of
their unique experience with industrial modernization
whose new elites displaced, in some respects, the tradi
tional role of the landed gentry and aristocracy of
mostly German origin.

Austria had been thought of as

being increasingly embourgeoisified compared to Hungary,
Refer to Skilling 65-66 and 156-57 for elaboration
on the political organization of Austria-Hungary.
10

and Czechs experienced considerably more liberties under
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the Austrians than did the Slovaks under the Magyars
(18).

Czechs became integrally involved as opportunities

for greater parliamentary participation in local and
imperial diets developed throughout the nineteenth cen
tury.
1880,

The Czech language was accepted for public use in
and that, in turn, created greater opportunity and

impetus for the accelerated institutional development of
universities, theaters, newspapers and various other
social and cultural organizations of a distinctly Czech
nature (17).

A high standard of education developed and

provided fertile ground on which claims for further na

tional recognition advanced (Polisensky 100), demands for
greater political representation and administrative
autonomy.
health.

Sokol became a distinct mark of national
Dvorak, Smetena and Manes developed their ex

pressions around the ideals of national identity, and
literary Czech experienced a revival after two centuries
of neglect (100).
The Slovak experience of increasing magyarization
over the course of some eight hundred years, however,
left its identity much more obscure.

Oppression of the

Slovaks became especially harsh after 1867 when Magyars
became equals to Germans and the Emperor's influence in
Hungarian domestic affairs became limited, especially his
ability to protect non-Magyar peoples.

The Slovak class

system was sharply truncated over the years in a

staunchly conservative aristocratic system.
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Its educa

tional opportunities drastically limited, the territory

of Slovakia had a literacy rate ten times less than that
of the Czech lands (Leff 1988, 17).

Magyar remained the

only official language, and the few remaining Slovak
schools were closed by 1874 (28).
curtailed as well.

Suffrage was severely

Even with six percent of the populace

permitted to vote, very few qualified Slovaks made it to

the ballot boxes (25).

Between 1899 and 1913, some

300,000 of the roughly two million Slovaks migrated from

the Hungarian kingdom as a result of the social and eco
nomic misery (Skilling 1994, 65).

Slovak culture was

being suppressed while that of the Czechs was expanding
(Leff 1988, 23).
The greatest cultural distinction between Czechs and
Slovaks involves the literary language as it developed
over the course of the nineteenth century.

While ger

manization and magyarization of the Czech and Slovak
regions hindered the mastery and development of endoge

nous languages, each survived its long period of repres

sion and managed to resurge and develop with considerable
vibrancy in the period of national revival.

One also

finds within this context, the earliest conception of a
"Czechoslovak" identity and the roots of contention be-

59

tween Czechs and Slovaks defined in terms of national

association and cultural distinction.

A language renaissance was a central element of the

national revival from the very beginning.

Prior to 1829

Josef Dobrovsky began using literature to support the

national cause, and his successors, Josef Jungmann being
among them, developed the conception of a common Slavonic
literary language based on Czech.

Jan Kollar and P.J.

Safarik, Protestant Slovak authors writing in Czech, are
the most acclaimed for their development of this concept
beyond the aspirations of Jungmann and others.

In their idea of what constituted a nation, the

mutual influences of Slovak and Czech on the literary
language were very important for national cohesion.

They

wanted "a Slovak Czech and a Czech Slovak" language
(Agnew 22).

Their views evolved from a very complex

interrelationship of literary Czech and an early, written
form of colloquial Slovak known as bernolacina, an inter
relationship which pitted Slovak Catholic and Protestant
clergy and intellectuals against one another based on

perceptions of what should be distinctly defined as Czech

and Slovak or possibly even Czechoslovak, a complex and
polemical situation to say the least.

Catholic priests, Father Anton Bernolak chief among
those Slovaks who used bernolacina and from whom the form
derived its name, began codifying this written form of

Slovak in the late eighteenth century (22).

As a result
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of this codification and Magyar suppression of literary

Czech and colloquial Slovak, Slovak intellectuals began
to question the fate of Slovak itself (28).

Conse

quently, a debate over literary language ensued among and
between Czech and Slovak intellectuals.
Czechs, in contrast, aggressively pursued lingual

purity.

In particular, German infringed on professional

literary and colloquial Czech as a result of the profes
sional and cultural dominance of German throughout the
empire.

Slovak also managed to get a word in edgewise as

Czech was the literary language of Slovak intellectuals,
some of whom interspersed it with bernolactna.

There were indeed different forces of Slavism at
work within Austro-Slavism in many respects (30).

Some

argued that the literary language of Slavs could be uni
fied while allowing dialects in the spoken word.

After

all, the Germans had succeeded in such an endeavor, and
the consequences of their efforts proved lucrative.

The

strength of the German empire was considerably enhanced
by the concept.

Yet, despite the logic of such a princi

ple for pan-Slavism and the eventual liberation of Slavs
from their oppressors, "tribal" proclivities of the
Slavic nation hindered any probability of realizing this
sort of ideal.

Kollar and Safarik both "used the term 'nation' to
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refer to the Slavs as a group (narod slovansky), while

using the term "tribe' (kmen) to refer to the different
Slav peoples making up the Slav nation.

Within this

framework, according to Kollar and Safarik, the Czechs
and Slovaks belonged together to a common "Czechoslovak"
tribe of the Slavic nation. 11

The Slovaks L'udovit Stur and Josef Hurban, however,

purported a different conception of national association
and the development of linguistics.

They believed that

Slovaks constituted a separate tribe from the Czechs

(31); indeed that they were a separate nation, and that
to the contrary of Kollar and Safarik, "Czechoslovak"
would not be considered a tribe of Slavism.
Stur codified what is called a "cultured Central

Slovak" in the mid-nineteenth century as it related to
the more western, cultured dialects of colloquial Slovak.
He codified the language as it was spoken rather than as
it was written from historical axiom, primarily from the
era of Bernolak (29).

By doing so, Stur and his support

ers stretched the idea of an independent literary Slovak
to its apex when in 1843 they declared in public that
from thenceforth they would write only in the Slovak
Refer to Agnew 23 for a discussion of the tribal
concept.
ll

language, in affect declaring an independent nation of
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Slovaks in Central Europe (21).

The logic of Stur best sums up exactly why the sepa

rate tribal proclivity became so appealing.

It also fits

appropriately in the context of describing why the Czechs
and Slovaks diverged on the basis of one of the most
important elements which define a nation, language.

comments:

Stur

Each nation is most easily united by what is
its own, what is nearest to it, for in what it
senses itself, its spirit, its thought, and
thus too the Slovak nation will be most quickly
and most certainly united through its own
unique, national, ancestral language (32).
This, of course, neither favored Czech interests nor the
ideals which Kollar and Safarik had put forward in an

effort to consolidate a Czechoslovak national identity.
In fact, Kollar and Safarik subsequently embarked upon a
collection of essays underwritten by the National Museum

in Prague in which they criticized the Slovak literary
language (25).
The course of events in the development of linguis
tics highlights the fact that the development of Slovak
was not because of any hostility towards Czechs.

It was

due to the purpose of uniting Slovaks (33), and the di
lemma lingered on the proposition put forward by Stur:
"If we [Slovaks] write in pure Czech, then we limit our

common people's access to reading, and if we prefer our

63

own language, we cut ourselves off from the Czechs" (24).
Aside from the development of linguistics, there

are, of course, many elements which have helped define
national association among Czechs and Slovaks independ
ently from one another over the course of centuries.
Foremost among them is the religious orientation of

Czechs and Slovaks.

Czechs have ascribed to Catholicism

since the Christianization of their lands, yet ever since
the fourteenth century and the Hussite movement which
challenged the Catholic church, Czech culture as such has

commonly been interpreted as incorporating a strong Prot
estant ethic; this despite the fact that only some 14

percent or less of the population has traditionally as
cribed to Protestant theology.

In contrast, Slovaks have

remained devoutly Catholic with only a very small propor
tion of the population ascribing to Protestantism.

The

distinction has not only contributed to two distinct
senses of national identity, as we shall see in Chapter
III, it has also affected how Czechs and Slovaks relate
to one another, especially with respect to goals, ambi
tions, interests and even conceptions of a mutual des
tiny.

From an historical perspective, then, Czechs and

Slovaks have come from two very clear and separate cir
cumstances.

The elements that comprise national identity

- a common history, culture, language, and common views
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about one's destiny, etc., have been distinctively quali

fied.

Simply put, Czechs and Slovaks have separate foun

dations for national association, and this has implica
tions for the political stability of union between

them. 12
Cooperation and Statehood
Cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks, indeed the
concept of a Czechoslovak associational identity, can be
traced to the early nineteenth century linguistics debate
and as nationalist sentiments were taking shape.

It

evolved as Czechs, in particular, grasped for greater
self-realization and liberation from the restrictive,

imperial controls of local and national affairs, while
Slovaks, by nature of their considerably more sharpened
repression, found commiseration with them (Leff 1988,
27).

This is not to suggest, however, that Slovaks did

not actively pursue their own interests.

Rather, because

of their circumstances within the oppressive Hungarian
administration, Slovaks could not effectively express and
lobby for their own interests independently from the

Refer to Illner 85 for an elaboration of religious
distinctions; refer to Wolchik 1991 and Leff 1988 gener
ally for more basic cultural and historical distinctions.
12
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Czechs. 13

However, despite this mutual cooperation,

Czechs and Slovaks did not approach each other with any

significant effort for shared independent statehood until
the early twentieth century.

And such cooperation came

in the face of the Empire's immanent demise.

Czechoslo

vak statehood came about under precarious circumstances
and with limited support (Leff 1988, 27; Skilling 1994,
77).
Thomas G. Masaryk, Czechoslovakia's first president,
is often noted as the keystone figure in the realization
of Czechoslovakia.

Masaryk was primarily a proponent for

Czech national rights in the Austrian sphere of the Dual
Monarchy, advocating a peaceful pursuit of national

rights for equality and self-government, essentially
calling for a reformed federal union of nationalities
within the monarchical arrangement, he sought greater
Czech rights beginning from the early 1880s and until his
exile at the onset of World War I (Skilling 1994, 158,
see also 147-71).
Masaryk's ideas for greater Czech autonomy were

influenced by the thoughts of Frantisek Palacky, Karel

Havlicek and Alois Hajn.

Each of these early intellectu

als of the national revival, with the exception of Hajn
See Felak 30; refer to Skilling 1994 in general
for further elaboration on the evolution of mutual rela
tions and the influence of Czechs with Slovaks.
13

with whom Masaryk worked, argued for varying degrees of
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national autonomy within the monarchical arrangement, and

each presented an intricate program of defining the Czech
and Slovak relationship in political terms.

From the

basis of their arguments, the conception of Czech and

Slovak political unity emerged, reinforced by those of
Kollar and Safarik on lingual separation and national

association.

Masaryk was influenced by elements of each

and, in turn, influenced the revival period with his own

moderate approach to the Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak
questions of national identity and political union by
serving as a delegate to the imperial diet in Vienna and
as a professor of philosophy at Prague's Charles Univer

sity.
Palacky argued that the Czech nation could not be

politically independent of the imperial power because of
its size, an aspect on which Masaryk reflected considera
bly (see Skilling 1994, 158-59).

Palacky emphasized the

development of the nation's culture and education, par
ticularly in the sciences, and advocated a power share of

the Czechoslavs (Czechs and Slovaks) with six other na
tional groups or provinces within the monarchical ar
rangement (Skilling 1994, 158).

He wavered between the

conception of a federation of nationalities and the fed

eration of historical lands, finally preferring the lat
ter (158).
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Havlicek, on the other hand, called for complete

administrative independence of the Czech Crown, advocat

ing a federation of nations, "sometimes [referring] to a

union of the 'Czechoslav nation' and sometimes to one of
Bohemian lands,• but he never directly addressed the
particulars of any such conceptions (158).
Hajn's plan of federation appeared in a 1905 draft
program of the Progressive party.

He advocated Austria's

division into large autonomous territories based on na

tionality.

These would include the lands of the Czech

Crown (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silecia without the Polish

population), the German lands (not including the German

parts of the Bohemian lands), and the Italian-Slovenian
Serbian-Croatian territory (159).

The plan had provi

sions which foresaw the eventual victory of the national
ity principle in Hungary, and the justified incorporation
of the Hungarian Slovaks into the Czech kingdom (159).
Masaryk was a critic of the Dual Monarchy for its
reluctance towards change and especially its foreign
policy.

Being of partial Slovak decent and realizing the

need to awaken the national consciousness of Slavs and

Slovaks in particular, Masaryk extended his quest for
national rights to all minorities within the Empire.

He

began to identify Slovaks as part of the Czech nation, or
as co-nationals, as the claim for Czech independence
developed into the twentieth century especially.

His

consideration of the Slovak question however, particu
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larly its fate, and the organization of the Empire in

terms of federalism should be described as ambiguous as
were most considerations of the kind.

He admired Jan

Kollar's thoughts regarding Slavic reciprocity, and he

favored national autonomy based on natural rights as put
forward by Havlicek rather than the historical rights
claims of Palacky (70-71).

It must be made clear from

the outset that Masaryk did not advocate any sort of
political union with the Slovaks either within the Empire

or as an independent state until prospects for the Empire
looked dim at the close of war in 1918 (79).

When speaking before parliament in Vienna on various
occasions, Masaryk would often make reference to Czech
Slovak reciprocity, suggesting the need for greater coop

eration.

At other times, however, he would speak of the

need for independent Slovak initiatives, making his com
mitment to any specific schemes rather vague (71).

One

fact stands clear, however, Masaryk respected the Slovak
national identity, and he did not see its distinct iden
tity as an obstacle for broader cooperation between
Czechs and Slovaks (71).

He believed that Czechs and

Slovaks formed a single nation, separated by language,
history and culture, but limited by primitive rational
identity.

Masaryk took great pleasure in acquainting himself
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with the Slovak people and their political culture

throughout his extended travels in the region.

His pro

fessorship in Prague proved a unique position from which

to associate with many Czechs and Slovaks alike, express
ing his views and influencing young students in particu
lar, especially young Slovak students who ultimately

played a considerable role in the events which helped
shape the future of the region (71; Leff 1988, 34).
Czechs were particularly interested in Slovak cul

tural and economic development from as early as the
1880s.

The Ceskoslovenska jednota served as a base from

which intellectuals and the middle class could sustain
contact with Slovak intellectuals (Leff 1988, 33).

The

organization encouraged understanding and support of

Slovak culture and its liberation from Magyar oppression
(33).

Political cooperation between Czechs and Slovaks,

however, was virtually non-existent (Skilling 1994, 68;
Leff 1988, 38).

In fact, the majority of leading politi

cal figures in Bohemia, being disenchanted with the ideal
of linguistic separation, turned away from any signifi

cant concern for Slovakia, thus concentrating on Czech
rights within Austria.

Czechoslovakism was hardly an

element of everyday affairs, and few Czechs were even
aware of the true plight of the Slovaks and their mutual
interests regarding autonomy and self-determination.

The

idea that Czechs needed Slovaks and Slovaks needed Czechs
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was not a concept deeply rooted in the social conscious
ness of either society (Leff 1988, 36).

As the suppres

sion of Slovaks became more severe, however, Czech po

litical parties, in particular the Social Democrats,

National Socialists and the Progressives, expressed con
siderably more concern for the plight of Slovaks
(Skilling 1994, 69).

Slovak intellectuals and politicians were heavily

divided over the issue of political and cultural coopera
tion with the Czechs.

For many Slovaks, Czech interests

in Slovakia were more instrumental than they were inher

ent to the needs of Czechs (Leff 1988, 32).

As the idea

of a Czechoslovak state became more obvious towards the
end of the First World War, some skeptics suggested that

Czechs needed Slovaks to offset the German populations if
Bohemia and Moravia were to become liberated even within
an existing empire.

Others feared the hybrid nature of

the Czechoslovak ideal or saw it as a mere tactical ma
neuver by the Czechs (30 and 35).
The most conservative elements of Slovak society

were of the older generation who had been shaped by the

ideas of Stur and the linguistic separation.

From the

small town of Turciansky Svaty Martin where Stur declared
the distinct Slovak language, Svetozar Hurban-Vajansky
led this conservative, predominantly intellectual faction

of Slovak society with widespread support.

They touted
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the distinct qualities of the Slovak nationality and

looked to the Russian Czar for support.

They were anti

Western and anti-modern, but not extreme like other na
tionalist forces in Slovakia.

Also, like most national

ist factions therein, the movement lacked a clear agenda
on the question of national goals, and they subsequently

failed to gain the type of strength which Czech national

ist parties had mounted towards Vienna.
The Catholics also had strong leadership in the
nationalist question.

They called for enhanced Slovak

national rights and held close relations and influence

among average Slovaks.

They often supported the Martin

Centre but not without considerable criticism of its

policies and tactics.14

It is, in fact, with the Catho

lic leadership and its following that some of the most
conservative nationalist sentiments of the First Republic
were to be exhibited over time, as illustrated later in

this chapter.
The Hlasists, named after their monthly publication
Hlast - which focused on the literature, politics and

social questions of the time, espoused the ideas of a
strong Czechoslovak tendency corresponding with the con14 Refer to Skilling 1994, 67 for further elabora
tion.
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cepts of Kollar, Safarik, Havlicek and Palacky (74).

Hlasists believed in the virtue of polemics and encour
aged debate on the Slovak question.

They called for the

replacement of pan-Russianism and Slavic cosmopolitanism
with the ideas of Slavic reciprocity, putting aside most
differences about language (74).

Along with the social

democratic tendency which called for Czech and Slovak

cooperation within the framework of Marxist internation
alism, the Hlasists experienced limited support even
among young intellectuals (69 and 78-79).

But at the

turn of the century, their range of support expanded.

Receiving encouragement and intellectual nourishment from
Masaryk himself, the Hlasists advocated the activism of

ordinary people on the basis of civil rights.

They be

lieved that an alliance with the Czechs was the only way

to achieve the national rights of the Slovak people (6768).

With this explanation of the Czech, Slovak and
Czechoslovak conceptions of association, there are pri
mary elements which preclude the national identification
of the Czechoslovak state (refer to Leff 1988, 37).

advocacy of unity lacked intensity and depth.

Both

The

Czechs and Slovaks had matured from two separate visions
of national identity, and while efforts to establish
mutual understanding among the two societies served well,
the fact remains that both societies developed from two

distinct circumstances.

One society was advanced politi

cally, economically, culturally and socially, the other

much less so, and political integration, by necessity,
requires a considerable degree of mutual growth.

Most of

the interrelationship between Czechs and Slovaks was

based on the initiative of Czech efforts at mounting
socio-cultural assimilation, a force which many Slovaks
indicted as an infringement and potential threat to their
own unique identity (39).

The conception of Czechoslovak unity was also amor

phous.

As exemplified by the ideas behind Masaryk's

position, there was never a clear plan of Czech and Slo
vak reciprocity, let alone a plan for mutual and inde
pendent statehood.

Czechs never considered the possibil

ity of statehood for themselves until the last years of
the war (Leff 1988, 39).

Simply put, there was no over

arching pressure for the consolidation of a drive toward
deeper unity between Czechs and Slovaks, except as this
was seen as an instrument in the quest for independence.
The ambiguity surrounding the liberation struggle and
establishment of political union at the close of war
merely set the stage for future conflict (38).
The Decline of Empire and the Rise of Statehood
Austria-Hungary's nationalist problems had been
mounting since at least the mid-nineteenth century.

The
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Empire had expanded and with little or no reform of rep-

resentation, only promises.
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In particular, Bosnia and

Herzegovina were annexed in 1908, and Vienna continued
its stalling tactics regarding Czech autonomy.

Emperor

Franz Josef I had promised three times to crown himself

as King of Bohemia and raise the status of Czechs to

parity with Germans and Magyars, but he never acted upon
his promises, especially because of Magyar dissension.
Masaryk, for one, continued to criticize the expansionism
and particularly the antiquated form of governing Austro
Slav minorities.

In fact, his efforts toward constitu

tional reform were augmented at the turn of the century,
while maintaining allegiance to Austria even after the
outbreak of war (Skilling 1994, 168).

The unfolding events of 1914 set the stage for the
realization of nationalist calls of self-determination,
yet not without considerable caution and confusion (Leff
1988, 39).

Radicals were conspiring for complete inde

pendence (39).

The strains of war suggested the possible

demise of the Empire, and Masaryk turned his peaceful
pursuit of national rights for Czechs into an aggressive
pursuit of Czech and Slovak interests abroad shortly
thereafter (Mamatey 80).
Charles I succeeded Franz Joseph in 1916.

The Rus

sian Revolution occurred in 1917, and American forces
also began their mission on the European continent in
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that same year.

The Bolshevik withdrawal from the war

and their avowed distaste for imperialism gave their

Slavic cousins in Austria-Hungary a sense of confidence

for their independence movements.

Finally, the American

presence in Europe spelled the death knell of the Central
Powers, especially Austria-Hungary and her allies.

Amer

ica'a position in the subsequent peace settlements, as

formulated by President Wilson, pressed for national
(ethnic) "self-determination".

Nationalists had reason

to be optimistic, and the mood of Austria-Hungary, which
characterized Charles I as "Charles the Last," foretold

the Empire's fate.

By this time, Masaryk had bet everything on the
demise of the Central Powers (Polisensky 107).

He and

several other Czech leaders, including Eduard Benes and
Milan Ratislav Stefanik, spent a considerable amount of
time in exile, particularly in Paris, for the purpose of
rallying support for the national liberation of Czechs
and Slovaks (Mamatey 82-3).

On November 14, 1915 in the

name of the "Czech Foreign Committee," a formal declara
tion was issued demanding the establishment of an inde
pendent Czechoslovak state (84).

In 1916, the Czech

Foreign Committee was transformed into the Czechoslovak
National Council of Paris (85).
With support from Czechs and Slovaks living abroad,

the conception of Czechoslovak unity became even more

crystalline (81-83; Petr).

Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh
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Agreement with American Slovak emigres in May 1918 for
the sake of garnering support for independence from
abroad.

In this agreement, both Masaryk and the Slovak

emigres agreed to support a common Czechoslovak state

with the condition that broad autonomy would be provided

to Slovaks.

Slovak emigres wanted to assure that Slova

kia would have her own administrative system, diet and
courts, and that Slovak would be the official language of
public schools, offices and public affairs generally in
Slovakia (Felak 143).

On May 24, 1918 in Turciansky Svaty Martin, the

Slovaks declared themselves for union with Czechs.
October 29, the Hlasist and Masaryk disciple, Dr.

v.

On

Strobar became a member of the National Council and de

clared in Martin that "the Slovak nation is both by lan
guage and history a part of the united Czechoslovak na
tion".

He then pronounced Slovakia's claim for a common

state, a pronouncement with which much ambiguity was
evident.

Neither the Martin Declaration or the Pitts

burgh Agreement, however, precisely defined the political
relationship between Slovaks and Czechs (Petr).

Much soul searching and anxiety was a part of this
process, to say the least (Leff 1988, 40).

The one hun

dred self-selected conferees at Turciansky Svaty Martin
were operating out of complete ignorance of their sur-

roundings (41).

The isolation of Czech and Slovak po-
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litical leaders prevented any mutual understanding and

cooperative efforts in the establishment of a Czechoslo

vak state (38).

The complications of unifying two very

disparate social and administrative entities, with no

clearly defines role for Slovakia, presented complica
tions for the future (39).

Upon the release of the Mar

tin Declaration, the delegates were unaware that a
Czechoslovak state had been proclaimed by the Prague
National Committee a day earlier (41).
Masaryk and Benes persuaded the French to include

Czechoslovak liberation among the allied war aims, and
Vienna's reluctance to accept Article 10 of the peace

treaty because of Magyar dissension spelled the demise of
the Empire (Mamatey 86-7).

Indeed, in December of 1917,

the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was spelled out
in U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen
Points.

A Congress of "suppressed nationalities" was

convened in Rome and the "Twelfth Night Agreement" con
cluded demands for unification of Bohemia, Moravia,
Silecia and Slovakia (Polisensky 109).
In the haste and uncertainty of the events of 1918,
the Czechoslovak National Council was recognized by
France, Britain, the United States and Italy as the rep
resentative of a new nation.

At last, the Czechs were

free after years of striving for autonomy.

Slovaks were

free of the Magyar oppression as well, and a new and
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independent state was born from the whirlwind events of

World War I.

Indeed, as Carol Skalnik Leff has stated,

the nationalist revival served as the gestation period

for not only the demise of the Empire but also the birth
of new and independent states, including the modern
states of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (1988, 38).
The First Republic
The two years following the euphoria of 1918 brought
a degree of stability to the region based on a constitu

tion of parliamentary democracy, a strong party struc
ture, and a strong presidential personality.

Czechoslo

vakia had been ruled by a provisional, revolutionary
National Assembly and constitution from its establishment
until a more detailed constitution was approved in Febru
ary 1920.

Modeled after the great Western democracies,

the constitution guaranteed basic rights and freedoms to
every citizen.

Additionally, the constitution provided

guidelines for work and social insurance and the protec
tion of basic family values.

It granted national minori

ties equal status with Czechs and Slovaks and guaranteed
freedoms for their cultural development through public
support.

The Constitution of the First Republic also

promised an autonomous administration of Ruthenia which
came to realization only in 1938 (Anderle 98).

Czechoslovakia was designed as a parliamentary de-
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mocracy which incorporated a bicameral National Assembly,
an executive branch and a presidency.

The National As

sembly had superior power in legislative issues, exercis

ing formal control of the executive branch and judiciary.
It elected the President who served as a head of state

and shared executive powers with considerable limita
tions.

The National Assembly approved the President's

appointment of the government and had measures available
for impeachment and a vote of no confidence built into
its constitutional authority. 1s

The local administration of Czechoslovakia was

highly centralized.

The territories from which the new

state was formed had been administered by various codes
of law under the Habsburg monarchy.

The provincial con

stituent bodies of the Czech lands were reorganized and,

along with Slovakia and Ruthenia, divided into self
administering counties.

By 1927, however, the provincial

parliaments and governments of the Czech lands were rees
tablished and expanded to Slovakia and Ruthenia due to
the preferences of local interests, especially Slovak

interests and the lack of compliance in implementing the

county based structure.
15

The provisional governments were

Anderle 98-99; Incidentally, neither measure had
ever been used in the history of the First Republic.

limited to adjusting laws and regulations of the central
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government and local conditions (99-100).

A number of circumstances accompanied the establish

ment of Czechoslovakia.

The territories of Czechia and

Slovakia were in a perilous economic situation as a re

sult of the war and post-war periods.

Various cleavages

in the social composition of the state presented them
selves as a result.
revolution.

Bolshevik antagonists threatened

Work days lasted up to thirteen hours, and

over half a million Czech peasants owned less land than

three noble families.

Two thirds of industry was owned

by German and Hungarian entrepreneurs and bankers.

Wages

were some 60 percent below the pre-war level while food
stuffs were twenty times higher.

Industry was going

through a period of post-war transition, 'and inflation
rose with unemployment.

Each aspect had near devastating

consequences for both peasants and workers, but the gov
ernment addressed the problems with radical social and
economic reforms from the onset in order to divert atten
tion away from desperate alternatives (95-97).
Land reform was enacted in April 1919 with roughly
32 percent of all land being distributed among the peas
ants over a ten year period.

Large estates were limited

to 250 hectares on a just basis of reimbursing the es
tates by the sale of land and providing government cred
its to the peasantry.

Commerce and industry were also

reorganized. Workers gained great strides in protective

welfare and education.
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Many public utilities were na

tionalized and dominant foreign ownership of companies
and institutions was relinquished.

Strict laws on monop

oly were enacted, and inflation was brought under con
trol.

Each aspect of the government's efficacy enhanced

the citizenry's allegiance to the new state (95-98).

The ethnic problems of the newly established state
paled in comparison to the social and economic difficul
ties of the time. Nevertheless, they remained a primary
factor and underlying element of threat to Czechoslova
kia's overall stability.

Czechoslovakia consisted of

more than six different ethnic identities.

Its borders

had been carved to encompass territories populated by
Germans (3.1 million), Hungarians (750,000) and white
Russians (500,000). The territories of Czechia and Slo
vakia consisted of endogenous populations of Roma (under
250,000), Jews (180,000 claimed identity), some Poles in
Silecia, just over six million Czechs and just under
three million Slovaks.

Czechia had been restored to the

historical perimeters of the Czech Crownlands, the crest
of the surrounding Bohemian Massif and Bohemian-Moravian
Uplands (Paul 100).

Slovakia, having never been an inde

pendent administrative unit, was carved from Hungarian
regions to the north and south of the Danube and Ipel
rivers.

Slovaks inhabited the northern mountainous re-

gions while Magyars inhabited the great plain stretching
immediately south from the river beds.
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Ruthenia was also

ceded to Czechoslovakia from Hungary along with its siz
able Magyar population (Anderle 91-93).

The First Republic is recognized as having a consid

erable amount of stability based on its constitutional
framework and balanced social and political system

(Anderle 101), despite the social and economic difficul
ties with which it was afflicted from the outset.

A

strong state structure brought two independent nations

together and provided a strong institutional and politi

cal system for the purpose of their common government.

But the divergent political cultures and national aims of

Czechs and Slovaks clearly tempered the nature of their
mutual political relations and the attempted consolida
tion of a deeper sense of shared national identity, espe
cially when real political influences emerged at the
international level and political union was challenged by
nationalist sentiments.

In particular however, Slovaks

had all along desired greater administrative autonomy
within the political union, an interest that was afforded
little attention.

It is within this context that the

most basic concerns are posited regarding the propensity
for Czechoslovak dissolution and stability generally.
Czech and Slovak aims were dependent on their abil
ity to work together (102).

Czechs needed Slovaks in

order to offset the population imbalance between Czechs

and Germans.
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Slovaks needed the strengths of Czechs to

offset threats of possible Hungarian revisionism of the

peace settlement.

Yet Czech and Slovak aims were often

at odds with one another, primarily over the definition
of their political relationship in terms of the Czech,

Slovak and Czechoslovak conceptions of national associa
tion and political organization within the new state.
Czechs and Slovaks were forced to address the Czechoslo
vak conception more seriously as a result of being placed
within common political borders, and this required a

significant amount of negotiation, cooperation and com
promise at various levels of social and political life.
Within this web of conflict resolution, however, Slovaks,
in particular, often carried the real burden of compro
mise because of their conservative political culture and
desire for increased administrative autonomy in relation
ship to trends toward cohesive Czechoslovakism.
Slovaks generally rebuked Czechoslovakism conceptu
ally simply because of its centralizing elements and
threats to their narrower sense of national allegiance.
This, of course, contrasted with the more cosmopolitan
Czechs and their progressive interests regarding a
strong, unified state.

Czech cosmopolitanism set the

agenda precisely because of its progressive nature and
preponderance of influence in political structures, while
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protect their identity and interests from enculturation
and intrusion.

Additionally, while the political system

possessed some of the resources necessary for conflict

resolution, it relied heavily on an inter-elite coopera
tion and particularly the satisfaction of individual

national aims, two aspects of Czechoslovak political
culture that were often at odds with one another (102).
Just about every conceivable ethnic, religious, and

socio-economic interest was represented by party affilia
tion in Czechoslovakia.

More often than not, each seg

ment was represented along distinct national lines (Leff

1988, 54-59), and segments often overlapped each other as

well (48-58).

More than thirty parties (Anderle 101) and

some accounts of fifty were represented in the First

Republic with an average of fifteen parties being repre
sented in the republic's first four elections (Leff 1988,
48).

Unlike its neighbors who experienced major impasses

due to the overabundance of party participation, Czecho
slovakia managed this seemingly chaotic situation with a
very strong party and elite core based on the precepts of
Czechoslovakism which permeated every aspect of politics,
government and society and maintained leadership through
consensus government for the duration of the republic's
existence (48).

Parties were generally too small to gain

an overwhelming majority by themselves, and only a little

more than twelve were able to gain enough electoral sup-

port for parliamentary representation (Anderle 103).
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The

centrist Czech People's Party, the rightist Agrarians and

National Democrats, the leftist Czech National Socialists
and Social Democrats, all known together as the Petka, or
party of five, provided the basis of coalition government

for the duration of the republic by example of their
cooperative efforts (100-03; Leff 1988, 59).
Coalition governments and the interrelations of

elites, bridging the economic, religious, ethnic and
regional cleavages, served as the basis of stability.

Rational moderation is also often cited as one of the

foremost characteristics of the Czechoslovak elite and

populace which enhanced the maintenance of cooperation
among such diverse interests.

Various individuals of

Czech, Slovak and German origin such as the conservative
Czech Agrarian Antonin Svehla; Father Jan Sramek of the

Czech People's Party; Socialist leaders Vlastimil Tusar,
Rudolpf Bechyne and Vaclav Klofac; Slovak Agrarians Milan
Hodza and Vavro Strobar; Social Democrat Ivan Derer; and

German Agrarian Franz Spina, Social Democrat Ludwig Czech

and Christian Socialist Erwin Zauicek are acknowledged
for encouraging and maintaining the basis of non
emotional cooperation and the promotion of the Czechoslo
vak ideal (Anderle 104).

Masaryk, however, is the person with whom most peo-
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ple associate the nature of elite interrelations and the

maintenance of stability within Czechoslovakia's other
wise volatile political environment.

He defined the

presidency as a powerful factor of Czechoslovak govern

ment beyond its constitutional provisions and used his

authority to temper the various divisions of Czechoslovak
society.

Masaryk had a rapport with the people that

defined him as the essence of the state.

Being of high

moral principle and moderately inclined toward democratic
socialism, there is little doubt that Masaryk's idealism
and his commitment to preserving the state was a basis

for its very legitimacy and authority (105; Anderle 10006; Leff 1988, 61).
The significance of the political system and its
elite, however, must, again, take into account the basis
of various national interests and the extent of their
commitment to the Czechoslovak ideal, an ideal that was
ambiguous and often at odds with the individual national
goals, as previously stated.

While the constitution

provided for the welfare of indigenous nationalities and
was obliged to tolerate national goals, for the sake of
its legitimacy and authority, especially the legitimacy
of democracy (Leff 1988, 65), the fact remains that as
similating practices toward a Czechoslovak national iden
tity were a part of the core elite's agenda (68 and 148).

The dominant personalities deemed it necessary for the
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sake of maintaining the stability of the state to place

limits on nationalist questions of self-determination and
self-administration.

The centralist structure of Czecho

slovakia's government and the influence of the core po

litical framework are basic reflections of this integra

tive goal.

The other more telling aspect is the nature

of the core parties and the elite, each of which took
moderate to favorable approaches to the Czechoslovak

question.

As a consequence, questions of independent

nationalist goals and their role within the state order

were neglected in certain respects for fear of prolifer

ating and polarizing the nationalist distinctions.

Ironically, the very efforts for preventing this occur
rence would lead to resistance movements of both moderate
and extremist proportions (68).
Regardless of the considerable strides forward in
the socio-economic and cultural welfare of the various
national identities as a result of core party and elite
efforts for parity among nationalities, the national
goals of Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians and Slovaks were
never entirely satisfied, and their political cultures
were never properly conditioned for the motives of accel

erated assimilation along the lines of Czechoslovakism.
Mutual frustrations between national identities increased
over the years as a consequence, and the Czechoslovak

ideal was insufficiently strong to withstand these pres-

sures.
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In particular, Germans and Slovaks evidenced

increasing resistance toward the assimilatory affects so

intrinsic to the centralist governmental structure and
its Czechoslav core elite in Prague.

The Slovak Peoples Party was the first to oppose the

Czechoslovak idea, primarily the centralist structure of
the First Republic (Felak 139).

Lead by Father Andrej

Blinka, a prominent advocate of nationalism in pre-war
Hungary (140) and followed by a large proportion of the
Slovak Catholics and Protestants known as ludaks (meaning
nationalists in Slovak), the party demanded Slovak self

determination and autonomy within the Czechoslovak state.
A party resolution presented in parliament in 1922 em

phatically stated that,
The Slovak people have never formed a nation
with the Czech people, they do not form one now
and do not want to form one. Instead they want
to live as their own people with their own lan
guage, in their own land, with the right of
self-administration and autonomy, to be sure,
within the framework of the Czecho-Slovak Re
public (142).
The ludaks based their claims for autonomy on the
rights of self-determination entitled to them as a sepa
rate nation.

They argued that autonomy would remove the

major impediment to good relations between Czechs and
Slovaks and thus help to consolidate the republic.

They
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also looked to their interpretation of the Pittsburgh
Agreement for justification.

Ludaks strove for legislative autonomy.

They de

manded a separate diet elected by Slovaks for the purpose

of passing laws that pertained to Slovaks, including laws
on administration, education, trade, agriculture, jus
tice, public works and the finance of these spheres
(142); all of this while the party leadership extolled

the virtues of the new state and maintained its alle
giance.

Propositions for Slovak autonomy even had provi

sions for the Czechoslovak President's appointment of a
Slovak government and veto power over its legislature,

requiring a two-thirds majority vote in the Slovak legis
lature to override that veto.

Ludak proposals also made

provisions for matters of statewide concern such as the

military, foreign policy and international trade.

The

Slovak legislature would have a two-thirds majority veto
power over such matters.

While subsequent ludak propos

als for autonomy differed in detail, they all contained
the principle of legislative autonomy for Slovakia.

No

autonomy proposals were considered by the National Assem
bly until 1938 (142), and this was also too little too
late in the scheme of consolidating interests.
Much of ludak disenchantment was based on Prague's
alleged cultural and economic discrimination, the imposi
tion of the Czech language in Slovak schools and the

stationing of Czech soldiers on Slovak soil (140).

As a
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result of its inability to compete with Czech industrial

technology, Slovakia was de-industrialized in the 1920s
(139), and its treasured religious institutions were

often treated with irreverence by scores of Czech profes
sionals and tradesmen filling the Slovak vacuum of
skilled personnel (139).

Nonetheless, ludaks never wa

vered from their formal support of the Czechoslovak state
until the critical days of 1939.

Ludaks, like most Slo

vaks, generally realized the significance of maintaining
strong relations with Czechs for their own national in
terests (143-44).

In a similar, yet contrasting vein, the Slovak
Agrarians, another moderately conservative faction of
society, had joined ranks with the Czechoslovak Agrarian
Party in 1922 and officially supported the idea of a
Czechoslovak nation and a unitary state.

With the lead

ership of Milan Hodza, the Slovak Agrarians approached
the Czechoslovak ideal with considerable support by cit
ing the merits of reaching a higher unit of Czechoslovak
nationality (145).

Yet their conviction in this regard,

like most cases, was vague, confusing, contradictory and
considerably distanced from the more radical Czechoslo
vakism of the Slovak branch of the Social Democratic
Party (145).

Slovak Agrarian views on the issue of na

tional self-administration sought a middle ground between

the ludak autonomism and strict centralism (145).

They
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advocated the administrative decentralization of the
state, but not legislative autonomy.

They were regional

ists and strong advocates of the county-based system of
local government.

They also supported the institution of

various social, political and economic organizations that
would address Slovakia's specific interests in an extra
constitutional form and redress them with Prague (147).
In fact, the Slovak Agrarians, especially under Hodza's
encouragement, advocated a principle of "Slovak coopera
tion" among all parties in Slovakia for the purpose of

assuring Slovak interests overall, especially with regard
to labor, land reform, educational development and tax
reform.

This concept was also intended to temper the

more extremist factions of Slovak politics, including the
Slovak People's Party and the socialists (147).
As a result of the growing discontent throughout
Slovak society, in 1925 the Slovak People's Party com
manded the largest following in Slovakia with 34.3 per
cent of the vote, twice as much as its nearest rival
(142).

The ludaks joined the government in 1927 and

moved to replace the county-based administrative organi
zation of the state with provincial status for Slovakia,
Bohemia, Moravia-Silecia and Ruthenia (148).

The ludaks

had attempted to find common ground with the Slovak
Agrarians and other Czechoslav parties from that point
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and again in the 1930s, but in light of rising radicalism
within its own ranks, they failed to agree on issues

basic to national identification and self-determination;

in other words, a political formula for mutual relations
(147-50).

The ludaks became increasingly hostile toward

Prague beginning in the autumn of 1936, and by 1938 they

intensified their autonomist demands, demands that Prague

could ill-afford to address in light of the German ques
tion.
Succession, the Third Republic and Communism:
Moving Towards Independence and Federalism
Amid a souring economy in the 1930s, nationalist
radicalism intensified in Czechoslovakia, despite the
government's success in maintaining the state's social
welfare under such circumstances (Anderle 108).

In par

ticular, Sudeten German nationalist sentiments were

stirred and intensified under the leadership of Konrad
Henlein and the coercive measures of Nazi propaganda from
Germany.

Sudeten separatism most severely threatened

Czechoslovakia's political stability and her territorial
integrity, a threat which Czechs had feared from the
Germans since the beginning of their efforts toward
autonomy in the nineteenth century.

With the Allied

powers reluctant to defend the territorial integrity of

Czechoslovakia and forces pulling at the nationalist
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threads of contention, the First Republic was transformed
from the only respectable democracy in Central Europe to

a dissolved and occupied set of fascist protectorates, to
a restored democracy and, finally, to a Soviet satellite
state within a short ten year period.

Moreover, nation

alist struggles were the substantive cause of this trans
mutation through which Czech and Slovak contentions them
selves became even more elevated to a level not previ
ously experienced.

As a result of the World War II expe

rience, Jews had been virtually exterminated from Czecho
slovakia along with large populations of Roma.

Almost

all Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia after the

war, and the Slovaks, in a state of contrasting scourge
and self-satisfaction, had elevated themselves to inde
pendence, a status that affected future relations with

Czechs in a restored, yet dramatically changed Czechoslo
vak state known as the Third Republic.

Slovak national

ism and its claims for greater autonomy continually per
sisted from that point forward, even pervading the commu
nist dictatorship of the state, an effort which the Com
munist Party of Czechoslovakia, by all intents and pur

poses, most emphatically attempted to prevent, yet to no

avail.
The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938 ceded all
territories of Czechoslovakia in which the German popula
tion exceeded fifty percent to the German Third Reich

(Taborsky 114-15).

94

Slovak separation was induced by

Hitler's contingency plans following the Munich dictat in
order to smash the Czech state and bring it completely
under German control.

With the Slovak People's Party

leading the pact and Slovak Agrarians coming into the
fold, Slovaks declared independence on March 14, 1939,
and the invasion of the remaining Czech lands followed
the next day (118).

Czechoslovakia was completely dis

solved as Czechia was incorporated with the Third Reich
under NThe Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia," and

Slovakia became a "protected state" of German tutelage.

Ruthenia was once again ceded to Hungary (119).

While Czechs were full of sorrow about the events,
Slovaks were generally optimistic about their prospects
(126-27).

In certain respects, they were relieved to

have escaped from direct control of the Third Reich.

For

the first time, Slovaks had an opportunity at state
building and a sense of achievement with regard to their
nationalist goals (Leff 1988, 89), but the fact remains
that Slovakia was shaped for Germany's interests and not
Slovakia's interests (Taborsky 127).

Authoritarian

structures were established in Slovakia and directed from
Berlin.

Naturally, relations between Czechs and Slovaks

changed drastically as each was cut off from the other,
the only exception being the limited communication links
between often diametrically opposed exiles in London,
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Paris and Moscow (Leff 1988, 87). The euphoria died

quickly, however, as Slovaks realized that they would not

escape the oppressive measures of Hitler, and resistance

movements ensued which in itself adds an ironic twist to
Slovakia's sense of pride from the World War II experi

ence of independence; Slovaks had proven to themselves
what they could do as a nation.

Of course this has a

dualistic and contradictory meaning between the separa
tists elements of Slovak society and those who resisted
the Tiso regime (Taborsky 127;

Leff 1988, 90-91).

Nev

ertheless, what remained from the experience is a more

acute sense of Slovak identity apart from the Czechs from

whichever perspective one chooses - secessionist or lib
erationist.

The need for mutual growth between Czechs

and Slovaks had been tragically interrupted at a very
crucial time in Czechoslovak history, a time when Czechs

and Slovaks needed to grow together as one nation, not as

separate nation's and at one another's expense.

On March 11, 1945, Benes returned to a restored
Czechoslovakia, but the circumstances of the state proved
to be nothing of the sort that they had been prior to
1938.

The degree of continuity between Czechs and Slo

vaks had been severely curtailed by limited communication
and dislocations throughout the war, not to mention that
the memory that Slovaks had abandoned the Czechs during a
vital time of national distress.

The nurtured coopera-

tion and assimilating effects between Czechs and Slovaks
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before the war had been broken by external events as

authoritarianism established itself and destroyed the

fragile association (Leff 1988, 96 and 215-17).

Czecho

slovakia would again have to be restructured politically,
economically, socially and in terms of international
relations in order to address the new circumstances of
the post-war era (86).

One aspect of this restructuring was a commitment

for administrative decentralization for the Slovaks, and

the need to balance an ever growing communist encroach

ment in the restored political and institutional struc
tures of Czechoslovak democracy (89).

There was opportu

nity to rectify the perceived injustices of the past and
begin to build an equitable relationship for the future.
The Slovak liberationists had established their own Na
tional Council already in 1943, a body which served as

the legislative agent of Slovak affairs and the basis for
claims toward symmetric federalism. (91-96).

The Agrari

ans, Small Tradesmen, National Democrats and the Slovak

People's Party were all prohibited in the post-war Third

Republic, and Czechoslovakia's balanced political system,
core party and elite slanted towards Czechoslovakism, had
suffered severe blows as a result of the occupation
forces and these subsequent developments of the post-war
period (94-95).

The exclusion of nationalist German and

Slovak collaborationist parties in a provisional govern-
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ment effort to control the political climate of the coun
try in effect limited Czechoslovakia's parties to the

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the National Socialist
Party, the Czechoslovak People's Party, the Social Demo

crats of Czechia, the Communist Party of Slovakia and the
Slovak Democratic Party (Wolchik 1991, 18).

The Slovak

Democratic party had consolidated power for itself in

Slovakia and became tightly pitted against the communists
(95).

There was little sound basis for coalition build

ing with this combination of.political interests, espe

cially as Thermidorian communism became effectuated (Leff
1988, 95).

Czechoslovakia's liberation from the Germans by the
Allied American forces in the west and the Soviet forces
from the east definitively determined Czechoslovakia's
future and the future of regional and international poli
tics for the remaining twentieth century.

The demarca

tion lines established by u.s.-soviet agreement defined
spheres of influence which ultimately included the Third
Republic in the Soviet sphere (Taborsky 126-29).

As a

result of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Agreement of 1944,
Czechoslovakia's borders were restored.

Ruthenia had

been annexed to the Soviet Union by a sort of forceful
military diplomacy, and the communization of Czechoslova
kia began as communist sympathizers infiltrated local

governments, the police and the leadership of labor un

ions, not to mention the military under the leadership of

General Svoboda (129-30).

By February 1948, after an

unsuccessful attempt to win control of government demo
cratically, the communists ascended to control of the
government in Czechoslovakia by way of coup d' etat

whence democracy and prospects for the development of a

truly democratic relationship between Czechs and Slovaks,
as it was known in the Third Republic, came to a halt.
Being founded in 1922 as a runoff of the social
democratic movement, the Communist Party of Czechoslova
kia pursued successively a variety of approaches to the

issue of national identities and Slovak autonomy within
the First Republic (Felak 152).

Until 1924, the Commu

nist Party of Czechoslovakia adhered to the idea that
Czechs and Slovaks constituted a single nation, and they
were opposed to Slovak autonomy.

The party espoused the

idea that autonomy was purely an effort to prevent na
tional unification with the Czechs as well as to prevent
the elevation of Slovaks from the oppression of histori
cal conditions, particularly the Catholic church (153;
Leff 1988, 218).

According to the communists, national

union with the Czechs was the surest way to improving
Slovakia (Felak 153; refer also to Leff 1988, 218).
The Comintern sharply condemned the nationality
policy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at its Fifth
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International Congress of July 1924.

Party policy began
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to fluctuate on the nationality issue beginning after
1924 as Leninist principles were introduced to party

platforms.

Klement Gottwald, a Slovak communist of Czech

origin who led the bolshevization of the party, proposed
the full independence of Slovakia as part of the commu
nist program, a program which only intended to exploit

the Slovak nationalists for its own purposes - the con
solidation of communist allegiances (Felak 154).

In

actuality, Gottwald cleansed the party of ethnic Slav
"nationalists" and "liquidators" throughout the remaining
1940s and 1950s (Leff 1988, 219 and 229).

Unlike most other parties, the communists were
highly centralized from Prague and not divided along
nationalist lines.

In fact, very few Slovaks had infil

trated the party apparatus in the beginning.

Mostly

Germans, Czechs and Magyars had occupied the leadership
positions and party membership (218).

Slovaks did not

generally associate with the communist concerns of socio
economics and class contention especially in earlier
times.

One reason has to do with the fact that Slovaks

were primarily agrarian peasants who had little under

standing of references to proletarianism and the problems
of the urban lifestyle so typical of Central Europe dur
ing the early twentieth century.

They were also gener-

ally threatened by the anti-religious expressions of
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communist ideology (Felak 153).

Claims for the territorial autonomy and federaliza

tion of the state ensued within party ranks, and Gottwald
ascended to the helm of the Czechoslovak party in 1929.
At the Fifth Party Congress in December 1929, the right
to self-determination to the point of separation was
included in party policy (156).

At the Sixth Congress in

March 1931, the party condemned the "opportunistic pas

sivity" of its pre-1929 leadership and supported the

liberation movements of all nationalities until fascist

elements literally threatened the state's dissolution
(156).

In 1937 the Slovak leadership in the party issued

the so-called "Plan for the Economic, Social and Cultural
Empowerment of Slovakia," for the purpose of greater
parity between Czechia and Slovakia and for the purpose
of consolidating the state (157).
Communists in general, however, offered vague, unre
alistic and unpopular approaches to the Slovak question.
Instead, they used the nationalist questions as brokerage

power for garnering support for their efforts toward a

proletarian dictatorship.

As a consequence and against

Comintern wishes, the Slovak communists organized amongst
themselves for the first time in 1939 (Leff 1988, 95).
In �1947 the Slovak communists were brought back into
the fold of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, (95-

100) and a triangular relationship was established be-
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tween Czechs, Slovaks, and purest communists during the

Socialist Republic (230-33).

The organization of the

party was such that a party existed within a party on an
asymmetrical level, the Slovak Communist Party function
ing as a distinct part of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party (99).

And there was no Czech party to balance the

nationalist interests.

Asymmetry was a structural com

promise between Slovak nationhood and Czechoslovak state

hood (103).

It symbolized, as one scholar of the subject

has suggested, enduring but politically unfulfilled na
tional aims (103), and it resonates on earlier discus
sions of societal segmentation and role structures as
outlined in the Introduction.
The party had actually become the "pathway" to

peaceful conflict resolution within the Socialist Repub
lic (103).

It softened relations between Czechs and

Slovaks on a number of contentious issues relating mostly
to culture and economy, in a similar, although less demo
cratic, fashion one might say as the petka and core elite
of the First Republic (103 and 223).

Great strides in

assimilation were also achieved as the focus of govern
ment and party organs was to solidify the state and tem
per nationalism.

While decentralization of the local

governments occurred, in effect making Slovakia three
regions, centralization of the state structures under

those of the party structure provided the basis of a
highly centralized state and party structure {107).
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The

Slovak National Council was slowly transformed into a
state organ in this process (103 and 106).

This cen

tralization of institutions, argued Slovaks in light of
the asymmetrical organization of the party and state,

defended Czech interests and advanced a feeling of Czech
guardianship over the state (123).

Of the 181 ministe

rial appointments from 1948-1967, only forty, or twenty
two percent, went to Slovaks, and the party appointments
were proportionally deficient as well (221-22).

The party apparatus continued to provide a narrow

and quite means of settling problems throughout the

1950s, (106) a period known for its harsh purges, espe
cially those of the Slovak party ranks and the general

population

(109 and 229).

This, in turn, left the Slo

vak Communist Party leadership subordinate to the Czecho
slovak communist leadership (230).
In the 1960s, however, nationalist forces were on
the rise within the party apparatus itself as Czechoslo
vakia began its belated process of de-Stalinization or

decentralization and newer minds began to enter the party
rank and file (109 and 234).

Rehabilitated "bourgeois

nationalists" such as Gustav Husak were brought back into
the limelight in 1962 (109), and Alexander Dubcek became
the first secretary of the Slovak communists after his

rehabilitation (110 and

234).

While no wholesale trans-
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formation of the party occurred, the media and Slovak

intellectual community were provided opportunity to re
kindle nationalist feelings.

By 1963, throughout several

years of quieted debate, the conception of federalism

reemerged as an effort to solve the reoccurring tumult of
Slovak autonomy that even communist mechanics could not

suppress (111-12 and 120).
From 1964 on, the Slovak National Council regained
some of its position.

Debate intensified on the issue in

1967 when the treatment of Slovakia emerged as only one
among many grievances made against the regime.

The No

votny leadership, the Slovak party elite and the Slovak
intelligentsia then collapsed into a consensus position
(234-35).

Only at the height of the Prague Spring in

1968, was the federalization of Czechoslovakia put for
ward and approved by the party and government organs.
Parity was granted to federal committees, the constitu
tional courts and structural and procedural elements of
the National Assembly.

The ministerial and governmental

appointments remained under simple majority rule (127).
Federalism was put into effect on January 1, 1969,

leaving Czechoslovakia as the only communist state in the
Soviet fold, outside of the formal structure of the So
viet Union itself and Yugoslavia, to be a federation of
nationalities.

Slovaks had finally achieved a degree of

the structural parity they had sought since the estab-

lishment of the state in 1918.
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The extent to which fed

eration truly addressed the problems facing Czechoslova
kia nevertheless, particularly political relations be

tween Czechs and Slovaks and Slovak satisfaction with the
newly achieved status, bears heavily on the context of

federalism's implementation.

This is a matter for con

sideration in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III
FEDERALISM:

THE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR A
BIFURCATED SOCIETY?

The Progression of Political Relations
The "Czechoslovak" concept is indeed complex both in
terms of nationhood and statehood.

In terms of national

identity, the description provided in Chapter II has
established that the national identities of Czechs and
Slovaks have been affected and shaped by various stimuli

and with often dramatic effects for their mutual rela
tions.

Czechs and Slovaks had grown together as they

pursued a sense of self-realization beginning with the
national revival of the mid-nineteenth century, but more
importantly, as we have seen, their growth has diverged
in numerous ways over the course of time.

Not only have

Czechs and Slovaks begun their mutual political relation
ship on an uneven plateau, their interests within the
initial stages of that relationship diverged when the
political equation failed to meet the demands for a par
ity of national interests.

Despite mutual growth between

Czechs and Slovaks over the course of some seventy years
of shared history, the development of events did not

translate into sufficient cohesion between Czechs and
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Slovaks and their interests.

Rather, divergent growth
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has persisted and Czechs and Slovaks have grown apart.

The context and Basis of Federalism
As a point of context for the consolidation of fed

eralism, the period of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia
culminated in 1968 with a fundamental change of the

strongly centralized system, including the democratiza
tion of authority, introducing the protection of civil
liberties, reexamining judicial malpractice from the
past, guaranteeing justice for the future and finding an
equitable relationship between Czechs and Slovaks.

The

Prague Spring reforms also sought to institute a decen

tralized economic planing apparatus with aspects of mar

ket socialism (Paul 63 and 79-84; see also Wolchik 1991,
27-35).
Nevertheless, Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslo
vakia in August of 1968 in order to abate the threats
which such reforms presented to Soviet hegemony (Wolchik
1991, 34).

By April 1969, Alexander Dubcek was replaced

as head of the Czechoslovak communist party and govern

ment by the rehabilitated Slovak nationalist Gustav
Husak, and the following period of Czechoslovak history,
until the later-1980s, is known as the period of
"normalization".
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The Husak regime reasserted the strongly centralized

government and ultra-conservative role of the communist

party during this period, and it purged the party of

reformist "counter-revolutionaries" (Paul 84-90; Wolchik
1991, 36).

In fact, the party experienced its second

largest purge from January 1969 to December 1970 as more

than twenty-five percent of its members were expelled for
their involvement in the events leading up to 1968 (Paul
70).

Of the Czech members in particular, some twenty

five percent were expelled because of their alleged lib
eral tendencies during the Prague Spring.

Normalization

re-imposed censorship and restrictions on freedom of

expression, and it changed the political formula, revers
ing all reforms except federalism (Paul 64; Wolchik 1991,
36-37).

Nevertheless, while federalism remained the only

reform of the Prague Spring to survive the Soviet led
intervention of 1968, it did not escape unchanged.
The party began to emphasize class relations over
national concerns once again in 1970 (Leff 1988, 247).
In 1971, the socialist constitution of 1960 was amended
in order to curtail the 1968 federalization amendment and
clarify ambiguity over the central government's role in

the affairs of governing, especially concerning the econ
omy (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 62; Leff 1988, 243-44).
Certain Slovak ministries such as planning, transporta
tion and telecommunications were abolished or reorgan-

ized, and their jurisdictions were transferred to the

federal arena.
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Dual citizenship was abolished and re

gional committees were reestablished, signifying the

decentralization of republic power, once again, as in the
pre-August 1968 period of the socialist republic (Leff
1988, 247-48).

The Egyitable Solytion
The nature of events in late 1968, and the two years
of political recentralization which follow, prevented any

clear realization of federalism until the early 1970s
(Wolchik 1991, 63; Leff 1988, 247).

ever,

It is clear, how

that after the reforms settled, federalism in

Czechoslovakia provided less autonomy and power to its
republics than did Yugoslavian federalism, yet it cer
tainly provided more autonomy in determining social,

educational and cultural issues than the Soviet form of
federalism (Wolchik 1991, 63).

This formula, in its

final version, fell short of Slovak wishes for an equita
ble solution.

In the most formal sense, the central government of

Czechoslovak federalism was comprised of a bicameral

Federal Assembly, a president and a government cabinet
composed of a premier, vice-premiers and ministers of the
various governmental departments.

The central government

controlled foreign affairs, defense, currency, the pro-
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tection of the constitution, federal legislation and the

administration (Paul 64; Wolchik 1991, 64 and 69).

The

National Assembly, holding formal sovereignty, consisted
of a 200 member Chamber of the People and a 150 member

Chamber of Nationalities (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 64 and
69).

The former was elected from districts composed of

proportional populations and the latter consisted of
equal representation from Czechs and Slovaks.

The Fed

eral Assembly was required to meet at least twice a year.
In the interim, the powers of the assembly were vested
with a forty member presidium for each chamber (Wolchik
1991, 69).

Parliamentary committees were also attached

to each chamber of the Federal Assembly (69).

The assem

bly elected the republic's president who served as the
ceremonial executive and head of state.

The president

appointed the government cabinet for the oversight of
administrative policies of the federal state and the

republics (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991, 65 and 69).
The republic governments of the Czech lands and
Slovakia paralleled the federal level structure, with the

exception of the presidency.

A unicameral 200 member

Czech National Council and the long established 150 mem
ber Slovak National Council were the highest government
organs in the respective republics (Wolchik 1991, 73).
The executive functions were fulfilled by elected na
tional councils instead of a president, and each council

consisted of a prime minister and deputy prime minister
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who supervised the republic-level ministries (Paul 66;

Wolchik 1991, 73).

The republics had jurisdiction over

education, culture, justice, health, trade, construction,
and forest and water resources.

They shared some control

with the central government over such areas as industry

and agriculture, but republic powers were extensively
curtailed by the 1971 amendment (Paul 65; Wolchik 1991,
73).

Most important, nonetheless, is the fact that the

federal government had the authority to override all

republic-level laws, and it had superior responsibility
for economic affairs (Wolchik 1991, 74).

The local level of government was organized by re
gional, district and local national councils consisting
of directly elected representatives.

Councils served as

a sort of town council with jurisdiction over local af

fairs such as utilities, public health, local enterprise
and construction codes.

They also had the responsibility

for implementing laws and policy of higher governmental
and party directives, and most importantly, once again,
they had little autonomy unto themselves (Paul 66; Wol
chik 1991, 75-76).

Even more importantly and resembling more accurately
the reality of government in Czechoslovakia, however, the
executive branch of the government, along with the top
branches of the communist party, played the most impor-
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tant role in state government, despite the legislature's
formal superiority (Wolchik 1991, 70 and 83).

As with

all Soviet style socialist republics, the communist party
apparatus was the real broker of power in Czechoslovak
government and society.

It's members permeated every

level and aspect of each (Paul 70).

The state structure

served merely as a rubber stamp for decisions made first
through the party apparatus (70).
The supreme power of the party rested formally with
the Congress of People and the Central Committee, a body
elected by the congress for the purpose of assuming the
authority of the congress during its recess.

The party

congress met every five years while the Central Committee
met every month for the purpose of reviewing executive
decisions of the party in a purely formal manner (Wolchik

1991, 84).

Real power resided in the executive organs of

the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia.

Being comprised of roughly thirteen

to eighteen members at any given time, the Presidium was
the supreme policy-making body of the party and the
state, serving in a similar capacity as the Politburo of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Secretariat

served as the administrative organ of the party.

Elected

by the Central Committee in theory, the organ consisted
of six secretaries and seven members, including the First
Secretary, who were responsible for carrying out Presid-

ium policies, directing the operation of the Central
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Committee departments and supervising the day-to-day

operations of local levels of the party organization
(85).

Incidentally, and paralleling the Soviet Union's

pattern, the number of party members in 1988 totaled
1,717,000 or approximately eleven percent of the popula
tion, the second largest enrollment after November 1948,
and quite a limited number of the population considering
the extensive influence it had in society (89).

The Faults of Federalism
There is considerable evidence to indicate that
conceptually the federal solution fell short of its in
tended purpose could not provide a full resolution to
outstanding Czech and Slovak grievances (Leff 1988, 243).
Primarily, there is reason to doubt that federalism pro
vided the Slovaks with the influence that they had
clearly desired from it, especially after 1970, because
the degree of Slovak access to the decision making proc
ess remained questionable (245).

Moreover, the federal

arrangement was flawed by two major loopholes or weak
nesses, and the party's role in government raises an even
greater impediment for federalism's intended purpose,
providing structural parity between Czechs and Slovaks in
terms of an equitably institutionalized government.
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Firstly, the parity principle existed only in the

composition of the constitutional courts and national
legislature, the two weakest bodies of the communist
system of government.

Secondly, the federal ministries

were guided by the majority principle, a point which
bears a crucial relationship to the essence of consocia

tionalism (245).

The fact of the matter is that Slovaks

were a permanent minority in the Czechoslovak state,

constituting one-third of the state's total population.
Between 1969 and 1983, one-third of all ministerial posi
tions were, in fact, occupied by Slovaks.

Slovaks con

stituted roughly 40 percent of any given cabinet, well in
tune with their proportion of the population (253, 248
and 251; Paul 128).

Slovaks, however, wanted structural

parity with their Czech counterparts, not proportional
representation in the traditional sense of the term.

In

this case, Slovaks would maintain fifty percent of the
power of the state and raise themselves from their inher
ent status as a minority.
Additionally, the real power broker of government
and the administration of state affairs, the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia, remained asymmetrical and uni
tary, as explained in the previous chapter, even after
federalization.

Despite the existence of informal parity

between Czechs and Slovaks within the party's elite
ranks, and considering the role of the party within the

governing arrangement, party asymmetry prevented any
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sense of real and secure parity - defined in terms of
equality (or even proportionality) within the party appa
ratus as well - between Czechs and Slovaks.

Dispropor

tional federalism and party asymmetry simply failed to
provide a durable framework for beneficial relations

between Czechs and Slovaks.
There was an attempt to federalize the party struc
ture in 1968 with the proposition that a Czech communist
party parallel the Communist Party of Slovakia; the idea
being that Czech and Slovak republic parties could veto
the federal Central Committee in certain instances where
national interests were at stake.

This concept failed,

however, due to Soviet fears of Czech tendencies, in
particular, toward the liberal reforms of the Prague
Spring era.

Simply put, Soviet authorities feared the

divergence of relations which such an arrangement posed.
Instead, the central party organs doubled as Czech or
gans, preventing further bifurcation, and the Communist
Party of Slovakia remained preempted by the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia for the duration of the socialist
republic (Leff 1988, 245-46).
Providing some substantive altercation to the situa
tion, in short, some people argued that this asymmetry in
the unitary party was an impediment to federalism's
proper functioning, reducing Slovak autonomy to

•declaratory significance•.

Others viewed the Slovak
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party's semi-independence as advantageous to the Slovaks

for the reason that they had a privileged sort of organ
ized lobbying power.

And others argued that the asymme

try guaranteed bilateral negotiation (246-47).
all, however, as we shall see in Chapter

Most of

v, federalism

was not the only and probably not the best alternative

for Czechoslovakia considering the bifurcated nature of
its society and the historical antagonisms associated
with it; it was, nonetheless, a natural development in

the progression of political relations between Czechs and
Slovaks as a result of historical conditioning.

Later

(Chapter V), it will be argued that while federalism may
serve as a measure conducive to stability in plural soci
ety by dividing society into component parts, in a bifur
cated society, the equation may lend itself to increased
levels of polarization with a basis of confrontation
rather than consensus building.
The Diminishing Role for Slovak Nationalist Sentiment and
the Rise of Political Dissent
Despite increased Slovak participation in the party
elite ranks after the post-1968 purges (261), there was
always the threat that Slovak representation could erode
during the period of normalization and diminish Slova
kia's influence within the establishment, especially as
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party ideology constrained nationalist expressionism and

more and more Slovaks found themselves alienated from the
party (Wolchik 1991, 36; Leff 1988, 245 and 260).

There

is little doubt that class concerns overshadowed national

concerns when it came to party policy (Leff 1988, 247).

The centripetal objectives of the party demanded a coher
ency in policy planning and the suppression of factional

tendencies which offset any threats of nationalism within
the formal structures of society and government (248).
Party policy held that the "struggle against bourgeois
and petit bourgeois nationalism would persist until the
definitive defeat of nationalism" (272).

Slovaks in

general, therefore, found little security for their na

tional interests within the political arrangement of the

state's federal structure as it existed under the commu
nists, and they found little opportunity to vent their
sentiments as well (249 and 253).
There were two camps within the communist party
organs.

They were based on ideological differences -

conservative and ultra-conservative - and on national
differences as well as might be expected with the asym

metrical arrangement; but the national forces were, none
theless, tempered by their commitment to party ideology.
The tripartite nature of the party structure, as in the
pre-reform period of the mid-1960s, was virtually non
existent during the period of normalization (259-60;

Wolchik 1991, 129-30).

Educational development for the
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party ranks occurred in separate channels according to

national, regional affiliation, producing elites at the
statewide level that were inevitably accustomed to inter
preting events from national perspectives (Leff 1988,
260).

Nevertheless, while the party Presidium was also

ideologically polarized by the late 1970s and especially

in the mid-1980s (255; Wolchik 1991, 129-30), party ranks
managed to transcend these lines of national divisiveness
(Leff 1988, 260-61).

In fact, the divisions of party

ranks were cross-sectional (257).

With party policy

determined to defeat nationalism (272), communist party
members of both nationalities were immersed in a very
complex interrelationship of interests, the most impor
tant being the preservation of power and the enforcement
of communist policies, not nationalist concerns (260-61;
refer also to Wolchik 1991, 126-37).

The staff of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
also experienced little movement during the period of
normalization, especially in the top echelons of the
party order.

Gustav Husak was challenging the lengthy

tenure of Thomas Masaryk, and the limited amount of turn
over in the highest ranking positions of the party cre

ated a turgidity, the likes of which was not seen in most
other communist states during this era (Leff 1988, 255).
The Communist Party of Slovakia also experienced little

turnover in its upper party ranks.

There was little
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polarization even in the later days of the socialist

republic as Slovak communists kept their ranks more or

derly and thoroughly "cleansed" of nationalist tendencies

than even the Czechoslovak party (253 and 258-61).

Slovak nationalists who had been increasingly ostra

cized from the governing framework, in particular, held
considerable quiet contempt for it.

Many of them were

advocates of confederalism and economic autonomy from the
very onset of the federalist initiatives of the later
1960s.

They were, of course, excluded from the governing

apparatus, and if they dared reveal their true feelings,

they most likely found themselves removed from profes
sional positions of any sort, if not removed entirely
from public participation all together (Wolchik 1991,
155).

The nationalist celebration was indeed drawn to a

close in the 1970s normalization period, and it was pro

vided little opportunity for liberal, democratic expres
sion until the political climate loosened considerably in
the later 1980s (Leff 1988, 261-63).
While Slovak nationalism was very seldom expressed

publicly, the grievances which polarized society during
normalization can be documented in abundance (269).
Czechs perceived Slovaks as advancing their national
interests at the expense of the aborted "socialism with a
human face".

Slovak opportunism and the sudden infusion
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of Slovak influence in the federal political system during normalization created resentment from Czechs.

Czechs

accused Slovaks of profiteering, and Slovaks blamed the

Czechs for their social and economic woes as usual (269Personal enmity surfaced toward Husak from both

71).

Czechs and some Slovaks for abandoning the 1968 reforms.
Czechs, especially, blamed Husak and his conservatism for
their personal problems.

Further, Husak was a Slovak,

and this only fueled negative Czech perceptions of Slo
vaks overall, however well-founded or ill-founded they
may have been.

Apathy and a self-conscious diffidence

developed toward the fraternal conception of the republic
(269-70).

An "us versus them" relationship emerged be

tween Czechs and Slovaks and between party and non-party
affiliates which polarized the federal structure of the

state despite the party's attempts to stem such develop
ments.

In the meantime, both Czechs and Slovaks alike be
came increasingly alienated by the limited political
arrangement generally.

With only eleven percent of the

population represented during a peak time of party mem
bership in the socialist republic, governing became an

exclusionary practice which neglected the sentiments of
the populace at large and with rather destabilizing con
sequences one might add despite the perceived stability
of the regime.

Despite the party elite's stability, and

120
as a direct result of the party's firm if narrow grip on

power, two distinct counter-elite movements emerged along

national lines which challenged the communist regime (261
and 268).

Dissident activists called for Czech and Slo

vak leaders to uphold human rights as stipulated by

Czechoslovakia's obligation to the 1975 Helsinki Accords
(Wolchik 1991, 152-53).

Already by 1977, Czechs and Slovaks turned to such
organized dissident activism as Club 231, The Club of
Engaged Non-Party Persons, and the human rights organiza
tion Charter 77 (Leff 1988, 263; Wolchik 1991, 152).

Charter 77 was primarily a Czech initiative which gained
most of its strength in the Czech lands during its ini
tial stages.

Only eight of the early signatories of

Charter 77 were Slovak, and most of them lived in Prague
(Leff 1988, 263-66; Ulc 28).

Slovak dissent was organ

ized predominantly through religious channels and the
environmental concerns of the officially sanctioned Club
of the Guardians of Nature.
The bi-polarized, counter-elite of Czechoslovak
society remained relatively distinct for the duration of

the communist state, aiding in their own unique ways the

challenging of the legitimacy of the communist (Leff
1988, 268).

With the limited ideological divisions among

party elites, these opposition forces, be they weak,
unofficial and barely organized, were able to fill a sort

of void with respect to the party's internal divisions,
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system inadequacies, and neglect of social concerns
(Wolchik 1991, 151).

A Divergent Economy
Efforts to integrate the two distinct economies of

the Czech lands and Slovakia during various periods

throughout Czechoslovakia's history have been successful
in several respects, but they have been hindered by non
synchronic modernization; they have failed to diminish
the real and perceived differences between Czechs and

Slovaks based on distinct national interests defined in
purely socio-economic terms.

Slovakia's economy emerged from that of the Hungar
ian sphere of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and it re
mained predominantly agricultural until the end of the
Second World War (Klein 1979, 147).

And while Slovakia

emerged from the Austro-Hungarian Empire as the most
industrialized of the Hungarian regions, its capabilities
and productivity were dwarfed by the Czech lands which
served as the industrial sector of the entire empire.

illustrated in the previous chapter, this discrepancy

As

created a difficult situation for Czech and Slovak eco
nomic and political relations within the First Republic,
its shadow remaining half a century later in the post
revolutionary period.
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The more conservative, eastern portion of Czechoslo-

vakia, with its traditional culture, presented difficul

ties for the overall socio-economic modernization of the
state (Wolchik 1991, 186).

One must remember that the

First Republic's integrationist policies concentrated on

educational and cultural development in terms of Czecho
slovakism (Leff 1988, 138 and 141-43).

Economically, the

free market of the First Republic favored continued de
velopment of the more advanced and productive Czech lands
(Paul 103).

Nonetheless, Czechia's economic prosperity

and influence with the new political and economic organi
zation tangibly benefited the eastern portion of the
republic from its very early stages.

Transportation,

communications, education, social and medical services
were advanced considerably in Slovakia by Czech economic
influences and the integrationist policies of the First
Republic.

Despite this, the eastern portion of the state

remained economically stagnate, and at times regression
ary, for a considerable period of time thereafter (103;
Leff 1988, 277).

With 28 percent of the state's popula

tion, Slovakia and Ruthenia produced only 15-18 percent
of the national product (Paul 103).

The nature of this

economic disparity superimposed on the nationalities
problem created the highly politicized situation which
helped fuel the nationalist tensions in the First Repub
lic (Leff

1988,

277; Wolchik 1991, 186).

Marxists argued that the origins of inequality and
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national tensions were in the economic and technological
spheres; industrialization and economic reorganization,

therefore, became the means of rectifying the inequali

ties of Czechoslovak society during the socialist repub
lic.

This, Marxists argued, would bring Czechs and Slo

vaks closer together into a common culture and in line

with the principles of socialist internationalism (Leff
1988, 141-42).

The greatest thrust for economic modernization and
development came with a series of five year plans which
transformed the Czechoslovak economy from a leader in

light industry and services, predominately in the Czech
lands, to an integrated statewide economy based on heavy
industry.

The first three five year plans in particular

- 1949, 1956-60 and 1961-65 - advanced heavy industry
substantially.

For nearly a decade, Czechoslovakia's

capital production increased considerably as well, at the
expense of consumer goods, agriculture and technological

innovation no less (Paul 108; Klein 1979, 152).
The greatest degree of modernized development and
integration in and between the Czech and Slovak economic
regions, did indeed, occur during the socialist industri
alization programs.

Even prior to the Prague Spring and

within less than twenty years under socialist policies,
Slovakia, in particular, made great advances in its in-

dustrial capacity and standard of living (Paul 108-09;
refer also to Wolchik 1991, 187).
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Its industrial produc

tion rose by 347 percent compared to 233 percent for the
whole country from 1948-1959 alone.

Even after this ten

year period, however, Slovakia's total industrial product
remained less than that of the Ostrava region of Moravia
(Paul 106; Klein 1979, 156).

Slovakia's advances also

came at the expense of balanced development in consumer

goods, agriculture and technical innovation, not to men
tion the Czech economy (Paul 105; Leff 1988, 281).
By the 1960s, the Czechoslovak economy was suffering

from chronic and inherent problems typical of command
economies throughout the Soviet sphere of influence.

Such problems entailed the obsolescence of plants, low
productivity, commodity shortages and plummeting growth
rates (Paul 105 and 110).

As a consequence, this

chronic, low-level economic crisis set the stage for the
reform efforts of the Prague Spring (105 and 110).

De

bate arose about the fundamental issues of socialist
economics, and radical reforms of the economic structure
were proposed (110).

The New Economic Model (NEM), pos

ited by Ota Sik and Zdenek Mlynar among others, called
for a decrease in the influence of planning and an in
crease in the authority of individual enterprises and
market forces.

Market principles such as profit, compe

tition and wage differentials for incentives were pro-

posed to compliment long-range planning.

Workers' coun-
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cils were also envisioned for expanded participation in

the work place, serving as yet another form of democrati

zation and decentralization (111-14; Wolchik 1991, 24041; Klein 1979, 153-56).

Any challenge to the integrated socialist economy,

however, especially in the form of a looser model, ran

the risk of creating separate "autotarchical" economies
(Leff 1988, 128).

The 1960s reforms stressed thrift and

profitability, but Slovakia's economy could hardly afford
such concerns.

Slovaks had, by necessity, an affinity

towards the Stalinist, command economy (238-39; Paul 105;
Klein 1979, 156), and nationalist Slovaks were qualified

in their commitment to both revising the economic struc
ture and developing it as it existed with the centralized
features.
reforms

Czechs, on the other hand, were eager for
(refer to Paul 113; Musil 18; Wolchik 1991,

191).
Modernization, then, proceeded more quickly, al
though at a later time, in Slovakia than it did in the
Czech lands.

The Czech lands modernized prior to, and

during, the earliest stages of the First Republic, begin
ning in 1900 and continuing into the present day (Musil
8).

Modernization in the Czech lands was implemented

under the framework of West European capitalism with a
widespread and diversified network and structure (7).

For example, the proportion of consumer goods produced
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was a relatively high proportion of overall production in

the Czech lands (10; refer to Klein 1979, 147-49).

De

spite their neglect of consumer goods, the communists

inherited a highly sophisticated industrial economy in

the Czech lands with little need for building anew (Klein
1979, 152).

Slovakia, on the other hand, modernized in the 1950s

according to the Soviet, command model (Musil 7 and 17;
Klein 1979, 152).

Its industry was designed according to

the economic as well as strategic targets of the federa
tion and the Soviet bloc (Musil 10).

Its industrial

framework was virtually non-existent prior to moderniza
tion, essentially needing a massive buildup of infra
structure.

As a result of being constructed under the

Stalinist model, Slovakia's development was not wide
spread, very well diversified or organized.

There were

some advancements in textiles, lumber, paper and food
products as well as an emerging development in electro
chemicals and machine production prior to the socialist
republic.

Slovakia's industrial modernization, nonethe

less, proceeded towards heavy industry from that point
forward (Paul 102).

Industrialization also developed

according to the location of resource deposits, irrespec
tive of population centers and logistical strategy (Musil
10) •. Consequently, not only was Slovakia's economy based
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initially on the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet, com-

mand economic model, but as will be elaborated upon

later, the traditional social transition which usually

accompanies economic modernization was severely affected
by this method of development.

This has, as well, varied

consequences in both cause and effect from the Czech
experience with modernization (10).

Slovakia is perceived as having benefited most from

the Stalinist strategy of economic modernization and
development.

Its limited industrial infrastructure prior

to the modernization process of the 1950s was more easily
organized according to the command structure and integra
tionist objectives of the region than that of Czechia's

developed and sophisticated market structures.

Any

consideration for economic reorganization along the lines
of efficiency, especially by moving away from the Stalin
ist, command economy towards market principles, was a
major threat to the foundations of Slovakia's economy and
all its advances made thus far under the aegis of the
command economy (Leff 1988, 237-39; Klein 1979, 152 and
156).

Slovaks were concerned about continued, guided mod

ernization and an increase in their standard of living.
Czechs, on the other hand, had mutual concerns, but their
standards were focused towards Western capitalist econo
mies (Klein 1979, 153).

The achievement of those stan-

dards necessitated reforms.

Thus, Czechs and Slovaks
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found themselves at odds once again, only in terms of the

economy this time.

Communists and nationalists alike

complained about the persisting failure of the Slovak
economy and its failure to catch up with that of the

Czech lands, despite the fact that statewide production
approached the proportion of the population overall (Paul
110 and 113).

Slovaks had for a long time advanced the

idea of a separate economy, and the 1960s reforms, par

ticularly the threats which they posed, only invigorated
Slovak support for the idea (Leff 1988, 238-39; Paul
113).

A considerable degree of economic autonomy was, in

fact, envisioned for the two regions in the 1969 feder
alization amendment, but the recentralization of politi
cal affairs during normalization ceased economic liber
alization and reorganization altogether (114).

As with

the political formula, the 1971 constitutional amendment
reduced the economic powers granted to the republics
under the original federal structure (Wolchik 1991, 219).
The rationale for these adjustments centered on,

"strengthening cooperation and unity of direction, espe

cially on certain economic questions" (Leff 1988, 247).
Where the 1968 law alluded to the "'integration of two
socialist economies,' the revision starkly proclaimed the
economy unified" (247).

The economy remained highly

centralized in the State Planning Commission and the
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various ministries responsible for its operation (Wolchik

1991, 219; Paul 114).

Czechoslovakia actually remained

one of the most centralized command economies in the
Soviet bloc (Wolchik 1991, 218).

Beginning in 1975, the government implemented a

series of appeasement policies which served as a contract
of sorts between the authoritarian Husak regime and the
people at large.

In light of the Prague Spring, if peo

ple behaved and allowed the government to govern, the

authorities promised to provide the populace with the

necessities of life, including a rise in the standard of

living.

The 1976-80 Five Year Plan allowed for more

available consumer goods, increased imports and a consid
erable increase in the standard of living.

Growth oc

curred at satisfactory rates in accordance with the plan,
and Slovakia continued to reach greater parity with the
Czech lands in industrial development (Paul 116).

This,

of course, was possible only with Soviet subsidies (115;
Klein 1979, 155).
The degree of egalitarianism in Czechoslovak society

overall is difficult to judge from the socialist era

because of limited and untrustworthy socio-economic stud
ies.

In many cases, the party elites were not included

in the configurations (Wolchik 1991, 171-72; Klein 1981).
A noteworthy study by Pavel Machonin from the 1970s sug-
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gests that social differentiation and stratification did,

in fact, take place around such factors as occupation,

education, geographic locale and ethnicity, thus defying
old ideological formulas and qualifying the degree of
egalitarianism between Czechs and Slovaks (Paul 141-42;
Wolchik 1991, 172 and 179).

There is substantial evi

dence, nonetheless, to point towards some success in
creating a more economically egalitarian society (Wolchik
1991, 171-72; Paul 139).

Government statistics indicate that the incomes of

Czechs and Slovaks reached parity in 1971 (Klein 1979,
147).

The number of people employed in industry and

construction was nearly equal between Czechia and Slova
kia, and the number of people employed in agriculture

overall diminished to less than 13 percent by 1974
(Wolchik 1991, 167 and 187-88; Klein 1979, 147).

Average

wages tended to be higher in transport, construction and
industry.

The lowest wages were in trade, education,

culture and health across the board (Wolchik 1991, 17174).

Wage differentials were stable from the 1950s until

1979, averaging in difference from highest to lowest by

only two and one-half times (171-74; Paul 139-40).

The

gap between educational access, infant mortality and
living standards also narrowed considerably (Wolchik
1991, 189-90).

By the mid-1960s there were more students

per one thousand in population in Slovakia than in the
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Czech lands (189).

A Divergent Social Transition
The demographic transition which accompanied indus
trialization in the Czech lands began already in 1870.

The period from 1870 until 1900 experienced an overall
decline in the population; the Slovaks began their de
cline later, about 1900 (Musil 11).

From 1921 until

1991, however, Slovaks have moved from 23 percent of the

Czechoslovak population to 34 percent.

Growth has oc

curred the fastest in Slovakia, reflecting traditional
values; large families, religious beliefs which both

discourage birth control and promote a conservative view
of women in society (11; Wolchik 1991, 186; Paul 126).
Reproduction levels have ranged from roughly thirteen in
every one thousand people in the Czech lands compared to
roughly seventeen per one thousand in Slovakia, and pres
ently the average Slovak is younger than the average
Czech (Wolchik 1991, 162; Musil 11).

Over time, demo

graphic development has fluctuated in part according to

population policies and social circumstances.

This demo

graphic shift is expected to continue well into the
twenty-first century (refer to Wolchik 1991, 162 and
186).
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Czechia experienced a low rate of urbanization dur-

ing its industrialization process (Musil 7), but its

urbanization was concentrated in the cities, not in the

peripheral regions of cities as in Slovakia (13).

Czechia has also experienced a higher standard of living

than Slovakia throughout the duration of the state's
existence (13).

Slovakia's industrialization process, on

the other hand, was accompanied by an insufficient level
of urbanization. (10).

Work was available in the newly

developing industrial areas, but housing was virtually
non-existent as a result of the location of industrial
development.

A typical industrialized urban environment

was absent with very few exceptions - Bratislava for
example.

Subsequently, population centers had to trans

fer to areas around emerging industrial sites.

By neces

sity, Slovaks had to construct private dwellings in the
periphery of industrial centers as state funds for hous
ing complexes were severely limited.
In contrast, Czechs typically dwelled in long estab
lished housing complexes, be they limited in availabil
ity, within already established industrialized urban
settings.

This possibly helps explain the persistent

provincial mentality in Slovakia despite such high rates
of industrialization and literacy compared to the Czechs.
Urbanization has, indeed, been constantly higher in Slo
vakia than in Czechia as well (12), but the quality of

133

living has also been generally poorer because of the
swiftness of expansion (13).

According to the 1980 cen

sus, roughly 17 percent of Czechia's population is urban
ized compared to 50 percent of Slovakia's population
(Wolchik 1991, 189).

While differences in and between

Czech and Slovak rural and urban areas have not disap
peared, changing demographic patterns have brought them
closer together (Paul 44-45).

The total number of vil

lages declined by one-third between 1945 and 1975.

So

ciological differences associated with rural and urban
lifestyles have considerably diminished, but they still
remain (145).
As noted earlier (see 57-58), Czechia's level of
educational development was quite high even during the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Its literacy rate was in the

ninetieth percentile by 1918.

Slovakia's most obvious

advancement in educational levels and literacy occurred
during the First Republic and the socialist era.

Slovaks

represented only 1.4 percent of the students in Hungarian
universities (Musil 13).

The literacy rate of Slovakia

reached 82 percent by 1921 (Leff 1988, 277), and pres
ently, some indexes of educational structure are slightly
superior to those of the Czech Republic (Musil 13; Wol
chik 1991, 189).

By 1970, the proportion of those with

out any education had decreased considerably to only 0.4
percent of the total population (Wolchik 1991, 164).

Politically as well, Czechia and Slovakia have mod-
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ernized at different rates and with distinct characteris
tics (109).

Czechia displayed a healthy degree of plu

ralism in its political structure from the very beginning
of the national revival and throughout the state's exis
tence.

Slovakia, on the other hand, experienced its

national rebirth with a more conservative political ex
pressionism.

From the 1890s until the First World War,

Slovakia was organized preponderantly around the Slovak

National Party (Musil 14).

Slovakia has been more na

tionalistic, autistic, conservative and panslavistic
(14).

While Slovakia's political climate did become more

complex, equal and pluralistic, during the First Repub
lic, Czech and Slovak political cultures have remained
traditionally distinct.

This divergent set of political

values, attitudes and opinions continued during the com
munist period (Wolchik 1991, 108).

Even under communism,

the Czechs tended to support political pluralism and a
strong sense of social democracy and commitment to social
justice.

The Slovaks were more attracted to authoritar

ian measures, even within the ranks of the party appara

tus (111).

This evidence then, once again, supports the

conception posited in the Introduction that Slovaks re
main rather provincial in their social outlook, whereas
Czechs are more cosmopolitan (Musil 15).

Studies from

the 1960s have even shown that Slovaks viewed Masaryk and

the First Republic in a less favorable light than did

Czechs.
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Instead, Slovaks reserve their truest affections

for their own national revival and its leaders (Wolchik
1991, 111-12; Leff 1991, 296).

All of this, of course,

has implications for national cohesion and stability.
A Conclusion
As a result of this non-synchronistic modernization
- the initial discrepancies and the asynchratic process the Czech and Slovak societies have remained bifurcated
both during the process and in its outcome.

They do,

indeed, resemble one another in many respects and some

economic integration has occurred (shared currency, in
frastructure and open trade, etc.).

However, Czechs and

Slovaks have not integrated socially throughout the proc
ess of modernization and economic integration.

On the

contrary, they have grown further apart (Leff 1988; also
refer to Wolchik 1991 and Musil).

All of the sociologi

cal research regarding family relations, the importance
of neighborhoods, their locations, social structure,

household structure, etc. also indicate the continuing
divergence of both societies (Musil 12).
Sociological differences predictably extended to
communal values and beliefs.

Czechs have traditionally

attached a considerable degree of importance to the effi
ciency and effectiveness of individuals and their success
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in such areas as education, personal endeavors, talent,
diligence and willingness to take risks, for example
(Musil 15).

Slovaks have traditionally attached greater

importance to ascriptive circumstances such as ancestral

extraction, family and tradition.

Their concern for the

efficiency of the individual is quite limited (15).
While Czech society has become one of the most secular
ized in Europe, Slovaks remain strongly Catholicized and
religiously active.

Secularization.has appeared in Slo

vakia, but at a much slower rate than in the Czech lands.

Languages have remained distinct between nationalities,
and the number of inter-marriages between Czechs and

Slovaks is limited to a very few (Wolchik 1991, 191).

In

the Czech lands in 1988, roughly forty marriages out of
every one hundred ended in divorce compared to roughly

twenty-two in every one hundred in Slovakia (Leff 1988,
295; Wolchik 1991, 163 and 180-95).

The rate of integration, no doubt, depends on the
exchange of people, information, capital commodities and
other mobile elements between societies (Musil 16).

The

limited interaction in terms of cross migration and inte
grated educational and professional development between
disaffected Czechs and Slovaks is one more primary exam
ple of just how distanced Czechs and Slovaks have re
mained (Leff 1988, 282 and 285-86; refer to Wolchik 1991,
180-95).
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Cross migration between the Czech lands and Slovakia
has diminished considerably over the last four decades
(Musil 16).

Some 40,000 people migrated annually from

Slovakia to the Czech lands during the 1950s in search of
employment opportunities in the Ostrava region in par
ticular.

By the second half of the 1950s the number of

migrations decreased to around 20,000 on average, and by

the 1980s, migrations to the Czech lands had decreased to
a level of some 10,000 people.

The migration from the

Czech lands to Slovakia, being considerably smaller in
proportion, also decreased (16).

Presently, Slovaks

constitute four percent of the total population of the

Czech lands, and Czechs represent roughly one percent of
the population living in Slovakia (Leff 1988, 284; Wol

chik 1991, 191).

Migration in Czechoslovakia has con

sisted primarily of two relatively closed migratory sub
systems according to demographers (285).

Ninety-five

percent of those Czechs who migrated from one village to
another stayed within the Czech republic.

Roughly half

of the mobile Slovaks moved to the Czech lands.
others simply stayed within Slovakia.

The

The number of Slovaks that have acquired their edu
cation in Czechia has also been decreasing as moderniza
tion has advanced and developed.

Czechs have remained

consistent in their pursuit of education within their
native land, and in terms of professional development and
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employment, Czechs have also remained in the Czech lands,

the only major exception being shortly after the estab

lishment of Czechoslovak statehood when Czechs were fill
ing the professional vacuum of Slovakia.

Slovaks have

increasingly turned away from both educational and em
ployment opportunities in the Czech lands for opportuni
ties at home with the increased modernization and devel

opment (287-92; Musil 17).

Modernization in Czechoslovakia is indeed complex in
its nature and consequences.

Industrialization occurred

largely at the expense of the Czech lands.

Czech capital

infusions in Slovakia created resentment between the

Czechs and Slovaks (Klein 1979, 156; Paul 105).

As in

the political arena, Czechs claimed that Slovaks did not
appreciate their generosity, and Slovaks perceived the
Czech infusions as a means of intrusion into Slovak af
fairs, not to mention the threat which such developments
possibly posed to Slovak culture (Klein 1979, 156).
Despite progress in terms of Slovak socio-economic ad
vancement and economic integration overall within the
socialist republic, the very distinct socio-political,
economic and cultural tensions remained an ever present
component of the political landscape which, in turn,
prevented the success of economic parity and union.

In

an area where the success of uniting two separate socie
ties became possible as Carol Skalnik Leff has suggested,

the opportunity was diminished (Leff 1988, 281).

Slovak
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nationalists claimed that Czechs and communists, in gen

eral, had the same conception for solving the nationality

problem; greater integration in economic terms as well as
socio-political and cultural terms, and Slovaks naturally
viewed this as a threat to their identity (238-39).

Federalism, with all of its potential prospects, failed

miserably to serve as a constructive means of coordinat
ing Czech and Slovak interests equitably within a formal
and practical constitution of political unity.

Instead,

federalism's very existence helped institutionalize the
natural bifurcation of society.

In one sense, federalism

divided the segments of society institutionally for ef
fectiveness in government.

In another sense, the divi

sion made the dissolution of Czechoslovakia all the more
accommodating and free of trouble.
return to this in Chapter V.

We must, however,

CHAPTER IV
THE VELVET REVOLUTION AND THE DIVISION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
A Pretext
The revolution which swept eastern Europe in 1989
was instigated by a series of events and circumstances
which developed over an extended period of time and from
internal and external factors inherent to the socio
political and economic structure of the region and its
independent states.

Each worked simultaneously to ad

vance the social revolution throughout its development in
the 1980s.

With particular relevance to Czechoslovakia,

the manner in which these events affected the actual
revolution and its aftermath becomes pertinent to rela
tions between Czechs and Slovaks for it indicates that
while relations between Czechs and Slovaks in no signifi
cant way either encouraged the revolution or shaped its
immediate course, relations between Czechs and Slovaks
were most certainly affected by the revolution.

From the

point at which revolution overthrew the ancien regime,
however, Czech and Slovak relations emerged as a major
determinant of the revolution's continued affects,
ultimately shaping them according to the enveloping
140

socio-cultural fault lines as described earlier.
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Czechoslovakia's revolution began on November 17,

1989 with a demonstration commemorating the death of Jan
Opletal, a student who was killed in Prague by occupying
Nazi troops in 1939.

The commemorative demonstration,

however, turned into a mass rally for freedom which be
came quickly and brutally suppressed by communist

authorities.

As a consequence, both students, many of

whom had been participants in the demonstrations, and
intellectuals became invigorated by such acts of state
aggression.

The infuriated demonstrators and socially

conscious groups alike called for a nationwide, general
strike on November 27, 1989 in protest of the govern

ment's blatant mis-use of power in this affair (Judt 98;
Bankowicz 156), and from this seemingly innocuous inci

dent revolution evolved in Czechoslovakia and overthrew
the communist government of some forty-one years, an
outcome permitted by the remarkable transition within the
Soviet Union.
There are, of course, a number of factors which

predate the crucial event of November 17 and its after
math and prepared the undercurrents of revolutionary

fervor, propelling the oppression of that day as a cata
lyst of social revolution.

Illegal demonstrations ad

vancing the ideas of free elections, a new democratic
government and the resignation of Milos Jakes, leader of

the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the time, had
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occurred prior to November 17 (Scheer "Post-Revolution

Haze"; Judt 97-98; Bankowicz 155-56; Wolchik 1991, 3949).

By August, there had been mass demonstrations to

mark the anniversary of the Prague Spring's termination,
including demonstrations in memory of Jan Palach who

immolated himself in 1969 while protesting the end of the
Prague Spring reforms and the positioning of Soviet
troops on Czechoslovak soil in August of 1968 (Bankowicz
155-56; Judt 98).

Vaclav Havel, the well known and re

spected playwright and dissident organizer of Charter 77,

had also been imprisoned once again in February 1989 for
his involvement in organizing dissident activities (Judt
96; Bankowicz 157).

Moreover, revolutionary currents in Eastern Europe

and Czechoslovakia occurred as a result of the number of
structural weaknesses inherent to the economic and po
litical order of the entire East Bloc as indicated in the
previous chapter (Judt 97).

As in the 1960s, Council for

Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) countries experi

enced the effects of economic inefficiencies.

Czechoslo

vakia, for one, experienced obvious economic difficulties
in the early to mid 1980s, while the whole process of
economic stagnation began as early as the mid 1960s.
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This, of course, had profound affects itself on the politics and social condition of Czechoslovakia.

As a result of the economic deterioration and the

new awareness of the oppressive nature of political re
gimes throughout the East Bloc, opposition movements
gained a great deal of support; and the devolving state

of affairs in the Soviet Union, with all of its implica
tions, provided impetus for reform throughout the region.

The wave of revolution finally brought the Berlin Wall
down on November 9, 1989, leaving Czechoslovakia and its
staunchly conservative Jakes regime virtually isolated

with its frail economic condition, devolving political
authority and the dissolving Soviet hegemony (96-97;
Bankowicz 156).

Organized opposition in Czechoslovakia arose due, in
part, to the liberalizing affects of political revolution
in Moscow and the entire Soviet sphere of influence with
the onset of perestroika and glasnost in the mid to late
1980s, but political opposition in Czechoslovakia also
came about because of the conservative nature of the
Jakes regime and its reluctance to correct its political
and economic shortcomings (Wolchik 1991, 40-42, 151-56
and 224).

The opposition forces which existed in Czecho

slovakia during the period of normalization were influen
cially weak and not very well organized mainly because of
the authoritarian nature of the regime and the threats

which such a system posed to opposition activists as

exemplified by the experiences of Vaclav Havel.
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Opposi

tion forces in Czechoslovakia served, however, as a most
profound element of the social revolution, and it is

within this context of opposition forces and revolution

that one finds the essence of Czech and Slovak relations
in terms of mutual coexistence and separation.
Dissident forces were effective at challenging the
communist establishment by way of underground organiza
tion and criticism of the regime's shortcomings through
out the normalization and appeasement periods of the

socialist republic, and they gained mass appeal by as

early as 1987, despite government efforts to squelch the

dissemination of their ideas and the proliferation of
interest in them (42 and 151-56).

By the late 1980s, as

many as a dozen new groups were formed, and mass demon

strations became a common occurrence along with their
emergence (42, 44 and 151-56).

Among the groups which

joined the ranks of Club 231, The Club of Engaged Non
Party Persons and Charter 77 in 1987 and 1988, were the
Helsinki Committee, Social Defense, Committee for the

Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted, Movement of Civil
Liberties and Democratic Initiative, Friends of the USA,
the T. G. Masaryk Association and the Masaryk Society
(42).

Such organizations as the Czech Children, the

Independent Peace Association and the John Lenin Club

were formed among the young people of Czechoslovakia
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beginning also in 1988 and well into 1989 (43).

The number of independent demonstrations and pil

grimages gained in popularity as well from as early as

1988, particularly in Slovakia and Moravia where demands
for religious freedom were strong.

Estimates indicate

that participation in the demonstrations and pilgrimages
grew to some 700,000 strong by 1989 (43-44).

By the

early stages of the revolution, in mid to late 1989,
these opposition forces found common ground among them
selves with regard to human rights and social justice.

Collectively, they provided the mass support for chal

lenging the communist authority and ultimately providing
the means for a smooth social revolution (156, also 4052).

Civic Forum was one organization which originated

from the primary leadership of Charter 77 in November

1989 at the height of revolution, and it served as the
major organizing force of the revolution along with Pub
lic Against Violence in Slovakia.

Civic Forum and Public

Against Violence guided the revolution into the initial
stages of the transformation process and the post
revolutionary period (79).
Civic Forum served as an umbrella organization for
opposition in the Czech lands with the purpose of coordi
nating the many diverse interest groups and their griev-

ances against the communist government (52).

By 1990,
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the organization attracted many prominent intellectuals,
political and cultural figures from all shades of the

political spectrum and broad social strata (80 and 83).
Their common attributes were a commitment to democracy,
economic reform and Czechoslovakia's reorientation to

wards Europe, together with a commitment to human rights

and social justice (80; Bankowicz 157; Ulc 20-21).
Likewise, Public Against Violence, the Slovak

equivalent of Civic Forum, united the Slovak opposition
forces (Wolchik 1991, 82).

Opposition in Slovakia was

slightly different than its Czech counterpart, however,
because a considerable amount of the movements' griev
ances came from a religious perspective.

While political

dissidents comprised most of the Czech opposition, sup
porters of opposition in Slovakia were often "non
conformists," or those who remained in positions of offi
cial power and influence, but lobbied for increased re
structuring and openness (82 and 154).

Most of Public

Against Violence supporters were involved in the official
Guardians of Nature (82), and while many supporters were

mere non-conformists, there were also open Slovak dissi

dents (80).

What this suggests is that the consideration

to support reform in Slovakia came from a very diverse
group of interests much like the Czech experience, but it
also came with a distinctly Slovak nature - meaning that

opposition had a more conservative and subdued nature
than its Czech counterpart.
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There is also evidence to

corroborate that support for opposition in Slovakia came
at a much slower pace and in a more delayed time-frame
than in the Czech lands (see Wolchik 1991, 46-47).

Despite their differences, Civic Forum and Public

Against Violence found common ground for the duration of

the revolution's transformation of power from communist
totalitarianism to a provisional government of recon
ciliation.

In fact, their mutual efforts were a primary

basis of the revolution's success.

Nonetheless, as a

later portion of this chapter details, once the communist
regime was removed from power and the power structure

became increasingly restored on the leaders of democratic
pluralism, this cooperative relationship diminished and
Czech and Slovak relations degenerated far beyond any
thing previously experienced with the possible exception
of the events leading up to 1939, Czechoslovakia's first
division.

Even Civic Forum and Public Against Violence

found it necessary to distinguish themselves.

Essen

tially, a great deal of confusion and decentralization of
authority was created, while simultaneously, a healthy
dynamic for a plural society was also established.

Once

the mutual interests of overthrowing the communist gov
ernment were satisfied, Czechs and Slovaks found them
selves at odds about the course of post-revolutionary

developments, primarily in terms of the political struc

ture and economic reform.
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Subsequently, the post

revolutionary period became shaped by their differences
(79-83; also refer to De Luce "Political Unity").
The Revolution
The factors just described provide the general con
text for the revolutionary events in Czechoslovakia.
From November 18, 1989 and until November 27, a series of
events led to the actual transfer of power and the begin
ning of the long road of "recovery" in the post

revolutionary period (Judt 98).

Along with the establishment of Civic Forum on No

vember 19, demonstrations were held for the following
three days at which time some 200,000 people gathered at
Wenceslas Square in Prague to protest the violence of
November 17 (98; Bankowicz 157).

Many others gathered in

Brno and Bratislava as well, demanding political and
economic reforms and the resignation of leading party and
state functionaries.

It was on this day that Public

Against Violence was formed in Bratislava (Bankowicz
157).
Vaclav Havel emerged as the leader of Civic Forum on
November 21 and began to address the crowds for the first
time (Judt 99).

On November 23, some 300,000 people

gathered at various sites throughout the country

(Bankowicz 157; Judt 99).

Havel spoke to 50,000 Public
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Against Violence supporters in Bratislava, and the presi

dent and secretariat of the Prague communist party were

dismissed from their positions that day because of their
involvement in the suppression of the November 17 demon
strations (Judt 99).

Some 800,000 people then gathered

at Letna Field on November 25, 1989, marking the height
of the revolution.

Karel Urbanek, who had replaced Milos

Jakes as the first secretary of the party on November 24,
was strongly criticized (Scheer "Post-Revolution Haze,"

8; Bankowicz 157-58).

The following day, November 26,

another demonstration was held at Letna Field, and by

this time, the real liberalizing force in these events,
Civic Forum, had a mandate from the populace at large.
The government could no longer avoid negotiations with
the leaders of Civic Forum as it had until this point
(Judt 99; Bankowicz 157-58).
On behalf of Civic Forum, Vaclav Havel met with
Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, and as a result of unsuc
cessful negotiations, general strikes were called
throughout the country on November 27, as had been
threatened.

Millions of blue collar workers from

throughout the country supported the strikes, calling for
greater political liberty (Judt 99 and 101; Bankowicz
158).

As a result, Civic Forum began negotiations with

the government again on November 28, and this time Adamec

promised to promote a coalition government.

The Federal
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Assembly voluntarily removed the constitutional clause

guaranteeing the communist party a •leading role" in

government (Judt 99; Bankowicz 158), and within seventy
two hours, the communists accepted a new non-communist

majority government with Marian Calfa, a communist him
self, as Prime-Minister.

The following day, former Sec

retary-General Milos Jakes and Prague party chief Mi
roslav Stepan were expelled from the party because of
their alleged involvement with the events of November 17
(Judt 99).

They were the first among many to be dis

missed or resigned from the party (Bankowicz 159).

On December 3, 1989, the People's Malitia was dis

armed and the Calfa government was inaugurated (Judt 99).
On December 8, a Government of National Agreement was
established at the Czechoslovak Round Table negotiations
(Bankowicz 158), and on December 10, Husak swore in the
Calfa government and then resigned his position as presi
dent of Czechoslovakia (Judt 100).

Of the government's

nists (Judt 100; Bankowicz 158-59).

With the possible

twenty-one members, only a minority of ten were coamu

threat that communists might feasibly attempt a comeback,
public demonstrations proliferated, demanding the elec
tion of Vaclav Havel as president.

Havel agreed to run

for president on December 16, and on December 29, he was
finally elected by a show of hands in the Federal Assem-

bly, a day after the assembly nominated Alexander Dubcek

as its chairman (Judt 100).
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Interestingly, Havel made

his election based upon the condition of Dubcek's elec

tion, attempting to strike a balance between Czech and
Slovak interests.

At this point, the six week old stu

dent strikes were called to a halt, their demands being
finally satisfied.
The Government of National Reconciliation
Once the provisional government of national recon
ciliation was put into place, steps were taken to insti
tutionalize a pluralist democracy and restructure the
state's economy.

Elections were scheduled for June of

1990 at which time a legitimate government could be in

stituted on the basis of democratic principles (Ulc 19;
Judt 101; Wolchik 1991, 50).

In the meantime, opposition

activists had to take responsibility for running the
government and instituting the necessary and immediate
political and economic changes that guided the revolution
for the sake of stability (Wolchik 1991, 50).

Policy had

to satisfy Czechoslovakia's diverse interests; this is

the obligation of a plural society based on democratic
principles.

The real challenges in such post

revolutionary developments, therefore, lay with the di
verse nature of Czechoslovakia's composition (50 afid 5961; Ramet 102; Wolchik 1994, 153-54; Judt 101).

By 1990, political organizations had proliferated.
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Some 334 associations and 58 parties were formed (Ulc 19;
Bankowicz 159; Wolchik 1991, 51 and 77;

Wolchik 1994,

The Federal Assembly's representative composition

154).

changed markedly.

Over 100 new members, mostly from

Civic Forum, replaced forcibly retired communist party
members on January 30 (Judt 102; Ulc 19-20; Wolchik 1991,
51 and 70-71; Bankowicz 159).

Even Prime Minister Calfa

left the party (Bankowicz 159), and from this panorama of
political organization and interests, the new political
order had to be contrived.

In terms of reorganizing the political structure in

Czechoslovakia, however, little could be done until after
the June elections when a legitimate government would be
seated.

The role of the communist party was dramatically

diminished and pluralism was taking root, but little was
seriously settled.

The task at hand for the interim

government was to establish the ground rules for the June
elections and begin consideration of a constitutional
framework of government, a task, that would prove to be

the most vexatious of the state's post-revolutionary
developments (Judt 106).
On February 28, 1990, the Federal Assembly passed an
electoral law which called for a list based, proportional
representative system of election (106; Wolchik 1991,
51).

The ground rules specified that any party seeking

election had to prove that it had 10,000 members or sig-

natories of support.
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The Communist Party of Czechoslova

kia and its former allies, i.e. the Czechoslovak People's

Party, the Czechoslovak Socialist Party and the Slovak

Freedom Party, were regarded as existing parties and
were, therefore, not required to register.

The same was

true for Civic Forum and Public Against Violence
(Bankowicz 160; Wolchik 1991, 78).

three parties met this test.

By April, twenty-

They included a number of

parties from the inter-war period such as the Christian

Democratic Movement, the Christian Democratic Party and

the Conservative Party, not to mention Slovak nationalist
parties, the Movement for a Self-Governing Democracy

Association for Moravia and Silecia and the parties of
Hungarian nationalism, forces which would ultimately play
a significant role in the composition of a new constitu
tion (Wolchik 1991, 51 and 77).
In order to be represented in the Assembly, a party
had to secure at least five percent of the popular vote
in the elections, a method commonly practiced among sev

eral West European multi-party systems.

Of the 150 seats

in the House of People, Czechs would occupy 101 seats
while the Slovaks would occupy 49 seats as under the
communist structure.

A further 150 seats in the House of

Nations were to be divided evenly among the Czechs and
Slovaks (Judt 106).

Elections to the Czech and Slovak

national councils were being held simultaneously.

As
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with the election of representatives to the Federal As
sembly, the Czechs would utilize a five percent hurdle

for the election of their national council, while a three
percent hurdle would pertain to the Slovak National Coun
cil because of Slovakia's smaller electorate and the

number of minor parties within the republic (106; Wolchik
1991, 78).

In terms of the economy, debate about the nature and

extent of the economic reforms necessary to curtail

Czechoslovakia's downturn had been growing since prior to
the revolution, but little continuity among various ex

pert circles and political interests was evident even in
the early stages of the post-revolutionary period (Myant
155-67).

Again, as with the political reforms, little

serious action was taken on economic issues during the
interim government.

Instead, the first half of 1990

served as a period of great debate about the political
and economic direction of the country for the coming
years.
Since the 1987 Law on State Enterprises, communists

had been discussing among themselves just how Czechoslo
vakia's economy might revive itself.

The approach taken,

among other aspects, involved a degree of decentraliza
tion by removing one tier of management.

It was hoped

that management and workers' councils would play a

greater role in shaping individual enterprises, boosting
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productivity so as to jump start the economy (155-60;

Wolchik 1991, 219-22 and 245-47).

Foreign investment was

even permitted at one point, but real and radical consid
eration of economic reforms, nevertheless, began to take
shape only after the revolution.
Debate about the economic reforms centered primarily

on propositions put forth by the newly placed Deputy

Prime Minister Valtr Komarek, Federal Minister of Finance
Vaclav Klaus and his deputy, Vladimir Dlouhy.

Komarek,

stressed the need for a slower pace of reform leading

towards a traditional free-market system by way of struc
tural reform of the economy.

Klaus and Dlouhy differed

from Komarek with regard to both the rate and nature of
the transformation.

They advocated a rapid economic

transformation with primary emphasis placed on restoring
or achieving macroeconomic equilibrium, and their plan
entailed only a few minor corrections to the institutional economic framework.16
By April of 1990, Klaus and Dlouhy were successful
at advancing their conception of shock therapy, a rapid
and painful move away from a planned economy to one of
free enterprise, markets and foreign investment. Under
16 For more details about the debate, refer to Myant
161-63 and 168-70; Wolchik 1991, 247-48; Judt 103.

their plan, the currency was to be made convertible,
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monopolies were to be broken up, price controls progres
sively removed and privatization initiated immediately
(Judt 103; Ulc 24).

They continued to stress the need

for achieving equilibrium in terms of macroeconomics -

bringing supply and demand into harmony - and the need

for restrictive fiscal and monetary policy.

Inflation,

they argued, had to be prevented for the sake of social
stability (Myant 162 and 172).
Most experts were conceding that Czechoslovakia's

economy needed dramatic reform based on market principles
and greater integration into the world economy (Wolchik
1991, 248).

This, of course, entailed steps which went

far beyond what the communists authorities had consid
ered.

Subsequently, property was slowly restituted in

the initial stages of the post-revolutionary period.
Corporations, joint stock companies and partnerships with
foreign ventures were also increasingly permitted beyond
the steps taken by the communist policies.

The role of

the planning commissions and ministries was eliminated
entirely.

The State Planning Commission became the Min

istry of the Economy, performing more and more along the
lines of a regulatory body rather than one issuing com
mands (222).
The interim government proposed a "minimal" economic
reform plan in April of 1990.

It detailed Czechoslova-

kia's transformation into a market economy over a two

year period of time.
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Initial plans entailed the creation

of the legal and institutional framework for a market
system (Myant 169 and 174).

Along with such action, and

with all constituencies supporting at least some measure

of economic reform as a result of Czechoslovakia's devas
tated industrial and ecological situation, debate became
increasingly intensified primarily over the pace and

costs by which Czechoslovakia could and should transform
itself (Judt 103; Ulc 23; Myant 155-71; Wolchik 1991,
249).

The Federal Assembly passed some sixty laws between
February and June of 1990, many of which reshaped the
methods of economic activity in the country and sought to
move Czechoslovakia closer to the free market orientation
of Western Europe (Judt 103).

A law ending monopolies

and establishing free enterprise was instituted on April
19, 1990 (103).

Also in April, the Central European Free

Trade Agreement was enacted, and Czechoslovakia set its
course for joining such organizations as the North Atlan
tic Treaty Organization and the European Community (104;

refer to Wolchik 1991, 257-72 for a discussion of exter
nal economic relations).

In May of 1990, communist party

property was expropriated (Judt 109), and prices were set
to be freed in two stages, once on July 1, 1990 and again
on January 1, 1991 (103; Wolchik 1991, 229).

With the
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reforms of July 1 alone, some thirty thousand items,

mainly foodstuffs, increased in price by 25 percent,
adding 10 percent to the overall inflation rate.

The

cost of industrial goods increased by 11 percent and
services by 10 percent (Judt 110; Ulc 23; Myant 174;

Wolchik 1991,

229).

As one can imagine, the economic reforms had near

devastating effects on social conditions, especially

considering society's vulnerability in light of the revo
lutionary experience.

As one might also imagine, the

devastation was felt more severely in Slovakia than in

the Czech lands, and this most naturally influenced the
nature of political discourse within Czechoslovakia.
Democratic elections were held on June 8 and 9, 1990
as scheduled by the provisional government (Ulc 20-21;
Judt 106-07; and Bankowicz 160).

Ninety-six percent of

the eligible electorate, consisting of 11,247,000 regis
tered voters, participated in the election (Ulc 21).

Of

the hundreds of parties and movements which competed,
Civic Forum, Public Against Violence, the Christian Demo
cratic Party, Social Democratic Party, Communist Party,
Liberal Party, Conservative Party, the Agrarians, and the
Slovak National Party, among many others, were repre
sented (Bankowicz 160).

Only seven of the registered

parties passed the five percent threshold (Bankowicz 162;
Ulc 21; Wolchik 1991, 51 and 78).

The results left Civic Forum and Public Against
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Violence with a narrow overall majority in both houses of
the National Assembly, with the exception of the Slovak

section of the House of Nations (Judt 107).

The Civic

Forum/Public Against Violence alliance received 168 of

the 300 seats in the Federal Assembly (Bankowicz 161;

Wolchik 1991, 71-72).

Civic Forum received 50.0 percent

of the vote for the House of Nations while receiving 53.2
percent of the vote for the House of People (Wolchik
1991, 51).

The Christian Democrats, however, were a

forebodable challenge to Public Against Violence.

They

received 19 percent of the vote for the House of People

and 17 percent for the House of Nations compared to Pub

lic Against Violence's 33 percent and 37 percent, respec
tively.

The Christian Democratic Union and Christian

Democratic Movement received forty seats overall in par
liament (52; Judt 107).
The communists received forty-seven seats with 13
percent of the vote, making them the second largest party
in the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council
(Wolchik 1991, 71-72).

Incidentally, most of the support

for the communists came from the older generations (Judt
108; Ulc 21; Wolchik 1991, 52).

The Movement for Self

Governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silecia
received sixteen seats, while the Slovak National Party
received fifteen seats and the Coexistence-Hungarian

Christian Democratic Movement received twelve seats in
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the National Assembly. 1 1

In the republic legislatures, Civic Forum did well

as it won 127 of the 200 seats in the Czech National
Council with 49.5 percent of the vote (Judt 107; Wolchik
1991, 51).

Civic Forum's largest rival, the union of

Christian Democratic parties received only 8.7 percent of
the vote due to last minute allegations of secret police

collaboration made against its main political figure,

Josef Bartoncik (Wolchik 1991, 51; Judt 107).

The commu

nists followed Civic Forum with thirty-two seats.

The

Movement for a Self-Governing Democracy-Association for
Moravia and Silecia obtained twenty-two seats with 10.3

percent of the popular vote (Judt 107).
The Christian Democratic Party received 19.2 per

cent of the vote and thirty-one seats in the Slovak Na
tional Council as opposed to Public Against Violence's
29.3 percent and forty-eight seats (Wolchik 1991, 52).
The Hungarian nationality scored 8.64 percent of the vote
and fourteen seats (Judt 107), and the Slovak National

17

Wolchik 1991, 71-72: refer to Table 2.2 of Wolchik
1991, 72 for a complete distribution of mandates in the
Federal Assembly; also see Judt 107.

Party received twenty-two seats with fourteen percent of
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the vote, equal to the proportion of the communists. 18

The local elections held in November 1990 indicate

that Civic Forum maintained its dominant position with
35.4 percent of the vote. Public Against Violence re
ceived 20.4 percent, running second to the Christian
Democratic Movement at 27.4 percent of the vote.

The

Slovak National Party received a mere 3.2 percent of the

vote (Wolchik 1991, 53; Wolchik 1994, 167).
As a result of the election, the emergent government
contained no communist party members for the first time
in the history of post-war Czechoslovakia, whereas only
nine had served in the previous interim government.

The

new government also decreased in size from 23 to 16 mem
bers (Ulc 22).

Dubcek was returned to the chairmanship

of the National Assembly, and Havel was elected as Presi
dent again in July 1990 for a two year term by a vote of
234 votes in his favor, 50 opposed (Ulc 21-22; Bankowicz
160; Judt 108).
The Government of Attempted Consolidation
Now that a legitimate government was in place, po
litical and economic reforms could proceed in full force
Judt 107; refer to Table 2.3 of Wolchik 1991, 75
for a complete distribution of seats in the republic
legislatures.
11

with little hesitation, except, of course, for finding

consensus among the vested interests of society.
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This,

naturally, entailed finding an equitable political solu

tion between Czechs and Slovaks above all other consid
erations.
The purpose of the new government was to establish
permanence and continuity, providing a constitution, and
the reconstruction of government from that of a police

state to one of democratic pluralism based on the rule of
law (Ulc 21-22; Wolchik 1991,

so and 60-61). The parlia

ment and its newly elected members were vested with the

task of devising a new constitution and revising the

country's legal framework to conform with the likes of a
free-market democracy (Wolchik 1991, 73).

Immediately

after the election of 1990, Czechoslovakia moved one step
closer to western Europe by joining the Council of Europe
(Ulc 22).
Politically, the state was indeed transformed into a
pluralist democracy, yet it was chaotic in its composi
tion.

Ethnic and political cleavages were becoming in

creasingly evident as debate over the nature of reforms

and their consequences, particularly economic reforms,

found Czechs and Slovaks coming from two different per
spectives.

Resentment was also mounting towards Civic

Forum's newly found hold on power (Judt 102).

How to structure the state politically and economi-
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cally had been a primary issue of contention in the June

election.

Up to this point, for example, each level of

government had been performing duplicate responsibili
ties:

decisions were being made at three administrative

levels (federal, Czech and Slovak) with ministries, com
missions and administrations often triplicating one an
other (Judt 105).

Now the newly elected government was

responsible for actually finding a workable integrated

formula (Bankowicz 164; Wolchik 1994, 153).
During the election campaign, Civic Forum promised

to adopt three new constitutions by June of 1992, one for
the federal level of government and one for each of the
two republics.

Yet, the most fundamental political issue

of the time lingered over the relationship between the

federal and republic levels of government, and the task
of finding a workable solution would prove formidable.19
The basis of disagreement between Czechs and Slovaks
focused on which level of government should have primacy.
Public opinion polls in June 1990 indicate that some 42

percent of those surveyed in the Czech lands favored a

common state with a strong central or unitary government.
Thirty percent supported a common state with strong re19 Refer to Ulc 31 for more details; Wolchik 1991,
62; Wolchik 1994, 155.

public governments.

However, 41 percent of Slovaks were
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far more supportive of a common state with considerable

powers for republic level governments; some 30 percent
favored a confederation.

Support for two independent

states, nonetheless, was not an issue of any great sig
nificance as only eight percent of the Slovaks and five

percent of Czechs surveyed favored such an arrangement
(Wolchik 1994, 178).

Another study from May 1989, only

one year earlier, shows that Czechs and Slovaks viewed
one another positively, with some 69 percent of the
Czechoslovak population affirming that relations between
Czechs and Slovaks were friendly (Wolchik 1991, 114).

In

May of 1992, 64 percent of Czechs thought they had good
relations with Slovaks while 72 percent of Slovaks
thought they had good relations with Czechs (Wolchik
1994, 175-76).

However, by November of 1991, the issue

of political unity was deemed unsustainable by many peo
ple as overall public sentiments became increasingly
nationalistic, and moves were made by the more extreme
factions of Slovak society, particularly more nationalist
elites, to declare Slovakia's independence, despite the
overall population's reluctance to do so (Ulc 31).20

20 Refer to Ramet 102 for a discussion of radical
separatist movements.
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bly

The distribution of votes within the National Assemgave

the Slovak nationalists a considerable amount of

power in influencing the design of a new constitution

since the Christian Democrats in Slovakia supported some

autonomist claims in order to improve their standing with
the populace.

Along with the Moravian/Silecian associa

tion and the communist dissenters, consensus would prove
difficult to achieve (Judt 107-08; Ulc 29; Ramet 102).

A

constitution would have to be approved by three-fifths of

the deputies of each house of the Federal Assembly, in
cluding the House of Nations, and the Slovak National
Council (Judt 107-08).

The divergence of Czechs and Slovaks at this point
in the development of events is best exemplified by the
"hyphen debate" which took place in March 1990, roughly
one year prior to the first democratic election.

The

socialist adjective was, of course, removed from the

state's name when the communist regime abdicated, which
in turn created controversy over what to rename the
state.

With the issue being opened for debate, Slovaks

wanted to accentuate their identity with the designation

"Czecho-Slovak Republic".

Czechs, on the other hand,

preferred the designation of "Czechoslovak Federative
Republic".

After heated debate, on March 29, a compro

mise allowed each republic to use its own variation of
the state's name.

Czechs could refer to the state as the

•Czechoslovak Federative Republic• and Slovaks could
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refer to it as the "Czecho-slovak Federative Republic".

The lower case "s" in the hyphenation was deemed manda
tory by Prague however, and three weeks later, after

significant protest from Slovaks at large, parliament

changed the state's name to the "Czech and Slovak Federa
tive Republic".
This dispute merely represents the intensity of
distinction held by both Czechs and Slovaks at this
point.

It resonates with the earlier discussions of what

defines the national identity between the two peoples and

how they define themselves in political terms, even after
the course of some seventy years of mutual existence.

It

also represents the lengths, albeit petty, to which each
would go to defend its sense of identity in the larger,
more serious scheme of things.

Moreover, it represents

the degree to which nationalist sentiment was becoming

increasingly evident, and it provides a prelude to the
more serious diffusion of mutual interests in the postrevolutionary period. 21
A more serious incident demonstrates not only the

sentiment of some Slovaks, but also the rising intensity
of nationalism and the degree to which the political
21

Refer to Ramet 101-02 for a discussion of the
hyphen debate; refer also to Judt 104-05 and Wolchik
1994, 154-55.

situation in Czechoslovakia was degenerating.
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In October

1990, Slovakia celebrated its March 14, 1939 declaration
of independence.

The commemoration included the unveil

ing of a plague commemorating Jozef Tiso, Catholic priest

and protector of Slovakia from 1939-1945 who was executed

at the end of the World War II for deporting thousands of
Jews and other victims of Nazi oppression into the hands

of Hitler (Ulc 29; Bankowicz 163).

The memorial itself

was enough to disturb many, but to top all, it was un
veiled on the same day that the Israeli president was
making a state visit to Prague. 22

On the economic front, the question still facing

reformers was how to implement the economic transforma
tion without disrupting the social order and the pros
pects for more extensive reforms in the future.

The

economic debate had intensified considerably by this time
and served as the primary element of contention which
contributed to the political polarization (175).

Vaclav

Klaus continued to push for the institution of a market
economy within the earliest possible time-frame and with
all of its positive and negative ramifications.

He re-

Refer to Ulc 29-30 and Ramet 105 for discussions
on the rise of neo-fascism in Slovakia; refer to Ramet
106 for discussion surrounding the language controversy
in Slovakia; refer to Judt 112-13, Ramet 100-01 and Wol
chik 1994, 154 and 176-77 for a discussion of rising
nationalism in Czechoslovakia generally.
22

jected a transitional phase with substantial central
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intervention or regulation, a scheme that many Slovaks,
in particular, had preferred (Myant 175).

The federal, Czech and Slovak governments adopted

the previous, provisional government's minimal plan of

action in October 1990 (171; 175 and 177; Wolchik 1991,
249; Judt 103).

By September of 1990, after private

government discussions and lobbying on the part of
Czechoslovakia's several economic institutions, the fed
eral government contemplated an even more rapid transfor
mation of the economic structure (Judt 103; Myant 17577).

The platform entailed an absolute priority for

containing inflation by further tightening fiscal and
monetary restraint, and proposed institutional changes
for simplifying the economic organization of enterprises
and government regulation (Myant 177; Wolchik 55 and
249).

Subsidies were to be reduced along with the final

deregulation of prices and making the currency internally
convertible in January 1991 (Myant 178-79 and 187; Wol
chik 1991, 249).

There were also provisions for a stern

wage policy with only some regulation of particularly
sensitive prices (Myant 179).

The new policy made way

for private enterprise, foreign investment, and the end
of central planning as expected.

Public control and

ownership of the means of production were to be minimized

(Judt 103; Wolchik 1991, 249), and this included the
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denationalization and privatization of all property

through the use of domestic and foreign capital, a policy

which is anathema to independent Slovakia's current

course of action under Prime-Minister Meciar (Myant 178;
Wolchik 1991, 55 and 249).

Structurally, the economic program provisioned for a

reduction in armaments production and the mining of vari
ous ores such as uranium (Myant 182).

From as early as

January 25, 1990, Foreign Minister Jiri Deinstbeir had
petitioned that Czechoslovakia stop exporting arms (Judt

110; Myant 223).

In fact, production would have been

reduced to 15 percent of its peak level by 1992, accord

ing to the plan (Myant 223).
Armaments manufacturing, however, was located pre
dominantly in Slovakia and served as a major means of
employment there.

While the industry accounted for about

three percent of Czechoslovakia's overall output in 1987,
a peak year, making it the seventh largest arms exporter
in the world (182-223; Ramet 111), the reduced production
level would have left Slovakia with only a 40 percent

share in the remaining industry and an estimated 58,000
unemployed (Myant 223).

Considering the general downturn

in heavy industry overall as a result of the reforms in
general, Slovakia, being especially dependent on heavy
industry and the hard hit electronics industry, was al-
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ready feeling the pinch of economic reform (Wolchik 1994,
164-65; Myant 223; Ramet 111).

In early November 1990, Czechoslovak Prime Minister

Marian Calfa, Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart and Slo

vak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar held a series of meet
ings to negotiate a power sharing scheme between the
federal and republic levels of government in light of the
ever increasing divergence of interests in political and

economic terms.

On November 13, after intense negotia

tions, an agreement was reached to amend the Constitution
of the Czechoslovak federation in such a way that it
would allow considerable autonomy to the republics in
many areas (Wolchik 1991, 104).

The agreement consti

tuted a compromise between centralists and advocates of
decentralization, and it established a relationship be
tween the federal and republic level governments on such
issues as the central banking system, the postal service,
gas and oil pipelines and jurisdiction over the policies
of nationalities (64).

Much to the aversion of Slovaks,

it also made provisions to move forward with economic
reforms (63).
The compromise agreement resulted in a devolution of
power to the republic level of government.

The federal

government retained jurisdiction over such all-state
functions as defense, the currency, the central bank,
taxation, price policy, foreign policy and trade,

churches and nationality policy.

All areas not specifi-
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cally assigned to the federal government were reserved by
the republics.

Thus, republic governments had extensive

powers over such policies concerning the economy, commu
nications, society, culture and education, and to some
degree international affairs.

Both republics contributed

to the budget of the federal government, but it was also
established that funds would remain in the republic of
origin instead of being redistributed by the federal
government (74; Ramet 104).

The provisional agreement

was adopted by the Federal Assembly on December 12, 1990

by a vote of 237 to 34 with 17 abstentions (Wolchik 1991,
64).

With no real political authority mandated to resolve
conflict in this power-sharing agreement,

President

Havel called for an increase in the powers of the presi
dency and the institution of a constitutional court for
the resolution of potential problems.

He requested the

right to dissolve the Federal Assembly should it fail to
pass laws.

He asked for the power to call elections in

the event of a no-confidence vote or when the legislature
could not form a government, and to rule by decree in the
interim.

He also requested emergency powers in the event

of threats to the state, and for the formation of a Fed
eral Council to serve as an executive cabinet to the
president himself (66; Wolchik 1994, 155).
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Slovaks were generally opposed to an increase in the

power of the presidency for fear of its centralizing
nature (Wolchik 1991, 66-67).

Slovak trust in the presi

dent ranked at 60 percent of those polled in a January

1991 survey, and this is substantially lower than the 90
percent of those polled in the Czech republic who had
confidence in the president.

Slovak trust was vested

with the Slovak government which ranked at 85 percent of
those polled.

The Slovak National Council received 69

percent and several Slovak politicians, including Prime
Minister Vladimir Meciar, also received high ratings

among the Slovaks (120 and 125-26).

Despite the fact that the power sharing agreement
passed, it was provisional, and negotiations continued
into 1991 and beyond (63; Wolchik 1994, 156-57).

By

December of 1991, agreement was still lingering over
procedural issues and differences of conceptualizing
sovereignty, not to mention the nature of continued eco
nomic reforms (Wolchik 1994, 157).

The constitutions

that should have gone into effect in October 1991 were
postponed (156; Ulc 31), and support for an independent

Slovakia continued to grow as satisfaction with the com

position of the Federal Assembly was waning for many
Slovaks (refer to Ulc 31; Ramet 102 and 104).
Vladimir Meciar, moderates and the extreme national
ist parties alike remained disillusioned with the compro-
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mise, and the situation deteriorated considerably within
the first few months of 1991 as shortcomings in the po
litico-institutional equation became increasingly more
obvious.

The Slovak National Council prepared a draft

declaration of sovereignty in September 1991. 23

All of

the major political actors in Slovakia wanted to see an

increase in the autonomy and powers of the republic level

governments, especially when they concerned the economy it was largely the nature of economic reforms which
spurred Slovak demands for greater autonomy.

Many Slo

vaks simply viewed the power of the republics as insuffi

cient (Wolchik 1991, 63), and various main-stream parties
such as the newly established Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (HZDS), Vladimir Meciar's offshoot of Public
Against Violence, and the Christian Democrats were in
creasingly swayed further to the right as a consequence
(Ramet 108; Wolchik 1994, 155 and 186).
Political continuity in Czechoslovakia had begun to
unravel and polarize.

This is best represented by the

diminishing cohesion in and between Civic Forum and Pub

lic Against Violence (Judt 103; Wolchik 1994, 155; De
Luce "Political Unity").

Approval ratings for Civic

Forum and Public Against Violence declined significantly
Ramet 104 provides a reprint of the Declaration's
Preamble and Article I; Ulc 31.
23

from a rate of 60 percent in February 1990 to 38 percent
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by October 1990 (Ramet 103).

Civic Forum had survived through the congress of

September 1990, only a few short months after the first
democratic election, but it quickly disintegrated into
competing parliamentary factions shortly thereafter in
February 1991 (Bankowicz 162; Ulc 27).

Vaclav Klaus was

elected chairman in September, and the organization
evolved towards a highly centralized organ with a strong
neo-conservative slant (Bankowicz 162; Wolchik 1991, 52
and 78-79; Myant 206).

As a result of the centralization

and strong ideological slant espoused by Klaus, the forum
divided into three parties beginning a month later, in

October.

Civic Movement (OH) emerged as a left-of-center

party composed of communist party members who were ex
pelled in 1968 (Ulc 27).

Others leaned away from Klaus's

economic platform towards a more moderate pace of reform
(Myant 207).

Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) emerged as

a centrist party and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) as
a right-of-center party headed by Klaus.

The Civic Demo

cratic Party became the largest party in Czechoslovakia
in 1991 (Ulc 27).

Public Against Violence had lost most of its support
in almost less than two years after its establishment as
well.

Support was redirected to a variety of forces

within Slovakia's political spectrum, namely Slovakia's

first post-communist premier, Vladimir Meciar, and his
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newly established party, the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia (29; Bankowicz 163).

Meciar, a former communist who had been successful

at winning over supporters because of his populist and

nationalist overtones, had been striking a careful bal
ance on the issues of federalism.

On one hand, he had an

avowed commitment to the federation and eschewed any
consideration of separatism whatsoever.

On the other

hand, he stressed nationalist concerns, vowing to destroy

centralism and bureaucracy, winning enthusiastic approval
from Slovakia's nationalist groups (Ramet 103 and 107-08;
refer also to Ulc 29; Wolchik 1991, 53).

He and his

followers argued for months that Public Against Violence
should adopt a more nationalist stance.

After an unsuc

cessful attempt to procure the chairmanship of Public

Against Violence from Fedor Gal, Meciar and his followers
then broke away and established the Movement for a Demo
cratic Slovakia on March 5, 1991, with a strongly anti
federalist stance (Ramet 107; Ulc 29; Wolchik 1991, 53;
Wolchik 1994, 155-56; Bankowicz 163).
Despite questionable support for autonomist claims
in Slovakia, whether a form of confederalism or outright
separation, Meciar's political might allowed him to pro
cure a significant portion of the population's support,
advancing his party's position and ability to shape many

aspects of the post-revolutionary development. 2'

As the
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opinion polls indicate, the issue of autonomy was a con

tentious one, not only between Czechs and Slovaks, but

also among Slovaks themselves. Defying public opinion, in
part due to his controversial stands on the issue of

unification, parliament voted Meciar out of office in
April of 1991 after a series of events involving his
management style and personality, the secret police and
dealings with the Soviet military (Ramet 107-08; Ulc 29;
Wolchik 1991, 53).

Jan Carnogursky, leader of the Chris

tian Democratic Movement, replaced him as Premier.

Me

ciar's power grew even more, however, after his ouster.

Some 100,000 people demonstrated in Bratislava demanding
his return to office.

The Slovak government's approval

rating plummeted from 69 percent to 22 percent, and
within a matter of months, Meciar's organization became
the strongest party in Slovakia.

By July 1991, HZDS

commanded 39 percent of the electorate, far ahead of the
second place Christian Democratic Movement at 17 percent.
In August of 1991, less than one year before the second
democratic election, Meciar proposed that his party be
co-opted into government as part of a "grand coalition"
(Ramet 108).
Refer to Wolchik 1994, 172-77 for a discussion of
elites and their ability to appropriate support.
2'

Economically, recession had taken shape with the
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collapse of CMEA and Czechoslovakia's transformation to a
market economy.

There was a decline in output, and prob

lems of infrastructure surfaced with the market's imple

mentation (Myant 200; Ulc 26).

Czechoslovakia experi

enced a 23.1 percent decline in industrial production in

1991 overall.

The Federal Office of Statistics reported

a fall in productivity in the area of 18.2 percent in the
Czech lands alone.
percent (Ulc 24).

The fall in Slovakia amounted to 23.6

By mid-1991, unemployment reached 6.31

percent and affected 500,000 individuals with the effects
being felt more severely in Slovakia than in the Czech

lands.

Slovakia's unemployment rate was 11.1 percent

while Czechia's was 4.1 percent (23).

On top of all of

this, the second wave of price liberalization on January
1, 1991 increased the price of some 85 percent of goods
(Myant 192; Wolchik 1991, 252).

By the close of the

first half of the year, consumer prices had risen by 45
percent, to stabilize at a near-zero rate of inflation
during the second half of the year (Ulc 23).

A 64 per

cent increase in overall prices and a 30 percent decrease
in real purchasing power during the first half of 1991
created increasingly greater hardship in Slovakia where
substantially more households were in the lowest income

group and unemployment afflicted many a household
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(Wolchik 1994, 165).

By November 1991, 42 percent of all retail stores

and service companies in the Czech and Slovak republics
had been transferred to private management through public
auction.25

In the spring of 1992, the Ministry for the

Administration of National Property and its Privatization
began to privatize large industrial complexes as well
through several methods, including the voucher method,

direct and partial sales of firms to foreign and domestic
interests, along with limited options for labor and management.2'

As one might imagine, privatization further

complicated an already troubled economic and social con

dition.

Under the guise of the Tripartite Council of Mutual
Agreement, the government attempted to counter economic
instability with a General Agreement passed in parliament
on January 28, 1991.

The agreement fixed wages so as to

counterbalance the market's rapid fluctuations in con

sumer goods prices, especially food (194; refer also to
Wolchik 1994, 166).

In addition to controlling the re

maining 15 percent of prices on staples (Wolchik 1991,
2 5 Refer to Ulc 24-25; Wolchik 1991, 250; Sedlak;
Simonet! 92 further details on small privatization.
26 Refer to Ulc 25; Wolchik 251; Sedlak; Simoneti 9094 for a discussion of large privatization.
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252), the government took various measures to create and
protect jobs (Myant 196).

Also, the economy began to experience success with

foreign trade and payments after the initial stages of

the transformation, due primarily to the shift in trade

relations from the east to the west.

The drop in trade

with the former CMEA countries was compensated by a 23.1
percent increase in trade with the European Community
(Myant 203; Ulc 26).

The trade balance did, however,

show signs of worsening in 1992 (Myant 203).

In 1991,

Czechoslovakia's foreign currency reserves increased from
USO 1.5 billion to USO 3.3 billion (Ulc 26). Czechoslova

kia joined the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank in September 1990

(Wolchik 1991, 271), and in No

vember 1990, it gained most-favored-nation trade status
with the United States (270).

In December 1991, Czecho

slovakia entered an Agreement of Association with the
European Community which allowed ten years for a transi
tional period to complete the trade liberalization and
possible community membership (Myant 203-05; Wolchik
1991, 270).

By January 1992 output had stabilized and

unemployment had dropped to a level of 7.1 percent of the
total labor force.

Inflation lowered from 58 percent in

1991 to 10 percent in April 1992 (Ramet 110).

Real wages
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and savings were on an upswing, and exports were making a

strong recovery (111).

Economic recovery, however, was taking place mostly

in the Czech lands (Ramet 110-11; Wolchik 1994, 164-67).

Foreign investment, for example, was concentrated in the

Czech lands and amounted to $900 million in the first
three quarters of 1992.

In contrast, it amounted to $76

million in Slovakia (Wolchik 1994, 166; Ramet 111; Si
moneti 93-94; Ulc 26).

In economic terms, differences

between the Czech lands and Slovakia appeared from as
early as mid-1990, but unemployment peaked in the Czech
republic and Slovakia at 4.3 percent and 12.7 percent

respectively in January 1992 (Myant 202-02; Ramet 110).
In June of 1992, unemployment reached 3 and 15 percent in
the Czech lands and Slovakia respectively.

In fact, the

rate of increase in comparison is astonishing.

From May

1991 until June of 1992, unemployment in Czechia edged
upwards only one percentage point, from two percent to
three percent.

Unemployment in Slovakia surged upwards

from 5.4 percent to 15 percent in the same time frame
(Ramet 111).

Unemployment was hitting small rural towns

especially hard, and once again considering the socio
economic structure of Slovakia as explained in the previ
ous chapter, one can easily understand how reforms
threatened Slovaks in particular.

Prague, however, was

pulling labor from the surrounding communities (Myant

In addition to this state of affairs, Klaus's

201).
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fiscal responsibility placed sharp restraints on the 1992

budget by cutting entitlements substantially in order to
reduce the deficits of federal and republic governments
(204).

The consequences of economic shock therapy were the

polarization of political life along the traditional

left-right continuum as indicated by the demise of Civic
Forum and Public Against Violence (206; Ulc 22-26 and 2832), and the rise of strong nationalist sentiments. 27
The reforms proceeded blind to the unique nature of
each republic, and the consequences undoubtedly affected
ethnic relations between Czechs and Slovaks (Wolchik
1994, 164; Ulc 24).

The perplexing state of affairs

became increasingly more evident as time advanced and

reforms developed.

The post-revolutionary developments

were forcing each republic to embark upon separate paths
of reform in order to address their unique problems and
potential social concerns, especially in economic terms.
In fact, as one sees with regard to Civic Forum, division

over the nature of reforms occurred even within Czechia
itself.

Because of the nature of their condition, how-

Refer once again to Judt 112-13, Ramet 100-01 and
Wolchik 1991, 154 and 176-77 for a general consideration
of rising nationalism in Czechoslovakia.
27

ever, Czechs generally embraced the classical liberal
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ideas for reform.

Public acceptance of the economic transition has

been mixed throughout the post-revolutionary development.
In December 1991, 45 percent of the Czechoslovak popula

tion claimed that their standard of living had gone down.
Only six percent claimed that their living standards had
increased.

Twenty-five percent of the population ex

pressed satisfaction with the domestic political situa
tion, and only 20 percent with the economy.

Most suppor

tive of the radical economic reforms were younger respon
dents and those with higher education.

Negative re

sponses in all subject categories were higher in Slovakia
than in the Czech lands (Ulc 27).

Public opinion polls

conducted in 1990 indicate that support for economic
reforms was ambivalent, and later polls indicate that
large segments of society either actively opposed or were
uncommitted to the economic changes (Wolchik 1991, 25457).

Some 80 percent of Slovaks were opposed to the

economic transition (Wolchik 1994, 170-71; Judt 104).
Popular dissatisfaction continued to increase from 1991
to 1992, especially in Slovakia.

In January 1992,

roughly 67-79 percent of the overall population surveyed
were dissatisfied with social welfare provisions, domes

tic politics, the economy and the standard of living

(Wolchik 1994, 171).

Opinion polls taken in the spring
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of 1992 suggest that 65 percent of Slovaks believed that
the economy was going in the wrong direction and 31 per

cent favored a return to what had existed before November

1989.

Czechs viewed the economic reform with optimism

however.

Only 38 percent believed the economy was going

in the wrong direction while 16 percent favored a return
to the old ways (Myant

225).

A January 1992 survey by the Institute for Public
Opinion Research found that 52 percent of respondents in
Slovakia felt that the federal government worked to the

advantage of the Czech nation, while 42 percent of Czechs
felt that it benefited Slovaks disproportionately.

In

April, the Slovak figure rose to 73 percent (Wolchik
1994, 171 and 174).

Sixty-eight percent of respondents

in Slovakia surveyed by the Association for Independent
Social Analysis in April 1992 felt that Czechs often
treated Slovaks as an underdeveloped nation.

Eighty-four

percent of Czechs, on the other hand, disagreed (refer to
Wolchik 1994, 175).

In February 1991, in response to the impasse and
heightened politicization of the political union, Presi
dent Havel put forth a set of propositions.

He suggested

making Moravia and Silecia a third republic along side
Bohemia and Slovakia.

This idea was turned down by the

Slovaks, however, for fear of diluting their unique posi-

tion in the struggle for power (Ramet 102; Wolchik 1994,
155).
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Searching for another solution, Havel proposed,

only a month later, that the Czech and Slovak republics
be recognized as the exclusive subjects of political
sovereignty.

Needless to say, this time Moravians and

Silecians rejected the plan (Ramet 102 and 105).

Havel

had also committed himself to the idea of holding a ref

erendum on the issue of political union from as early as
November 1991 (Bankowicz 164).

His proposal called for a

public referendum to decide the fate of the union once
and for all.

The idea fell short because it allowed for

only a choice of either a common state or separation and

nothing in between.

There was no clearer definition of

what might constitute a common state, and this was the
very basis of the disagreement between Czechs and Slo
vaks.

Subsequently, Meciar, the HZDS and Carnogursky's

Christian Democratic Movement rejected the referendum.
The referendum issue failed to pass the three-fifths
majority vote in the Federal Assembly.
The Velvet Divorce
In light of this blatant discrepancy between Czech
and Slovak attitudes about the political union and eco
nomic reforms, President Vaclav Havel initiated a series
of talks at Lany in mid to late 1991 in which federalists
and confederalists might iron out their differences.

Facing another impasse, however, Havel once again called
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for a referendum on the fate of the union in January

1992, this time without parliamentary approval (Ramet
110; Bankowicz 163).

The Civic Democratic Party opposed

the referendum for fear that Czechs might advocate sepa
ration themselves at this point, subsequently causing
Prague to loose its successor rights to international
agreements.

parliament.

Slovaks, however, blocked the referendum in

Havel had made it clear that if the referen

dum did not decide the issue, then a decision on the fate
of the union had to be made by September 30, 1992. 28

On February 8, a joint commission of the republic

councils submitted a draft constitution for parliamentary
consideration.

On February 12, the proposed draft was

rejected by the Slovak National Council.

Shortly there

after, Slovak federal parliamentarians defeated three

amendments designed to redefine the relations between the
president and the parliament and to reform parliament's
structure (Ramet 109-10; Wolchik 1994, 156; Bankowicz
164).

Vladimir Meciar continued to push for a union along

the lines of a confederation with slower economic reforms
Refer to Ramet 108-09 and Hangley "Federal Future"
for a discussion of the impasses at Lany; refer also to
De Luce "Nations Leaders" and Wolchik 1994, 177-78 for
details on the referendum, ODS opposition to it and the
deadline.
28

(Ramet 110).

He made it clear in the spring of 1992,
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just prior to the June elections, that he was not contem

plating anything that would be incompatible with a united
Czechoslovak economy (Myant 222; Hangley "Federal Fu

ture"; Ramet 108-09). Meciar stressed the impact that
rapid marketization policy was having on Slovakia.

He

wanted to move closer to the type of social market econ
omy found in Austria, reducing the speed and nature of
the economic reforms initiated by Klaus.

He also de

manded that Slovakia be allowed to establish its own
central bank and to regulate its own privatization pro
grams, promising to slow down the pace of privatization
(Ramet 110-11; Wolchik 1994, 157 and 167; Hangley

"Federal Future").

Meciar built his strength among disgruntled indus

trial workers despite a modest decrease in unemployment.
Slovak unemployment declined from 11.3 to 10.4 percent

from June to December 1992, but Czech unemployment also
abated, if only one tenth of a percent, making the diver
gence an issue of contention (Wolchik 1994, 165). Meciar
had a 47 percent approval rating in Slovakia, far ahead
of the second place Alexander Dubcek at 24 percent, Va
clav Havel at 16 percent and former Slovak Prime-Minister
Carnogursky at 13 percent (Ramet 110).
Klaus argued that a confederation would not work,
and along with his supporters, he argued that there could

not exist, simultaneously, two states and one unified

state.
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He continued to call for radical and rapid steps

to reform the economy, claiming that Slovaks wanted

merely to reap the benefits as a distanced participant in
a reforming Czech economy (Wolchik 1994, 157). Klaus,

therefore, continued to pursue the traditional arguments
for tightening the federation.

This was, after all, in

his interests as a progressive reformer.29
Discussions about the fate of the union provided a
prelude to the June elections.

In a sense, the decisions

made in the election determined the fate of Czechoslova
A vote for a particular party was a vote for its

kia.

leaders' beliefs about the union and other vital issues
such as the economy and certain social issues such as
lustration.

The various views were, no doubt, very well

known by this point. J O
Surveys conducted after the June 1992 elections,
however, reveal a degree of dissent from the positions
articulated by the dominant political leaders in both
parts of the country.
veyed

Although a quarter of those sur

in the Czech republic agreed strongly with the

29 Samuel Huntington makes reference to the impor
tance of centralized power in transition periods in Po
litical Order in Changing Societies.
30 Ramet 110; Bankowicz 164; refer also to Wolchik
1994; Hangley "Federal; Future" briefly discusses Klaus's
and Meciar's divergence on the lustration issue.

188

viewpoint of Vaclav Klaus regarding the form of the

state, and another 40 percent, more or less, supported

his position, approximately 27 percent did not agree or
strongly disagreed.

Thirty-one percent of those surveyed

in Slovakia agreed with the positions articulated by

Vladimir Meciar.

Some 37 percent strongly agreed, but 16

percent disagreed with his position, while 11 percent
strongly disagreed (Wolchik 1994, 176).

Regardless, only

eight percent of the Slovak respondents were satisfied
with the existing federation prior to the June elections

according to a study conducted by the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Bratislava in October 1991. 3 1
Elections were held on June 5-6, 1992, with approximately 83 percent of the population voting. 32

Klaus's

Civic Democratic Party obtained just over 33 percent of

the Czech vote for the federal parliament and roughly 30
percent of the vote for the Czech National Council.

Meciar's HZDS received a third of the Slovak vote for the
federal parliament and about 37 percent of the vote for
the Slovak National Council. 33
31

The results left Klaus

Ramet 110; Wolchik 1994, 179; also refer to Wol
chik 1994, 178-81 for a discussion of preferred state
arrangements.
3 2 Wolchik 1994, 168 provides details about voter
interests.
3l Ramet 111; refer to Wolchik 1994, 184-86 for a
breakdown of the election results.

and Meciar, two diametrically opposed political figures
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by this time, as the two most powerful forces in Czecho

slovakia who would ultimately determine the fate of the
country.

Two weeks after the election, Meciar was re

turned to the Slovak premiership and Klaus became prime
minister of the Czech republic (Ramet 111).

Additionally, the dominant political parties rein

forced Klaus's and Meciar's polarized grip on power in
their respective republics.

This, of course, was facili

tated by the divergences of Czech and Slovak political
cultures generally.

The Left Bloc and Czechoslovak So

cial Democrats, strong advocates of maintaining the fed
eration, ranked second and third respectively in the

Czech republic, just behind ODS.

Although the Left Bloc

and Social Democrats were not necessarily akin with ODS,
the coalition partners of ODS gave Czechia a strong
right-of-center slant, attempting to preserve the federa
tion, yet leaning towards separation if necessary to
preserve the liberal economic policy.

In contrast, HZDS

was joined by the strongly left-of-center and autono
mist/separatist parties, the Party for a Democratic Left,
the Slovak National Party and the Christian Democratic
Movement, each of which are listed in order of their

190

electoral representation at both the federal and republic
levels of government. 3'

Indeed, the election results determined the fate of

the federation (Bankowicz 164; Hangley "Federal Future").
With Klaus wanting to preserve the union, yet not at the
expense of slower economic reforms, and Meciar favoring a
confederation based only on a common defense and cur

rency, the two sides met in Brno and Prague to discuss
the fate of Czechoslovak federalism
"Deadlock").

(De Luce

They concluded that the federal level of

government had to be substantially reduced.

Neither side

could agree, however, on the election of Havel as Presi

dent, or to the formation of a new government (De Luce
"Deadlock"; Hangely "Federal Future").

Meciar stood firm

in his convictions - even going so far as to suggest that
a confederation might consist of two internationally
recognized states - while Klaus rejected such ideas,
arguing that there was no mandate for what amounted to
the breakup of the state.

He also claimed that efforts

at redefining the relationship were a ploy to build Slo
vak institutional might with federal moneys (Ramet 111;

Refer to Table 4 in Wolchik 1994, 185 for an ac
count of the distribution of seats and voting percent
ages; also refer to Hangley "Federal Future" for a dis
cussion of the absence of centrist and moderating forces
in the June 1992 elections.
3'

De Luce "Deadlock").

Klaus gave an ultimatum - accept
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the existing federation or opt out of it (Bankowicz 164).
On June 19, 1992, after 10 days of discussions, the

two prime ministers agreed to split the state (Ramet 11112; De Luce "Deadlock"; Bankowicz 164).

An interim gov

ernment of "maintenance" was established for the purpose
of dismantling the state, or for agreeing on another
arrangement.

The future of the country was to be deter

mined by legal, constitutional means - meaning ratifica
tion by the Federal Assembly.

However, after impasses

over electing the president, determining the exact struc

ture of the constitutional framework, the interests of

ODS in severing ties quickly if, in fact, that was to be
the case, the possibility of agreeing upon an arrangemen�

other than separation was moot by August of 1992, and so
were the formal means of ending the state. 3 5

The state

was to be politically divided by September 30, 1992, with

JS De Luce "Nations Leaders" and "Slovaks"; Kobylka;
Larsen "Czechs Don't Want"; Hangely "Czechs Lead Drive";
refer to Chang "Parliament Stalls" for a discussion of
attempts by Democratic Left to save the union; refer to
De Luce "Havel Criticizes" for a discussion of Havel's
criticism delaying the division; also refer to Boris
Gomez "Klaus, Meciar Thwart" for a discussion of Klaus's
and Meciar's thwarting of opposition's demands.
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economic ties being severed from federal control by January 1993. 36

Subsequently, the Czech National Council began to

assume powers without the Federal Assembly's official
sanction.

In fact, it had been doing so from as early as

June 19. 3 7

The Czech government also began to prepare a

constitution for an independent Czech republic, despite
last minut� efforts by oppositionist forces within each
republic's parliament to save the union. 38

At the same

time, the Slovak government pursued its own direction.
It immediately initiated a new economic strategy and

restricted the free press, among other liberties such as
public use of the Hungarian language (Ramet 112).
With negotiations on the budget for 1992, the Czech
government voted to deny subsidies to Slovakia (Myant
225).

On November 25, 1992, the Federal Assembly voted

for the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Re
public.

Czechoslovakia was formally replaced by two

independent states on January 1, 1993 (Bankowicz 165).
Ramet 99; refer to Boris Gomez "Federal Role" and
"The Currency Debate" for an elaboration on the severing
of economic and currency ties.
37 Boris Gomez "Klaus, Meciar Thwart" and "Federal
Role"; refer to Chang "Parliament Stalls" for a discus
sion of delays in the Federal Assembly regarding the
division.
38 Refer to Larsen "Czechs Don't Want"; Hangley
"Czechs Lead Drive"; refer once again to Chang
"Parliament Stalls".
36

CHAPTER V
TWO NATIONS
Czechs and Slovaks were brought together by the

circumstances of World War I and the demise of imperial
ism.

They were also brought together by a mutual pursuit

of national self-determination.

In one respect, self

determination brought Czechs and Slovaks to a point of
mutual interest and collaboration with one another, yet
in another respect it brought them together with con

trasting views about the nature of their shared political
relations based precisely on distinct national character
istics and interests.

Naturally, this disconnection has

served as a basis for adversity and instability through
out the history of shared political relations between
Czechs and Slovaks.
Both Czechs and Slovaks pursued autonomy from their
imperial rulers separately from each other over the

course of nearly a century, and while they found consola

tion in one another in pursuit of their independent
goals, and ultimately resorted to shared statehood out of
mutual interest in finding a means to their ends - self
determination, the terms of a political union between
Czechs and Slovaks were never clearly established.
193

In-

deed, what one may surmise from a detailed historical
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account of mutual relations is that while Czechs and

Slovaks may have found solace in one another for the
pursuit of their mutual interests, each had a vague and
often contradictory vision about their common political

and social relationship.

The equation has provided a

ground for conflict and instability in Czechoslovakia

over the course of the state's seventy-five year history,
and with implications that defy virtuous efforts to con
solidate a common national identity.

The First Republic provided the institutional and

political organization for the common government of two

independent nations, but the political culture and na

tional aims of Czechs and Slovaks clearly qualified the
nature of their mutual political relations and the con
solidation of a shared national identity, despite even
the degree of stability and assimilation encompassed
within its political framework defined in terms of a
highly centralized institutional structure, elite and
party organization.

The significance of the qualifica

tions is that they precluded various shared national
interests and their commitment to the Czechoslovak ideal,
nation and state.

In fact, this thesis has argued that

the ideal itself was ambiguous and quite often at odds
with individual national goals from its very conception.
Furthermore, there is a discouraging absence of an inter-

locking civil society, or more directly, a cohesive in-
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formal constitution among societal segments throughout
the Republic's history.

Instead, two primary social,

political and economic units have existed separately from

one another and developed accordingly with aims at advan
taging independent objectives and ambitions rather than,
or in spite of, the collective condition.

Relations between Czechs and Slovaks were indeed

favorable throughout the first twenty years of coexis
tence.

A highly centralized government and political

elite based on the Czechoslovak ideal helped meld rela
tions between the plethora of ethnic and political inter
ests which comprised the state.

Prospects for a state

which unified Czechs, Slovaks and Germans, among other
nationalities, were genuinely optimistic.

Nevertheless,

loyalties to the Czechoslovak ideal never consolidated to
any significant degree.

In fact, they were more often

than not challenged by both internal and external forces,
forces which focused primarily on fear of domination and
a lack of respect for self-government.
The political organization of the First Republic put

considerable limits on self-determination and self

administration of peoples, the two most basic elements of
German and Slovak discontent which have emerged repeat
edly to the detriment of the ideal.

Even after twenty

years of steady development in international relations,

the semblance of a social and political order that ex-
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isted within Czechoslovakia was challenged and ultimately

destroyed by divergent interests within society itself German and Slovak.

While Nazi Germany bears the respon

sibility of being the efficient cause for the dissolution
of Czechoslovakia, the fact remains that the nature of

Czech, German and Slovak relations compromised the very
cohesion of Czechoslovakia - society and state, making
its continence more vulnerable to fortune.

Twenty years

of mutual coexistence, especially among Czechs and Slo
vaks, amounted to very little in terms of a cohesive
Czechoslovak national identity and its ability to coun
teract such aggression, especially with respect Slovak
secession; the pretense was ended.
With the restoration of Czechoslovakia in 1945,
Czechs and Slovaks had an opportunity to build an equita
ble relationship.

Sudeten Germans were expelled from the

country in retaliation for their role in the occupation
of Czechoslovakia, simplifying the ethnic fabric.

By

1948, however, communism had instituted its own assimila

tory centralism of far greater proportions than had ever

before been experienced, and relations between Czechs and
Slovaks were subsequently thrust into a brusque campaign
designed to bridge the social, political and economic
gaps between each segment for the sake of national, or
rather doctrinaire, cohesion based this time on the com-

munist ideal.

But even after twenty years of forced
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assimilation under communism, the strength of Slovak

resistance to assimilation persisted and inevitably led

to increased demands for a precisely defined equitable
political relationship in the liberation campaign of the
1960s.

With ethnic tensions between Czechs and Slovaks

being the primary politic.al cleavage of the initial so
cialist experience (Wolchik 1992, 192-93), federalism
surfaced as a solution to such a problematic relation.

Defined in terms of a compromise between an extreme
concentration of power and a loose confederation of inde

pendent states for governing a variety of people where

power is divided, with balanced spheres of authority on a
proportional basis, vertically and horizontally, in order
to allow each state its own fundamental political integ
rity (Plano 32), federalism may have, in effect, provided
a structural solution to the Czech/Slovak conflict had it
been given an opportunity to develop along these norma
tive lines.

After all was said and done in terms of

instituting federalism, however, Czechoslovakia remained
highly centralized and became increasingly bifurcated
along the traditional, more natural lines of distinction
- socio-political, economic, ethno-cultural, and geo
graphic in nature.

Federalism failed both because of

inadequacies in its design after 1971 and as a result of
the communist encroachment upon its proper function.

Moreover, in the more recent context, Czech and Slovak
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nationalism impeded upon federalism's utility as well.

The issues of proportional equality in terms of territo

rial neutrality and the lack of a sufficient amount of
homogeneity of fundamental interests prevented the con

stitutional, political structure of federalism from pro
viding a solution to Czechoslovak political and social
organization.

Indeed, the very existence of federalism

aided in the separation and dissolution of Czechoslova
kia, not successfully negating the forces of disharmony
but legitimating their persistence (refer to Leff 1996).
With the success of revolution in 1989, reforms

designed to institutionalize a real democracy within the
existing federal structure were proposed with great opti
mism.

Centralized authority no longer existed in Czecho

slovakia, and the traditional presence of coerced assimi
lation disappeared for the first time.

Moreover, oppor

tunity arose once again for Czechs and Slovaks to work at
achieving a truly democratic and equitable relationship
between themselves without outside interference (i.e.,
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union).

Czechs and Slovaks

were free to define their mutual relations based on the

merits of mutual desire and democracy.
Prior to 1989, Czechs and Slovaks were denied the
opportunity to effectively develop their interrelation
ship of a more accommodating order within formal demo-

cratic and federalism.
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Instead, communist centralism had

guided their relations in what appeared to be a construc
tive direction of cooperation via sheer force.

Central

ized government and policies of assimilation had always

created a veneer of harmony - even within the First Re
public.

With the success of revolution, however, the

reality of the social condition under communism became
increasingly evident and more troublesome over time, and
when the circumstances of the post-revolutionary period
developed and affected Czechs and Slovaks respective to
their real conditions, the fundamental divergences and a

severe lack of "national" cohesion dramatically qualified
the post-revolutionary optimism.

Years of asynchratic

modernization and·development in political, economic and
social terms, supported by the institutionalized separa
tion of Czechs and Slovaks within federalism, presented
itself with distressing implications for a smooth and
successful transformation;

Czechs and Slovaks responded

to post-revolutionary reforms differently, each group in
terms of its specific conditions and perceptions.

Insti

tutionalized federalism based on distinct social, politi
cal, economic, ethno-cultural and territorial lines only
contributed to the polarized nature of society, all con
sequences of which have had perilous implications for a
stable, cohesive order in the final analysis (refer to
Leff 1996, 132).
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From an historical perspective, one should clearly

see a fundamental lack of national cohesion and a propen

sity for dissolution.

Relations between Czechs and Slo

vaks had been jarred and jeered for far too long.

At

tempts at finding a workable solution were never allowed
to develop historically, and the circumstances of time
and tribulation, foreign and domestic in origin, left
Czechs and Slovaks estranged.

When, in fact, opportunity

arose for Czechs and Slovaks to work at an equitable and
just relationship between one another, which in turn
would have provided a greater sense of cohesion for the
sake of stability, either an external variable would

enter into the picture and destroy the opportunity as
exemplified by the influences of Nazi Germany and the
onset of communism, or Czechs and Slovaks would go in

divergent directions as with the increased support of the
ludak movement of the 1930s and the introduction of fed
eralism during the era of Prague Spring.

By the time of

the events of 1989, divergences between Czechs and Slo
vaks were greater in many respects than when Czechs and

Slovaks had first come together, and with the absence of
a central authority of even the most mild nature, Czechs
and Slovaks were once again repelled from one another.
With the historical development in mind and given
the nature of conditions and circumstances in the post
revolutionary period, the prospects for a stable politi-

cal union between Czechs and Slovaks appeared to be slim

at best.
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Seventy-five years of coexistence between

Czechs and Slovaks did very little in terms of advancing
the nature of political relations and a significant de
gree of national cohesion.

Under the circumstances of

the post-revolutionary period there was too little which

bound Czechs and Slovaks together and all too many things
which pushed them apart.

The equation suggested little

sound basis for a stable political union, and it is from
this fundamental perspective that the thesis is restated
and argued within this chapter.
In compliance with the stated objective of this
thesis, this chapter argues from the proposition that the
former state of Czechoslovakia is inherently unstable due
primarily to the incohesive composition of the state, the
historical conditioning of relations between Czechs and

Slovaks in social and political terms over the course of
a century and more, and most particularly as these vari
ables relate to the circumstances of the post
revolutionary period.

To clarify the significance of

these propositions and to prepare the ground for my con
tention that durable regional security is best achieved
by the division of Czechoslovakia into two independent
and reasonably homogenous states, we must again consider
Arend Lijphart's theory of democracy in plural society
and his theory of consociational democracy.
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We have seen that Lijphart argues convincingly that

consociationalism is a means for achieving stable order
in plural society.

However, a more detailed understand

ing of consociational theory and its application to

Czechoslovakia reveals that the basic elements of conso
ciationalism are not present in Czechoslovakia.
The argument of this thesis is designed to correlate

the theoretical propositions for stability in plural

society with the nature of Czechoslovakia's circumstances
from an historical and contemporary perspective in order
to draw conclusions about the prospects for stability

within a unified Czechoslovakia versus that which cur

rently exists within and among the successor states.

The

argument is supported by a comparative analysis of the
prospects for stability within the union versus that

which exists within the successor states under current
circumstances, and it concludes with a reasoned explana
tion as to why division should not be lamented; for the
division of Czechoslovakia has provided not only a higher
probability for stability within each successor republic,
it also serves as a constructive example, be it isolated,
to counter negative perceptions of modern state devolu
tion in light of the trends in modern state devolution.
It has been argued in Chapter I that the favorable
alignment of institutions, elites, and civil society is a
vital and necessary component of stable order.

Constitu-
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tionalism is the basis of all order, and the elements

which comprise an informal constitution must be in them
selves wholly compatible and center (centripetal) ori

ented.

The nature of a regime in terms of the organiza

tion of government institutions, the interrelationship of
elites, especially with respect to the established insti
tutions of government, and civil society have a tremen

dous impact on stability.

The manner in which each is

constructed and relates with the other is a most funda
mental basis for a constitutional order; in essence it is
the basis for stability.

In this vein, therefore, con

siderable emphasis has been placed on the situation of

plural society as it relates to the arguments presented
previously with regards to Gabriel Almond and Seymore
Martin Lipset, for example.

Without a considerable de

gree of political homogeneity and elite agreement, insti
tutions, elites, and civil society are susceptible to the
fragile nature of society's composition (political, eco
nomic and socio-cultural).

If the cohesiveness which

binds society is frail, the greater the burden placed on
political elites and institutions.

Czechoslovakia is clearly classified as a non
homogeneous state and, therefore, inherently unstable.
Much as Gabriel Almond defines stable and non-stable
types according to their plural nature as depicted in the
Introduction, Arend Lijphart agrees with the fundamental
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premise of such propositions and regards social homogeneity and political consensus as natural prerequisites for,
or factors strongly conducive to, stable democratic gov
ernment, arguing that the deep social divisions and po

litical differences within society are held responsible

for instability and the breakdown of democracy.

Lijphart

goes beyond the perspective of political homogeneity,
however, and argues that political stability is achiev

able in plural society despite the injurious elements
inherent to its very nature.

He argues that where the

obvious conditions for stability appear absent, one is
challenged to find solutions, and solutions, he contends,
can be found in consociational theory.

The large number

of states classified as unstable types, and what this
suggests for the stable order of the world order overall,
demands solutions.

It is from this perspective that

Lijphart posits a series of alternatives for sustaining
or achieving stability in plural society, primarily his
theory of consociational democracy.
The Management of Pluralism
Arend Lijphart's primary concern is the centrifugal

force inherent in plural society, arguing that while
segmental cleavages and the centrifugal tendency associ
ated with them create instability by way of the diver
gences, cleavages are an inherent part of a plural soci-

ety and must be, therefore, used as basic building blocs
upon which stability may be constructed.
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Lijphart argues

the importance of reversing such destabilizing forces by
inculcating certain elements such as elite cooperation
and consensus government (i.e., each major bloc has a

veto over collective decisions) into political and social
designs.

He states that centripetal forces in plural

society are dependent upon the interaction of segmental

elites and their ability to channel the various segments
of a plural society in a beneficent direction - centripe
tal or cohesive in nature.

The several elites must work

closely in order to achieve consensus on what is mutually

conducive to society as a whole instead of segments

within society vying for their own interest in a manner
detrimental to the interests of the collective.

Only by

this means is stability effectively enhanced in plural
society.

The means of achieving this consensus of inter

ests, according to Lijphart, can be done in several ways
which vary in nature according to the conditions and
circumstances within varying contexts.

Each of these

conditions has relevance with limited prospects for suc

cess in the context of Czechoslovakia, and each will

therefore, be presented as succinctly as possible in
relationship to the Czechoslovakian context.
Centralized government and assimilation are one
method for stabilizing plural society according to Li-

jphart's theory.

By integrating segments within society
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and providing an adequate degree of egalitarianism, divi
sions and the problems associated with them will either

disappear or diminish considerably.

Lijphart contem-

plates centralized government where possible as the most
effective means of providing continuity.

Centralism,

however, usually requires considerable state coercion

which may undercut the principles of democracy, a direc

tion which Lijphart advocates with great reservation.

In

fact, Lijphart warns of its often counterproductive out
come and tendency to stimulate segmental cohesion and

inter-segmental violence rather than "national" or inter
segmental cohesion

(Lijphart 24).

With regard to cen

tralism and assimilation, Lijphart states the following:
Although the replacement of segmental loyalties
by a common national allegiance appears to be a
logical answer to the problems posed by a plu
ral society, it is extremely dangerous to at
tempt it. Because of the tenacity of primor
dial loyalties, any effort to eradicate them
not only is quite unlikely to succeed, espe
cially in the short run, but may well be coun
terproductive and may stimulate segmental cohe
sion and inter-segmental violence rather than
national cohesion (24).

The potential role which centralism might play in

helping shape the stability of Czechoslovakia in the
post-revolutionary era, therefore, is not a viable con
sideration.

First of all, centralism has never been

accepted as a just means of government in Czechoslovakia

historically, despite its relative successes during the
First Republic.
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In fact, resonating with Lijphart's

concerns, centralism by its very existence has only pro
vided the fuel for segmental cohesion and instability,
although the weight assigned to centralism is obscured by
other factors (communist objections, etc.).

Centralism

and assimilation only invigorated Slovak demands for

greater autonomy.

Moreover, centralization of power was

the very phenomenon that the revolution heartily dis
carded for nothing other than democracy and the right to
self-determination.

It is highly unreasonable that

Czechs, Slovaks and other endogenous peoples of Czecho
slovakia would desire a centralized state after forty

years of authoritarian rule and twenty years of pseudo
federalism.

This is precisely the case; Slovak public

opinion, a substantial social force, demanded greater

autonomy within the post-revolutionary period, but this
was countered by Czech wishes for a strong centralized
union.

In light of the history of centralism and its

affects on relations historically, therefore, centralized
government and assimilation are unreasonable means for

achieving continuity and stability within Czechoslovakia.
Rather than the risk associated with centralized
government, Lijphart proposes a normative and empirical
model of consociational democracy as an alternative for
stable order in plural society, stating that it offers a

more promising method for achieving both democracy and a
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considerable degree of political unity than does central
ism (45).

Aside from the grand coalition which will be dis

cussed in a moment, Lijphart stresses the need for such

concepts as mutual group veto, proportionality, and ade
quate autonomy for societal segments as necessary prereq
uisites for effective consociationalism.

Each element

has a fundamental and theoretical relevance to Czechoslo

vakia, yet each is limited in its prospects for success

due to the lack within Czechoslovakia of the prerequi
sites.

Consociationalism, by its very definition, entails

the cooperation of segmental leaders in spite of the deep
divisions separating them.

Leaders must be committed to

the unity of the country and they should be committed to

democratic principles.

They must have a basic willing

ness to engage in cooperative efforts with the leaders of
other segments in a spirit of moderation and cooperation,
while at the same time, maintaining the support and loy

alty of their own followers; a difficult balancing act to

say the least (refer to 31 and 53).

Lijphart stresses most of all in his theory of con
sociationalism the conception of a grand coalition in the
form of a "grand" council or committee composed of repre
sentative leaders from each of the segments in society,
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each of which have important advisory functions (25).

While the grand coalition may come in many different

forms, its primary purpose is to collect the leaders of

all significant segments in society within a grand, coa

lition government.

The concept is coalescent and not

adversarial, and it is contrasted with the British system
where leaders are divided into a majority government and

minority opposition.

The prime example of a grand coali

tion government is that of Switzerland's Executive Grand
Council where the leaders of each segment in society -

French, German and Italian - come together and serve as

the executive head of government and state (25).

A grand

coalition may take a number of shapes depending on the

nature of societal segmentation for example, but as Li
jphart states, it is not so much any particular institu
tional arrangement which satisfies the prerequisite as
much as the participation by the leaders of all signifi
cant segments governing a plural society (31-36).
Another element of Lijphart's consociational democ
racy, the mutual veto of concurrent majority rule serves
as protection of vital minority interests.

It must be

ests.

c.

mutual among all interests, especially minority inter
Lijphart quotes with respect to John

Calhoun:

The very fact that a veto is available as a po
tential weapon gives a feeling of security
which makes the actual use of it impossible.
By giving to each interest, or proportion, the
power of self-protection, all strife and strug-
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gle between them for ascendancy is prevented,
and thereby••••every feeling calculated to
weaken the attachment to the whole is suppressed (36-38).

Decisions must be unanimous at the group level, and they
must deviate from the majority rule principle in order to
be effective.

Furthermore, proportionality serves as the principle

standard of political representation in terms of the

civil service appointments and the allocation of public
funds, according to Lijphart.

Parity is an especially

useful alternative to proportionality when a plural soci
ety is divided in two segments of equal size (41).

Pro

portionality eliminates the majority/minority confronta

tion in decision making bodies (38-41).
In tune with proportionality, a large amount of
segmental autonomy, providing segmental rule over itself
is an essential point of consociational theory (41).

On

all matters of common interest, decisions should be made
by all segments with equally proportioned degrees of
influence.

On all other matters, the decisions and their

execution can be left to individual segments (41).
Abstractly, each aspect of this theory has consider
able relevance to Czech and Slovak relations.

The con

ceptions of a grand coalition, mutual veto, proportional
ity and autonomy, in particular, are essential components
for stable order in Czechoslovakia.

They are the basis

upon which a stable political union might have been con-
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structed equitably and to the benefit of each party in

volved.

Consociationalism seems an interesting alterna

tive for achieving a stable order therein.

In fact,

Lijphart has drawn attention to Czechoslovakia's modest

attempt and success with consociational democracy (the
Petka) during the First Republic.

There are, however, significant specific circum
stances which prevent consociationalism from being a
viable alternative in Czechoslovakia's case.

These cir

cumstances pertain primarily to the role and nature of

elites and the other prerequisite conditions necessary

for consociationalism - the commitment to union, the

degree of segmentation within society, the structure of
federalism and the level of overarching loyalty.
The conditions which are favorable for consocia
tional democracy include the size of a state, the struc
ture of cleavages - including the cross-cutting of cleav
ages, multiple balance of power among societal segments,
segmental isolation, and overarching loyalties (54).
Lijphart argues that small size is favorable to consocia
tional democracy in so far as it is conducive to closer
interaction (65-70).
One of the most important conditions conducive to
consociational democracy is the structure of cleavages
themselves, a point made by Lijphart and others, notably

Lipset (10; Lipset 78-91).

Cleavages must be distin-
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guished in terms of numbers and the degree of fragmenta
tion that they cause in society, the extent to which

different cleavages crosscut or coincide, the types and
intensities (Lijphart 71).

Agreeing with such as Lipset

and Eckstein, Lijphart stresses that the number, relative
size of segments and the manner in which cleavages cut

across each other affects the chances for consociational
democracy by providing a balance of power.

Cross-cutting

can have important consequences for the intensity gener
ated with and between cleavages because they moderate
attitudes and actions (75).

Nevertheless, the theory of

consociational democracy does not rely on the advantages

of crosscutting cleavages as the primary explanation of
the political stability of plural societies.

Of greater

significance is the relationship of elites, how those
elites are chosen, how they interact with respect to the
nature of segmentation, and their commitment to the ad
vantages of inter-segmental cooperation (81).

When

cleavages are roughly equal in social power, they result
in separate internally homogenous segments that are not
strongly subject to cross-pressures (8l)J such divisions
are, therefore, more dangerous and require greater meas
ures to bridge the gap for the sake of harmony.
In terms of the balance of power, Lijphart argues
that a multiple balance of power among the segments of a

plural society is more conducive to consociationalism
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than a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of the

segments because if one segment has a clear majority, its
leaders may attempt to dominate rather than cooperate
with the rival minority.

In a society with two segments

of approximately equal size, the leaders of both may hope
to win a majority and to achieve their aims by domination
instead of cooperation (55).

This is precisely what

happened in Czechoslovakia; Czechs dominated in every
respect simply because of their plurality, and the domi
nation was exacerbated by Slovak perceptions of Czech
dominance.

However, Lijphart states that when one is

dealing with a large number of segments within society,
as with a very limited number, the greater the difficulty
in achieving cooperation among all interests.

The

greater the number, the greater is the task of forging
social cohesion and the greater likelihood for deadlock
and contention.

The optimal number of segments for ef

fective consociationalism, he states, is three or four.
The conflict potential of cleavages also depends on
the degree to which inherent intensities are moderated by
overarching loyalties - cohesive forces which bond seg

ments together and diminish their isolation from one
another.

For example, the overarching loyalty of Slo

vaks, one might argue, is particular to Slovak interests
solely, whereas for Czechs, overarching loyalty may be to

the Czechoslovak ideal.

Conversely, overarching loyal-

ties may operate simultaneously with the cleavages.
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The

conflict potential depends on the combined effect of both

the divisive and cohesive forces - cleavages and over
arching loyalties (81).

In terms of the interrelationship between segmented

cleavages and party systems, political parties are the

principle institutional means, according to Lijphart, for
translating segmental cleavages into the political realm
(83).

Yet, the evidence suggests that the influence of

cross-cutting between segments of society and party are
not very strong and not always positive.

The most sig

nificant types of cross-cutting, argues Lijphart, are
those moderating class cleavages and their linkage to
segmental cleavages, especially if they produce segments
with approximate economic equality and stimulate society
wide overarching loyalties (87).

In terms of party systems which are favorable to
consociational democracy, Lijphart argues that parties
based on segments are most favorable because they can act

as the political representative of their segments and

provide a good method of selecting the segmental leaders
(62).

While a more homogenous political culture may

respond favorably to a limited number of parties, multi
party systems are appropriate to plural, less homogenous
cultures (64).

In plural societies with regionally con-

centrated segments and a federal constitution, the func-
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tion of representation may, furthermore, be shared by the
state governments or the state representatives in the
national legislature and executive (62).

The merit of

proportional representation is that it allows the forma
tion of segmental parties, and that it does not artifi

cially force the establishment of larger but less repre
sentative parties (64-5).
Finally, Lijphart also introduces the role which

federalism may play in enhancing stability within plural

society (42).

Federalism is an attractive way of imple

menting the ideas of segmental autonomy, according to
Lijphart, because it organizes the segments for represen
tational purposes (43), if the segments have specific
geographical foci.

One would expect instability to in

crease as territorial fragmentation increases because

clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society
have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and conse
quently the escalation of potential antagonisms into
actual hostility (88).

Federalism, however, can serve as

a means of enhancing consociational democracy by separat

ing societies institutionally.

It aids in giving seg

ments a sense of autonomy and independence and provides a
constructive system by which interests may be equitably
balanced both in terms of the formal institutional struc
ture and the operation of democracy.

However, federalism

is not a panacea; there are dangers Lijphart warns, and
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the greatest danger is particular to segmental isolation

along geographic lines.

Here federalism may increase the

degree of separation by applying segmental autonomy, and
in a bifurcated society without a varied balance of in
terests, this can be detrimental to the objectives of
consociational theory (89).
The prospects for consociationalism in Czechoslova

kia are, therefore, severely limited by the prerequisite
conditions required for its success.

In terms of the

population at large, Czechoslovak society is bifurcated.

Two distinct segments do not provide for a sound balance
of power, especially when viewed from the perspective of
federalism based on ethno-geographic lines.

The degree

to which cross-cutting cleavages are present - that is in
terms of socio-economic status, religion, language etc.,
has not superseded ethnic/national cleavages.
no adequate basis of overarching loyalty.

There is

Segments re

main isolated and loyalties were confined to the several
segments, and while levels of civil society were evident,
there were certainly no developed institutions bridging
the two primary segments.

Indeed, there is little evi

dence to suggest that the population at large had any
extraordinary commitment to union, certainly not enough
to compensate for the absence of elite accommodation.
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There is a fundamental lack of basis for elite coop-

eration in Czechoslovakia within the post-revolutionary
period.

The events surrounding the constitutional crisis

from 1990-1992 as described earlier are testament to the
perils which afflict elite relations.
strong social commitment to the union.

There is simply no
Instead, as

Welsch depicts so succinctly, elite relations developed
according to self-interest.

The ability of elites, Va

clav Klaus and Vladimir Meciar in particular, to engage
in cooperative efforts with one another while maintaining
the support and loyalty of their followers was a diffi

cult balancing act to achieve in light of both the diver
sity of interests within each republic, and the diver
gence of conditions between the republics.

In theoreti

cal terms, the concept of a grand coalition is pertinent,
but in practical terms, considering the real variables,

it is simply not feasible that a grand council of segmen
tal interests be assembled and operate under the condi
tions found among Czechoslovak elite as they stand, both
during and following the process of dissolution.

The

Czech and Slovak republics, their people and elites had

little upon which they could find consensus, including

how to reform economically, let alone the extent to which
they should remain united.
Lijphart argues that where the basis for consocia
tionalism is not evident in a plural society, another

solution is to divide society into more or less politi-
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cally homogeneous entities in order that stability may
then be achieved within this assemblage of interests

either through centralized or consociational means.

It

has been argued here that neither of these alternatives

are feasible and that, therefore, political stability is

enhanced by the division of Czechoslovakia.

Indeed, two

more than less homogeneous states have been created, each
upon the merits of its more localized sense of national
association - a shared heritage, language, present condi
tion and vision of the future - with characteristics

which are more conducive to an enduring stable order.
Contrasts:

The Successor Republics

In light of the division of Czechoslovakia, a certain
stability is evident both within and among the successor
republics.

The level of stability, however, varies for

each republic, and a comparison of levels of stability
within each, in contrast to the federation as described
earlier, suggests that stability is considerably enhanced
by the division.
As it stands, the Czech Republic may be character
ized as more than less homogeneous in its social and
political composition.

Of the 10.4 million inhabitants

in the Czech Republic, Czechs (Bohemians and Moravians)
comprise 94 percent of the population.

Ethnic Slovaks
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comprise about 3 percent of the population, close to
300,000 people.

There are some 69,000 Poles comprising

about 0.6 percent of the population and 52,000 Germans
comprising

o.s

percent of the population.

Additionally

there are roughly 31,000 Gypsies, 20,000 Hungarians, and
15,000-18,000 Jews living in the Czech Republic.

The Czech Republic also has a sound basis for stable
order in terms of its formal constitution.

Organized as

a parliamentary republic, the Czech Constitution provides
for a bicameral national legislature consisting of a two
hundred member Chamber of Deputies and an eighty-one

member Senate.

The executive branch is composed of a

President who serves as head of state and a national
The

government composed of a Prime-Minister and cabinet.

Constitution provides for a healthy basis of individual
rights within a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Free
doms, and there is a sound basis for a separation of
powers and checks and balances (Illner 74 and 79).

The

President, for example, is elected by the legislature
(National Council) every five years and is responsible
for appointing the Prime Minister at the recommendation

of the Chairman of the House of Deputies.

The President

makes appointments for an independent Constitutional
Court, top officials at the National Bank and the Supreme
Control Office - an independent office for supervision of
state property and the budget.

The President has veto

powers and the power to dissolve the House of Deputies

within certain conditions.
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As head of state, the Presi

dent also has a number of rights and responsibilities

concerning the ratification of treaties, appointment of
military leadership and the right to grant amnesty.

The

legislature is the only directly elected body of govern
The House of Deputies is elected on the basis of

ment.

universal suffrage with party proportional representa

tion, while the Senate, rather limited in its authority,
is elected by majority representation.

As an example of

its limitations, the Senate can only initiate legislation
at the suggestion of the government; legislation is pri
marily initiated from the House of Deputies.
There are ten main political parties in the Czech
Republic representing a broad range of political inter
ests.

Government is comprised of the Christian Demo

cratic Union-Czech People's Party; Civic Democratic Alli
ance; The Civic Democratic Party; Christian Democratic
Party.

Each is reform-oriented, center-right with pro

European stands and only minor differences on such issues
as agricultural policy, protectionism and centralism
(Illner 81-82).

The coalition as a whole is currently

solidly right of center.

The Christian Democratic Union

Czech People's Party is characterized as social-liberal;
the Civic Democratic Party, conservative liberal with
emphasis on a strong state; the Christian Democratic

Party, conservative-liberal, denominationally-Christian;
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and the Civic Democratic Party, decidedly liberal (8182).

As described earlier, the Civic Democratic Party was
the first Western style political party to emerge from
the dissident movement, Civic Forum.

It is the only

political party with a well developed grass-roots organi

zation and a democratic base from which to elect it lead
ership and formulate party policy (Pick 207).

Chief

among the coalition members, the Civic Democratic Party
has a broad appeal due to successes in formulating and

implementing economic reforms and its ability to absorb

smaller parties and form alliances with centrist parties.
With the leadership of Vaclav Klaus, the Civic Democratic
Party has maintained a directed economic reform program
complimented by a deliberate social policy which has
substantially delayed unpopular measures for the sake of
social peace since the revolution (Illner 31 and 76).
Opposition, on the other hand, is comprised of the
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia; Social Democrats;
Czech and Moravian Party of the Center; Liberal Social

Union (the Farmers' Party and the Green Party); Liberal

National Social Party; and Czech Republican Party.

Each

is characterized as either radically populist, left,
centered, moderately liberal or state centered
nationalist and extremist-authoritarian.

The Left Bloc
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and Republican parties are the two most extreme parties

with little more than 15 percent of the public's support
(Illner 77 and 81).

Opposition is primarily vested with

the left of center Social Democratic Party, an offshoot
of the former communists.

The Social Democrats tend to

concentrate on the quality of the social condition, but
they have failed to produce a concise and coherent eco
nomic program (81; Pick 207).

They advocate moderate

state interventionism, participation of employees in
corporate life and ownership, and the legality of priva
tization.

Ranking second to Civic Democratic Party, the

Social Democrats suffer from the lack of a broad appeal

and they are commonly associated with the policies of the
former communists (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 9
and 11).

Despite the number of parties and the diversity of
interest, however, Czechia's party system seems to be
evolving towards a two party system.

Main parties are

coalescing and consolidating with one another (Illner
82).

It is, therefore, fair to characterize the politi

cal party orientation of the Czech Republic as center
right, centripetally oriented and stable (77 and 83).
Currently, the orientation of Parliament is such that of
the two hundred seats, Civic Democratic Party holds 65
seats; Christian Democrats 10; Civic Democratic Alliance
16; Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party 15;
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Czech Social Democrats 18; Left Bloc 25; Communist Party

10; Liberal Social Union 9; Liberal National Social Party
S; Bohemian-Moravian Center Party 9; Assembly for the

Republic 6; and 12 seats for the independents.

Complimenting this structural basis of stability is

a positive elite composition.

The Czech Republic's elite

representation and interaction is diverse yet congenial

and also centripetally oriented.

Czechia has instituted

a policy of lustration ("screening") since the revolution
which prevents top communist functionaries, members of
the People's Malitia and agents and suspected collabora
tors of the secret police from holding key positions in
both government and industry for a period of five years
(Derlien 412).

Just recently parliament has extended

this policy until 2000 (Knox "Screening Extended").
The policy of lustration has aided in the transition
of the state apparatus from the old elite to the new
democratically oriented elite of the revolutionary era.
In general, there has been a generational and political
shift as a result (Illner 79).

The new elite tend to be

younger; they are typically better educated and profes

sional.

Most importantly, however, there is a healthy

elite dialogue.

Elites struggle with one another over

various policy issues as one might expect in any healthy
political context, most of all in a transitional process;
the nature of elite interaction in the Czech Republic is

vibrant and healthy.

Much like the nature of political
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party representation, elites are center oriented and
generally conciliatory.

Such individuals as Vaclav

Havel, President of the Czech Republic; Milos Zeman,
Chairman of the Social Democratic Party; Vladimir
Dloughy, member of Civic Democratic Alliance and Minister
of Foreign Trade; Jiri Dienstbier, former Minister of

Foreign Affairs; Josef Zilience, current Foreign Minis
ter; Vaclav Klaus, Prime-Minister; and trade union leader
Richard Falber help create an atmosphere conducive for
stable government and political interaction.39

The Czech Republic's successful economic transforma

tion, based on macroeconomic stabilization and micro

economic restructuring, has also contributed to a sound
basis for stability.
of 1995.

The economy grew in the first half

The Gross Domestic Product increased by 3.9

percent in real terms in the first quarter of 1995 and
4.1 percent in the second quarter against the same peri
ods in 1994.

Inflation halted in July 1995 with an an

nual rate of 9.5 percent for 1995 compared to 11.1 per
cent and 9.5 percent in 1994 for pensioners and employees
respectively. Unemployment was a mere 2.92 percent in
July 1995 compared to 3.18 percent in July 1994 - Prague
has an unemployment rate of 0.2 percent (Economist Intel39 Refer to Derlein 317 for a thorough discussion of
elite interaction within Eastern Europe generally.

ligence Unit 1995, 22-24).
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Labor productivity was up,

and average wages have increased evenly across all sec
tors.

There is also indication of a trend towards in

vestment rather than consumption.

Additionally, as of

October 1, 1995, the Czech Korun is fully convertible,
making investments in and out of the Czech Republic eas
ier and completing the Czech Republic's last condition

for membership of the Organization for Economic Coopera
tion and Development (8 and 15).
Clearly, the Czech Republic is well on its way to
integration with Western Europe, the primary goal of the

post-revolutionary government.

In September 1994, Prague

repaid $471 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF)
loans five years ahead of schedule, making the Czech

Republic the first in Eastern Europe to pay off all IMF
debts (World Fact Book 114). Hard currency reserves in
the banking system totaled more than $8.5 billion in
October 1994, and Standard and Poor's gave the Czech
Republic a credit rating of BBB+, two steps higher than
Hungary and one step higher than Greece (114).
In structural terms, the Czech Republic has privat
ized 75-80 percent of its economy.

There are roughly

only 2,000 enterprises remaining in state control while
1,426 are still owned by the National Property Fund.
further 579 enterprises are scheduled for partial or
whole sale by June 1996; these primarily include the

A
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country's steelworks, coal mines and electricity generating enterprises.

Some forty-five enterprises deemed to

be of strategic importance to the state, and therefore

exempt from privatization initially, are now docketed for
privatization as well.

Only four enterprises will remain

under state control within the next five years (Economist
Intelligence Unit 1995, 15-18; Illner 51).

Despite the successes in political and economic

reform, however, there is still work to be done.

The

outcome of reforms are not imminent, and there is always
the danger that reforms will adversely affect social
conditions.

Democracy and capitalism - the free market -

are not clearly understood or firmly anchored, and civil
society is not well developed institutionally.,o

Constitutional provisions for instituting the second
chamber of parliament, the Senate, have not yet been
implemented despite the fact that election of the Senate
has finally been scheduled for the general election in
June of 1996.

Additionally, Higher Level Administrative

Units of Government (HLAUs) have not been instituted,

leaving a gap between the central government and its

6,237 rural and urban principalities and seventy-five

districts.

Prior to January 1, 1991, the Czech Republic

was divided into seven regions, being themselves composed
,o Pehe provides a well developed description of this
claim through a contrast of Klaus and Havel.

of eight to ten districts, but since 1991, regions and
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districts have been completely eliminated.

While such conditions present no serious threat to

social or political stability, they do present serious
concerns for constitutional order, especially the manner
in which civil society is to be constructed (refer to
Pehe).

Prolonged delays in implementing various consti

tutional bodies of government are cause for concern be

cause they are part of the process by which the political
order is defined.

Additionally, the sentiments with

which the issues have been addressed are cause for con
cern.

Vaclav Klaus, for example, has all along criti

cized the bicameral legislature, arguing its redundancy
and potential threat to maintaining a small and efficient
government.

This, of course, coincides with his classi

cal liberal philosophical position and his concerns for
consolidating the transformation quickly before the state
gets mired down in parliamentary procedures (Pehe 15).
Opponents of Klaus, however, argue that the basis of
constitutional democracy and order depends upon the com
plete implementation of the constitutional order.41 Again
with respect to the HLAUs, Klaus maintains that the state
does not need multiple layers of government, and that it
'1 Refer to Lansky 12; Victor Gomez "Delay Could
Spell Death"; Knox "Deputies Approve System of Election"
and "Creation of Senate" for detailed information about
the Senate.

only inhibits efficient government.
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Vaclav Havel, on the

other hand, argues that HLAUs are an essential element of

civil society.

They tie government to society inte

grally, he argues, building government from the bottom up

and making a basis for stable social and political or
der.'2

Advocates of decentralization favor limited, yet

precisely directed government, and the debate surrounding
the issues remains healthy and conciliatory, but the
duration of the debate runs the risk of compromising
stability by affecting public confidence in establishing
a sense of order.

While there is no serious demagoguery in Czech poli

tics, there is use of populism and non-democratic meas
ures, neither of which contribute to an atmosphere of
rationality or trust among the population at large
(Illner 88).

Indeed, varying levels of corruption are

prevalent in both government and the economy.

While most

cases are only a result of inadequate legal restrictions
such as parliamentarians taking advantage of their posi
tions (refer to Zivnustkova "Accountability Makes a De
bute"), there are more extreme cases of fraud and corrup

tion.

The most infamous and highly publicized case of

42 Refer to Victor Gomez "New Level of Government";
refer also to Lyman and Hanspach 2-3 for a details about
HLAUs and the debate surrounding their implementation;
refer to Pehe 14-15 for a discussion of the debate be
tween Havel and Klaus over the issue of centralized gov
ernment and civil society.
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corruption involves the chairman of coupon privatization,

Jaroslav Lizner, who was convicted in October 1994 for

accepting a substantial bribe ($307,000) for the sale of
a western Bohemian milk company.

The case raised public

concern about the legitimacy of privatization despite the

fact that there are no other instances of corruption of
such magnitude.

Needless to say, this type of develop

ment places serious doubts in the public's trust of

authority (Lawson "Lizner Handed a Seven-Year Sentence").
Campaign finance is also a hot button issue among
the general public.

Political parties have been known to

accept significant amounts of money from questionable
sources.

The coalition Christian Democratic Union -

Czech Peoples' Party, for example, allegedly borrowed Kc
3 million ($100,000) from Italian businessman and alleged
cocaine trafficker, Lionell Moscu, in order to pay for
1992 campaign debts, and Klaus's Civic Democratic Party
is known to have held very expensive fundraisers during
privatization (some $4,000 per plate) at which leaders of
Czech industry were present.•J

A more direct and serious threat to stable order,

however, is microeconomic restructuring and the implica
tions it poses for social order.

While macroeconomic

See Prognosis (April 29-May 12, 1994: 2) for an
explanation concerning the corruption found among opposi
tion forces.
'3

stabilization is being addressed rather eloquently, mi-
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croeconomic restructuring has yet to face its greatest

challenges - competition and profit.

Laws and regula

tions provisioning bankruptcy and capital markets, for

example, are either not yet created or are not clearly
drawn.

Additionally, private sector development is still

deficient with regard to technological advancements
(Illner 44-46 and 55).

There is an ever increasing re

alization of greater corporate modernization and reform.
Corporations and industry are continually down-sizing and
reorganizing for competition and profit (43-50), while
firms remain inefficient and struggle for profit in an
increasingly competitive marketplace.

With the need to

catch up to the West, companies are forced to modernize
or face bankruptcy.

In 1994 alone, bankruptcies quadru

pled, and this trend in itself has left the general pub
lic with a greater sense of skepticism about the reforms.
In many cases, little of the promised benefits of priva
tization are being realized.

As a result of companies

either going bankrupt or modernizing, few people are
seeing clear returns on their investments.
With the end of communism, securing of market re
forms and the continuing reintegration into Europe, in
creasingly greater attention is being paid to social
conditions.

There is an increasing sense of alienation

and anomie as the economy moves further away from command

structures towards free markets and capitalism.

There
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are problems with wages, employment, the cost of living,
and economic security.

Workers are having to increas

ingly reorient their careers to meet the needs of indus
try and the market.

With the pace of change, there is

always a sense of uncertainty about the future.

Jobs are

going from industry and agriculture to tourism, services,
banking and the insurance sectors (27).

Still, more than

30 percent of the labor force is employed in manufactur

ing with well over 45 percent in the services, and the

percentages are decreasing and increasing, respectively
(30).

The Czech Statistical Office reported in March

1993 that Czech family incomes rose by half ($93) between
1988 and 1992 to 2,809 Kc. - average monthly wages are
now $250-$300 per worker.

When 88 percent inflation is

taken into account over the same period, the real value
of incomes fell by one-fifth (Knox "Six Years After").

While inflation has been kept under control and wages are
increasing, the nature of reforms places greater strain
on incomes.

Housing and medicine are still in the proc

ess of being privatized (Illner 68; Knox "Bills Outstrip
Incomes"; Schneider "Patients Face Big Bill").

Educa

tors, doctors, and rail workers, all of whom are still
predominantly employed by the state, are struggling to
survive on incomes that are increasingly falling behind
the market averages.

The public sector simply can not

compete with market wages, and strikes have been initiated by educators, medical unions and rail workers.
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Thus

far, however, government has been able to negotiate with

unions and management within a tripartite arrangement to
diffuse the tensions (Zivnustkova and Kayal "Unions
Threaten Chaos"; Schneider "One-day Strikes").

It is also evident that as reforms take shape Czech

society is becoming increasingly stratified along socio
economic and political lines typical of free-market de
mocracy.

Change in real income is indeed dramatic.

There has been a remarkable increase in inequality be
tween 1988 and 1990 (Illner 68).

The socio-professional

structure is witnessing a leveling off in terms of the
percentage of population in each subdivision.

For exam

ple, while skilled labor has traditionally been the high
est percentage of labor, higher staff and intellectuals

are becoming equal in percentage to other higher profes
sionals.
creasing.

The percentage of self-employed is also in
By the year 2005, roughly ten percent of the

population is projected to belong to the higher staff

intellectual class, 14 percent to other higher profes

sionals, 17 routine non-manual, 16 self-employed, 21
skilled workers and 16 unskilled workers with only 5
percent as farmers and agricultural workers (67).
Despite the fact that Czech society appears to be
abandoning its egalitarianism in terms of a relationship

shaped by market determined wages and occupations, a
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significant proportion of the population continues a

commitment to equality of result (71). In fact, the
share of poor in the total population is low.

The share

of those in poverty - the percentage of those individuals
living under 50 percent of the income median - was 1.3

percent of the population in 1993 compared to 3.1 percent
in 1991 (69; Knox "Bills Outstrip Incomes").
In November and December of 1989, more than 40 per

cent of the population preferred the reformed socialist
option for the Czech Republic, 3 percent were for capi
talism and some 50 percent for the "third way," compris
ing elements of both capitalism and socialism.

As of

1993, 63 percent of the population supports unlimited
enterprise, 50 percent gives a positive evaluation of

privatization and more than 50 percent views capitalism
as the only road of development (Illner 70).

More than

half recognize the capitalist character of the privatiza
tion.

A majority, ranging to two-thirds of the popula

tion, tolerates the changes.

The remaining part of soci

ety regards privatization with some suspicion.

Seventy

five to 80 percent of the population favors state inter

vention in the economy in order to control private enter
prise (71).
Over 70 percent of the population favored the con
temporary regime over the communist regime in 1991, this
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compared to 31.5 percent in Hungary, 50.7 percent in
Poland and 43.5 percent in Slovakia (87).

Democratic

liberal orientations have strong support in Czechia.

In

1992, 92 percent of the population agreed that all people
must have equal rights, 74 percent agreed that the state
should not force an individual to do something he does
not want to do.

Above all, Czechs had strong feelings

about order in society, having in mind the need to sup
press the growing crime rate.

Ninety-four percent of

Czechs stated that "above all, there must be order in
society".

As it stands, the political orientation of the

Czech Republic is such that roughly 29 percent of the
population advocates policies espoused by the left.

They

typically include pensioners, people with secondary edu
cation and "losers" in the transformation process.

Some

26 percent is oriented towards the center, and 45 percent
to the right.

Those professing the right are private

entrepreneurs, non-manual laborers, the young and winners
in the transformation process (88).

Roughly 90 percent

of the population favors either reformed socialism or the
third way - a healthy mixture of capitalism and social

ism, probably defined best as social democracy as experi
enced in many Scandinavian countries.

This assemblage of

variables represents an extremely sound basis for socio
political continuity, and with the institutional organi
zation, the nature of political party orientation and

elites, not to mention Czechia's economic success, the
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promise of social cohesion of Czech society outweighs the

immediate dangers presented here.

Despite all such possible threats to stability,
government reforms are moderate and incremental and this
is likely to become more the case by necessity as society
reacts to them over time.

Government has proven itself

keen on the social problems which threaten its very own
position to say the least.

The government coalition

holds only a slim majority - 106 of the 200 seats with a
third of the vote, and there is evidence that the Civic

Democratic Alliance is loosing popular support while the
Social Democrats are gaining.

Indeed, the Social Demo

crats have maintained just below a third of the public
support in public opinion polls as of late, and the per

centage of support for the Civic Democratic Party and the

Social Democrats has fluctuated since September 1994
(Knox "Social Democrats Surpass Klaus").

Nevertheless,

opposition is unlikely to muster enough support to oust
government in the June 1996 election (Economist Intelli
gence Unit 1995, 17; Stojaspal "Social Democrats Are

Closing In").

They may, however, influence the direction

of policy by gaining a significant proportion of the
vote, in turn impacting the nature of government reforms.
Much depends on the nature of reforms, their success,

especially in terms of the economy, and the public's

reaction to the effects of such reforms.

But with eco-

nomic forecasts, the future appears optimistic.
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A growth

rate of 14 percent is expected over the next few years.

Gross Domestic Product is forecasted to grow by 4.2 per
cent in 1996 and slightly higher in 1997 (Economist In
telligence Unit 1995, 8).

Inflation is projected to

remain slightly below 10 percent for the immediate fu

ture, and government is beginning to address the regula

tion of the economy (17).

The future holds promising

prospects for the Czech Republic.

This and the nature of

Czechia's social composition suggests a high probability
for a durable stable order.

The prospects for Slovakia are not as promising.

The stability of Slovakia is highly questionable due
predominantly to the nature of Slovakia's ethnic and
cultural structure. Slovakia is highly fragmented in
terms of both social organization and political culture;
and the nature of elite accommodation is incondusive to
coalescing these differences. In fact, it is the primar
ily catalyst for societal divisiveness.
Eighty-six percent of Slovakia's 5.4 million inhabi

tants are Slovak, and one million people are of minority
status.

Of greatest concern are the 560,000 Hungarian

inhabitants who comprise 11 percent of Slovakia's popula
tion.

While Slovak and Hungarian relations have tradi

tionally been congenial since World War II, relations
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have become especially troublesome since the revolution.
In fact, relations between Slovaks and Hungarians are

beginning to bear a striking resemblance to the nature of
Czech and Slovak relations prior to the division.

Other

accounts of the situation have equated Slovak-Hungarian

relations with those surrounding the Sudeten German popu

lation of Czechoslovakia prior to World War II.

Hungarians are organized politically into three

parties which, as a coalition, form the third largest
political movement and the second largest opposition
group in Slovakia.

With Hungarian support for the plight

of nationals living outside of Hungary proper, tensions

with Slovakia are becoming increasingly troublesome with

tenuous implications for stability both within Slovakia
and the region.''

The issue of contention centers on the Hungarian

claim for distinct nationhood and the rights of minority
status in general.

In particular, Slovak-Hungarian rela

tions began to deteriorate considerably in 1990 with the
Gabockova Dam dispute between Hungary and Slovakia
(Implementation of the Helsi�ki Accords 16).

It esca

lated with Slovak independence and the ratification of
the Slovak Constitution in 1992 which makes reference to
'' Refer to Implementation of the Helsinki Accords
12-14 and Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 38 for a
consideration of ethnic tensions in Slovakia.
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only the Slovak nation, with no attention paid to Hungar-

ian nationals or any other of the sizable non-Slovak

population.

As of late, however, contentions have cen

tered on legislation which prohibits the use of Hungarian

in official state business, declaring Slovak the official
language of Slovakia.

Legislation passed in early 1995

has, in essence, prohibited the use of Hungarian on
street signs and in public schools, even in areas which
are occupied predominantly by Hungarians.

The legisla

tion goes so far as to insist that Hungarian women use
the traditional Slovak suffix "ova" with their names.

Furthermore, radical Slovak nationalists have advocated
the enculturation of Hungarians into the Slovak nation by
introducing Slovak in the curriculum of Hungarian nurser
ies, closing Hungarian schools and instituting Slovak

schools in towns inhabited predominantly by Hungarians
(12; Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 41).
Other concerns with Slovakia's ethnic composition
involve the significant Gypsy population which is by most

accounts dramatically under estimated in the last census.
It is suggested that the Roma comprise 1.5 percent of

Slovakia's population.

The Banska Bystrica incident of

July 21 in which a teenage Romany died of burns inflicted
by skinheads is the most famous example of just how the
Gypsy population is treated within Slovakia, and the
broader region (refer to Implementation of the Helsinki

Accords 13; also Economist Intelligence Unit 1995).
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While the Romany conflagrations pale in comparison with

respect to the more serious political implication of

Slovak/Hungarian relations, they contribute to the ever

increasing concern about the national stability of Slova
kia.

And while it is also true that Czechia has its

share of problems with racial hatred etc., the issue in
Slovakia takes on a more serious tone, one which seri

ously threatens the stability of the society itself both

internally and externally. In each case, the ethnoracial problems of the post-revolutionary era are usually
indicative of other endemic problems in society. In

addition to the sizable Hungarian and Roma population,
there are roughly 54,000 Czechs, 32,000 Ukrain
ian/Ruthenians, 5,400 Germans, 54,000 Poles, 3,000 Jews
and a number of others people of various ethnic

groups/nationalities living in Slovakia (Illner 22; Wol
chik 1991, 181; Implementation of the Helsinki Accords
11).
In terms of a formal constitution, Slovakia has the

basis of a sound democratic order.

Much like Czechia,

Slovakia is organized as a parliamentary republic with a
president as head of state, a 150 member unicameral na
tional council and a government headed by a prime
minister serving as chief executive officer.

As with the

Czech constitution, there are adequate separation of

powers and checks and balances provisioned in the Slovak

Constitution.
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The President is elected by the National

Council, and the Government is appointed by the President

on the recommendation of the Prime Minister who, in turn,
is appointed by the President at the suggestion of the
National Council.

While there is skepticism about Slova

kia's use of party slates in electing the National Coun

cil, the most vexing aspect of Slovakia's constitution is
its vagueness with respect to free speech, personal lib
erties and the protection of minorities (Implementation
of the Helsinki Accords 7 and 9), a problem of greater

concern considering that Slovakia does not have a free
and independent judiciary (19).

An additional negative attribute of Slovakia is the
nature of political party organization which is neither
stable or centripetally oriented.

The organization of

political parties in Slovakia is developing along in

creasingly divergent lines, reflecting Slovakia's politi
cal fragmentation.

On the one hand there are eight major

contending parties of which the Movement for a Democratic
Slovakia, Slovak National Party and the Association of

Slovak Workers comprise a loose-knit governing coalition.
Opposition, on the other hand, consists of the Party of
the Democratic Left, the Christian Democratic Movement,
the Democratic Union, the Hungarian Christian Democratic
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Party, the Hungarian Civic Party, and Coexistence
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37).

The coalition government is staunchly conservative

and fragile as it is comprised of three radically differ
ent political interests, each of which have come together
under the pretenses of vague and often self-serving in
terests.

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, for exam

ple, is the leading party within the government.

Headed

by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar, it holds 12 of the 17
key ministries of government and 61 of the 150 seats in

parliament with 35 percent of the popular vote from the
September 30-October 1, 1994 election.

Advocating a

strong centralized government, the Movement for a Demo
cratic Slovakia is highly nationalistic and authoritar
ian.

It supports the continued role the state police,

and it has gone so far as to call for the elimination of
the Presidency and the cancellation of privatization

(Ledford "Night of Long Knives"; Mihailovich "Meciar
Takes No Prisoners").

The first major move of government

was to postpone the second wave of privatization s�hed
uled December 15, 1994 (Reynolds "Meciar's Hand of
Friendship").

The Slovak National Party, on the other hand, is the
oldest of Slovakia's political parties.

Being founded in

1881 at the height of the emerging Slovak nationalism,
the goal of the party has been to create an independent

Slovak state.

The Slovak National Party is best charac-

242

terized for its nationalist and xenophobic stands on a

number of issues, and it is most responsible for inciting

the ethnic and racial problems in Slovakia, especially
the antagonistic governmental policies towards Slovak

Hungarians (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 41).

Jan

Slota, leader of the coalition partner, has suggested
that Romanies be housed in separate villages because of
failed attempts to integrate them into society (41).
The Association of Slovak Workers is a left-wing

party which espouses limited economic reform and a moder
ate level of privatization. While they have an interest
in continuing with privatization, members of the Associa
tion of Slovak Workers contend that Meciar's current
privatization scheme is unjust.

This, in turn has cre

ated the potential for a split within the Association
itself (38 and 42).

Both the Slovak National Party and

the Association of Slovak Workers are opposed to Slovak
entry into NATO and the European Union (refer to Gomez
"Slovakia's Odd Bedfellows"; Reynolds "Meciar's Hand of
Friendship").

The Association holds 13 parliamentary

seats with 7.3 percent of the vote.
Much like government, opposition is diverse and more
limited in its common interests.

Indeed, it is weak due

to the level of fragmentation among such diverse inter
ests.

The Party of the Democratic Left is the major
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opposition party.

Coming in second to the Movement for a

Democratic Slovakia, with 10.4 percent of the vote in the
last election, the Democratic Left is an offshoot of the

former Communist Party.

The third largest representation

in parliament, as stated earlier, is the Hungarian Coali

tion.

Holding 10.2 percent of the vote in the last elec

tion, the Hungarian parties are moderate and ethnically

oriented, advocating territorial autonomy within Slovakia
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1994, 31).

The remainder of

opposition in parliament is the Christian Democratic
Movement with 10.1 percent of the popular vote, and the
Democratic Union, an offshoot of Movement for a Demo

cratic Slovakia, which received 8.6 percent of the popu
lar vote.

As it stands, the government holds 83 of the

150 seats in parliament (MOS 61, SWP 13, SNP 9) while the
opposition holds 67 seats (DLB 18, Hungarian Coalition

17, COM 17 and DU 15) (World Fact Book 381).

Complimenting this fractured semblance of political
representation is a autotarchical elite structure with
fault-lines that permeate deeper into society's political
orientation and set a course for the country's future
within the post-revolutionary period (Economist Intelli
gence Unit 1995, 37).

Keep in mind that Slovakia has no

policy of lustration, and that which existed under the
federation was eliminated with Slovak secession and
Vladimir Meciar's lack of interest in keeping the policy

(Implementation of the Helsinki Accords 19; Reynolds

"Meciar's Hand of Friendship").
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Seventeen of the 18

members of government, including Meciar, have been mem
bers of the Communist Party at one time or another.
Elites are predominantly organized into two polarized
camps led by Vladimir Meciar and President Michal Kovac,
the two most visible figures in Slovak politics.

Peter

Weiss of the Party of the Democratic Left along with Jan
Carnogursky of the Christian Democratic Movement and
Jozef Moravcik of the Democratic Union are also recog
nized as fundamental figures who help shape the nature of
elite interaction in Slovakia.

Most attention in Slovak politics, however, is cur

rently paid to Michal Kovac, Slovakia's President.
Standing for a liberal interpretation of constitution, he
is recognized as the "guardian" of democracy and capital
ism, and he advocates a society built on the rule of law
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37 and 40).

He in

sists that the formal constitution of Slovakia is ade
quately structured, but much more responsibility must be
displayed by political elites in order to insure stabil
ity within the existing structures (40).

He has accused

Meciar of pursuing a course of "permanent political con
frontation" (41).
Meciar, on the other hand, stands for a conservative
interpretation of the constitution.

He has tried to
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strengthen his executive position and has pursued controversial policies on such issues as privatization, ethnic

minorities and trade unions (37).

Often using fear and

intimidation, there is growing evidence which suggests
that Meciar is using the Slovak Intelligence Service

(SIS) to consolidate his personal position and privatiza
tion to reward his political allies.

Despite this, how

ever, opinion polls show steady support for Meciar
(Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 37).

Being first elected in June 1990 and taking control
of government, Meciar was ousted from government by a
vote of no-confidence in 1991.

He was then reelected in

the June 1992 by a significant plurality of the vote,
some 30 percent.

Meciar pursued an ill-defined agenda

which satisfied only his personal aspirations.

He and

President Kovac disagreed on appointments to key govern
ment positions such as minister of privatization, and the
Slovak economy was suffering because of inaction.

For

eign investment sharply declined for fear of political
instability.

In the midst of such gridlock, Foreign

Minister Jozef Moravcik and Deputy Prime Minister, Roman

Kovac, formed a splinter party of HZDS in the name of the
Alternative of Political Realism, presently known as the
Democratic Union.

In turn, Meciar supporters passed a

no-confidence vote on Moravcik and Kovac, effectively
expelling them from the administration and party.

With

the splintering of HZDS, Meciar lost his majority, and
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with pressure mounting from the Democratic Left, the HZDS
was forced into an alliance with the Slovak National

Party.

The stalemate worsened to the point that the

international community expressed concern about the
President Kovac called for a vote of no

events.

confidence against Meciar's government in March 1994
(Reynolds •Rebels Surround Meciar•; Drew •Meciar is

Ousted•).

The Parliament gained enough votes, acting

with uncharacteristic unity, to heed the President's
call.

Members of Parliament voted by a margin of 78-2

with the remainder of the 150 deputies abstaining to

remove Meciar from the Prime-Ministership on March 11,
1994 (Drew "Meciar is Ousted"}.
Despite the economic and political successes of the

interim government headed by none other than Moravcik,

public opinion extended little confidence to the govern
ment.

Indeed, with the October-November 1994 general

election, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia made a
rebound by receiving the largest percentage of the vote,
some 38 percent.

With the difficulty in forming coali

tions that presently exist, Meciar resumed control of
government.45 Since his reelection, Meciar has pursued an
even stronger authoritarian stance, vowing to "steamroll"
45 Refer to Drew "Meciar Ousted" for an elaboration
on the success of the interim government.
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anyone involved with his ouster, and often showing disrespect for constitutional order.

He has put considerable

limitations on the press, removing several key officials
in the communications departments of government and in
dustry.

He has also established several parliamentary

committees to investigate the past activities of his
political opponents (Spitkova "Slovak Dragnet").

Moreo

ver, he has instituted a policy which dramatically halts
or reorients the privatization process, advocating the

direct sale, public auction and/or a complicated and

questionable bond program for offering of a very limited
number of state assets to the public (Economist Intelli
gence Unit 1995, 42-43).

Vital industries such as gas,

electricity, telecommunications and the manufacture of
arms will remain in state hands (42-43).

Meciar's policy

also advocates maintaining state influences with 50 com
panies in the areas of oil, energy and steel (43).

Sev

eral laws already in existence advocate reversal of the
status of many companies that have already been privat
ized under Slovakia's first phase of privatization.

The

legislation also bars the involvement of investment funds
which have proven to be particularly prevalent in the
Czech Republic's privatization process.

Meciar and his

supporters argue that chosen economic policy will prevent
major shut downs and the problems endemic to other re
forming economies in Eastern Europe.

The purpose, he
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contends, is also to create a strong domestic business

class, but critics argue that it will amount to political
cronyism.

In retaliation for calling for a vote of no confi

dence in 1994, Vladimir Meciar is currently pursuing a

public referendum to remove President Kovac from office

(Spitkova "Slovak Cabinet Demands" and "Secret Attempt").

Meciar has repeatedly asked Kovac to resign under the
allegation that he used intelligence units to gather
damaging information to remove Meciar from office.
The most intriguing development of Slovak politics,

however, and a primary example of just how far Slovak

politics has devolved, involves the kidnapping of Michal
Kovac, Jr., son of President Kovac, who has been impli
cated and indicted by the German government on fraud
charges. Meciar and the state security apparatus (SIS)
have been implicated in the kidnapping, and there is
substantial evidence to suggest that Meciar was indeed
involved.

Several special prospectors, for example, have

been relieved of their duties just as each had come to
the conclusion that Meciar and SIS were most likely in
volved in the affair. Ironically, Meciar appoints the
special prosecutor and is overseer of the SIS (Economist
Intelligence Unit 1995, 39).

Also suggestive of the political climate is the
Miklosko affair; Civic Movement representative, Frantisek

Miklosko, was beaten on a Bratislava street corner.

and his party have been the most boisterous in their

He
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accusation of misdeeds by Meciar and SIS (39; Spitkova

"Kovac, Jr. Gives President's Foe"; "Kidnappers Abduct

Son"; "Plot Thickens"). Opinion on these developments
have been divided along party lines, with the opposition
claiming that such things do not happen in a democracy,
implicitly placing blame on Meciar (Economist Intelli
gence Unit 1995, 40).
Needless to say, this state of affairs is reaching

dangerous proportions. Violence has erupted, and there
is particular concern about the significant portion of

the population which is increasingly turned off by the
political discourse and remains silent.

There is evi

dence to suggest that society is becoming increasingly
divided (37).

The opposition Christian Democrats and the

Hungarian Civic Party have gone so far as to claim that
Slovakia's transition to democracy has been diverted to a
completely opposite direction than was intended (39).
The political wrangling, ethnic problems and violations
of civil rights have brought great skepticism from the
world community, including the United States, European
Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) and others such as U.S.-Hungarian financier
George Soros who has warned of fascist undercurrents in
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Central Europe, particularly in Slovakia (41; Larsen
"Europe Demands"; Spitkova "Meciar Snubs").

Nevertheless, Slovakia is doing reasonably well

economically (Economist Intelligence Unit 1995, 38).
According to the Slovak Statistical Office, GDP in the

first half of 1995 was 6.1 percent higher in real terms

than a year earlier (46).
in industrial output.

There was a 7.9 percent rise

Inflation rose by only 0.5 percent

in August 1995, making the year on year rate 9.8 percent
(46).

In July 1995 unemployment was 13.5 percent of

343,147 of the workforce, up from 13.3 percent in July,

but considerably lower than the 14.6 percent at the end
of 1994 (47).

Official forecasts for 1996 assume a 5

percent real GDP growth with inflation dropping below 10
percent, declining unemployment and a budget deficit that
is expected to reach only 1.5 percent of GDP.

The gov

ernment has constructive relations with the IMF, and
plans are to follow the Czech Republic in current-account
convertibility of the Slovak Koruna (38).

Slovakia is

also the only country in the region to have a positive

trade balance with the European Union (Spitkova "Slovak

Government").

Slovakia formally applied for membership

into the European Union on June 27, 1995 (Economist In
telligence Unit 1995, 44).

Despite such positive attributes, foreign investment
in Slovakia has waned significantly because of the po-

litical turmoil (38), and the prolonged effects of post-
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poning economic reform are not going to be offset by
Slovakia's macroeconomic capital for very long (38).

Bankruptcies are being postponed in an effort to soften
the effects of economic transition.

While such a policy

is understandable and necessary for maintaining social

and political stability, the situation is being capital
ized upon for political gains.
fragile.

Economic stability is

The balance of variables suggests great uncer

tainty about the future of Slovakia.

Will Slovakia re

main divided and in a state of attrition?

Will it

im

plode through it own internal pressure, or will events
begin to take a more positive course?

While Slovakia has

a great deal to address in terms of its own development,
and while it is impossible to reach firm conclusions in

such matters, much of the evidence presented in this
contrast suggests that Slovakia's ability to handle its
internal divisions is greater than if these variables
were antagonized even more by the issues which affected
stability within the union.
Optimism for the Future:

A Conclusion

The division of Czechoslovakia is not to be la
mented.

As it stands, each republic is free to address

the problems peculiar to its own conditions, irrespective
of the other (refer to Illner 11).

Had the union been

preserved, history suggests that relations between the
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republics would have become increasingly more antagonis

tic.

Considering the current struggle within Slovakia

itself, not to mention the divergences among the two

republics currently, one can surmise that contentions
between Czechs and Slovaks would probably be escalated
had the union been preserved due to the nature of circum
stances in the post-revolutionary and post-dissolution
periods.

Even after separation, each society has only

become more rooted in its own convictions.

Both Klaus

and Meciar remain in office as a result of democratic

elections, and despite concerted efforts in Slovakia to

reshape the leadership.

Moreover, the direction of

Czechia's reforms suggest only negative consequences for
Slovakia's political climate.

Even a modified pace of

reform would have been enough to antagonize Slovak atti
tudes, especially rouge elite interests.

Likewise, the

need for Slovakia to have delayed reforms would have
antagonized Czech attitudes towards Slovaks.

As it

stands, an independent Slovakia has only itself to blame
for its present and future direction; much the same with
Czechia.

Both Czechia and Slovakia are maturing as demo

cratic nations, and division has eliminated one major
impediment to their successful development - the antago
nisms historically associated with union - allowing each

other to develop according to distinct needs and aspira-
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tions.

Additionally, it is important to highlight that

despite little public support for the division, the dis
solution of Czechoslovakia was easily achieved.

Czecho

slovakia was divided with only a few minor disputes con

cerning state assets and boarders, but nothing that has
not been settled peacefully (Fischer "Czech and Slovak
Relations," 11-13).

The point is that while there was a

sigh of disappointment from Czechs, Slovaks, and the
world alike about the division, there was no public out

cry within Czechoslovakia itself contesting the decision.
The federal legislature approved the division.

Moreover,

there is currently no public sentiment calling for reuni
fication (9-10; refer also to Leff, 1996)
Relations between Czechs and Slovaks are cordial.

They work cooperatively both bilaterally and within the
framework of the Visegrad Four.

In bilateral terms,

Czechs and Slovaks maintain a customs union with which
trade between the republics is made easier and less
costly.

As of late, the union has experienced problems

of a political nature; the Czechs have pulled out of a

clearing house agreement for the finance of trade after
Slovakia increasingly raised tariffs and import quotas on
Czech agricultural imports (Fischer "Czech and Slovak
Relations," 14-15).

Nevertheless, relations remain fa-

vorable despite such developments.

The Czech and Slovak
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republics maintain a number of cultural and educational

exchanges, and their policies on citizenship are mutually
cooperative (refer to Fischer "Czech and Slovak Rela

tions").

The evidence to this point suggests that the divi

sion of Czechoslovakia provides a more solid foundation
for stability within each republic by virtue of the very
devolution of political relations and, therefore, the
problems historically associated with them, especially in
light of the absence of a sound basis for consociational

ism.

With the probability of a more durable stability

based on a more homogenous political culture within each
republic, stability in and between the successor repub
lics is enhanced.

Moreover, greater opportunity for the

realization of national self-determination based on mu

tual respect and democracy is evident, provided the new

republics are responsible to their own inhabitants, each
other, and the larger community of nations of which they
are an integral part.
This thesis has been concerned with revolution's

affect on stable order, most particularly as it pertains
the disruption of established order in Czechoslovakia.
Indeed, just one of the outcomes of revolution in Eastern
Europe is the disruption of the geopolitical order of the
continent as it has been known for the last half-century

and more.

The revolution of communist Europe has dis-
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rupted the established order of states with ramifications

the world over.

Yet the dangers commonly associated with

the dissolution of so-called modern nation-states should
not inhibit one from realizing the virtue of modern state
devolution within this context, especially as it pertains

to Czechoslovakia, but also with respect to the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and even Russia.

Such activity is

indeed a direct outcome of revolution as well as histori
cal circumstance.
Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia are aspiring to

become members of the international community of European
states.

Each is a member of the United Nations, NATO's

Partnership for Peace Initiative and the Central European
Initiative as well as the Council of Europe.

Both main

tain associate membership with the Western European Union
and the European Union with aspirations for full member
ship by the twenty-first century (Fischer "Czech and
Slovak Relations," 10-11; Hunter 467 and 1164).

Counter

vailing trends in inter-state cooperation and suprana
tional development throughout Europe help temper the
negativity of separation.

And while the integration of

Central and Eastern Europe into West European political
and economic structures is conducive to both independent
state stability and geopolitical order, there is still no
guarantee for peace and stability.

Yet when placed into

256

this context and the historical context portrayed heretofore, the division of Czechoslovakia is not as threaten

ing as one might be led to believe.

Rather, division

provides a basis for political stability in and among the
republics of Czechoslovakia in this, the post

revolutionary era, especially when viewed in light of the
political relations between Czechs and Slovaks histori
cally, the peaceful process by which dissolution oc
curred, and the potential for continental cooperation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agnew, Hugh LeCaine. N Czechs, Slovaks and the Slovak
Linguistic Separatism of the Mid-Nineteenth Century.N
The Czech and Slovak Experience. John Morison, ed.
New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 21-37.
Alince, Petra. N Slovaks Should Build a Civil Society.N
Editorial. Prague Post March 2-8, 1994: 9.
Anderle, Josef. N The First Republic 1918-1938 N .
Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages Past. Hans
Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, eds. New York: East
European Quarterly, Boulder, 1979.
Ash, Timothy Garton. The Uses of Adversity:
the
Fate of Central Europe. New York:
Books, 1990.

Essays on
Vintage

Auster, Amy. "Trial-and-Error: Democracy Has Much of
Both." Prague Post May 12-18, 1992: 3.
Ayling, Stanley. Edmund Burke: His Life and Opinions.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
Banak, Ivo, ed. Eastern Europe in Revolution.
Cornell UP, 1992.

Ithaca:

Bankowicz, Marek. "Czechoslovakia: From Masaryk to
Havel. N New Democracies in Eastern Europe: Party
Systems and Political Cleavages. Sten Berglund and
Jan Dellenbrant, eds. Brookfield, Vermont: Edward
Elgar, 1994. 142-68.
Baranovsky, Vladimir and Hans Joachim Spangler, eds. In
From the Cold: Germany, Russia and the Future of
Europe. Boulder: Westview Press, [1994?]: 53-75.

Bauman, Zygmunt. "A Revolution in the Theory of
Revolutions?" International Political Science Review
Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994: 15-24.
Birsch, Hans and Ivan Vogyes, eds. Czechoslovakia: The
Heritage of Ages Past: Essays in Memory of Josef
Korbal. New York: East European Quarterly, 1979.
257

258

Blanchard, Oliver, et al., eds. Reform in Eastern Europe.
MIT Press: Cambridge, 1992.

Blank, Stephen. "The Return of the Repressed? Post-1989
Nationalism in the 'New' Eastern Europe."
Nationalities Papers Vol. 22, No. 2, 1994: 405-23.
Brecher, Jeremy. "The National Question:
Reconsiderations from a Ecological Perspective." The
Nationalism Reader. Omar Dahbour and Micheline R.
Ishay, eds. New Jersey: Humanities Press: 344-61.
Brown, Michael E., ed. Ethnic Conflict and International
Security. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993.
Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the Revolution in France.
J.G.A. Pocock, ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
Publishing Co., 1987.

Chang, Leslie. "Parliament Stalls Rush Towards Split."
Prague Post October 6-12, 1992: 1.

Chipman, John. "Managing the Role of Parochialism."
Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Michael
E. Brown, ed. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1993. 26563.

Coakley, John. "Approaches to the Resolution of Ethnic
Conflict: The Strategy of Non-Territorial Autonomy."
International Political Science Review Vol. 15, No.
3, 1994: 297-314.

Cokford, Ross. "Strikers Bypass Union and Win."
Post August 17-23, 1994: 4.

Prague

Constitutional Law of the Czech National Council of 16
December 1992. Trans., n.p.: n.p., n.d.

Cooper, Susanna. "Voters Shape A New Nation."
Post May 12-18, 1992: 3.
Cornej, Petr. Fundamentals of Czech History.
Praha, 1992.

Prague

Prague:

Coudenhove, Sophia. "National Union Congress Displays
Egoism, Hatred-and a New Leader." Prague Post April
19-23, 1994: 1.
----. "Unions Bark, Government Bites." Prague Post
March 30-April 5, 1994: 1.

259

Cozic, Charles P., ed. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict.
San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1994.

Crosby, Alan. •Republics Agree on Customs Union.•
Prague Post November 3-9, 1992: 5.

Dahbour, Omar and Micheline R. Ishay, eds. The
Nationalism Reader. New Jersey: Humanities Press,
1995.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. Reflections on the Revolution in
Eastern Europe. New York: Times Books, 1990.
Damsell, Kieth. •car Theft Fuels High Auto Insurance
Rates.• Prague Post May 4-10, 1994: 7.
----. •Government Leaves Companies to Solve Management
Crisis.• Prague Post April 20-26, 1994: 6.
De Luce, Dan. •Deadlock Puts Federation in Danger.•
Prague Post June 16-22, 1992: 1 •
• •Nations Leaders Open Door to Future."
Post June 23-29, 1992: 1 •

• •Slovaks: Go Slow On Split.•
30-July 6, 1992: 1 •

Prague

Prague Post

• •Political Unity is Just A Memory.•
May 12-18, 1992: 3 •
• •Havel Criticizes Assembly Vote.•
OCtober 6-12, 1992: 3.

June

Prague Post
Prague Post

Derlien, Hans-Ulrich and George J. Szablowski, eds.
•Regime Transitions, Elites, and Bureaucracies in
Eastern Europe.• Governance Vol. 6, No. 3, July
1993.

Di Palma, Guiseppe. •Legitimation from the Top to Civil
Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern
Europe.• World Politics Vol. 44, No. 1, Oct. 1991:
49-80.

Dorotkova, Jana. •Slovaks May Finally Get a Referendum.•
Prognosis March 4-17, 1994: 3.
Drew, Kevin. •Slovak Television Goes Commercial.•
Post April 27-May 3, 1994: 1.

Prague

260

• "Last Place: Slovakia is Hoping to Gain Ground in
Foreign Investment." Prague Post April 27-May 3,
1994: 6.

----. "Kovac: Democracy Still Works Here."
April 6-12, 1994: 4.

Prague Post

----. "New Slovak Prime Minister Pushes for Consensus."
Prague Post April 6-12, 1994: 4.
----. "Slovaks Pick Up the Pieces."
23-29, 1994: 1.

Prague Post

----. "Meciar is Ousted-Moravcik Appointed."
March 16-22, 1994: 1.
----. "Slovak President Caused Final Fall."
March 16-22, 1994: 1.

March

Prague Post
Prague Post

----. "Vote In Slovakia A Sign of the Times."
Post July 13-19, 1994: 1.

Prague

----. "The Political Leader Who Just Won't Lie Down and
Die." Prague Post August 17-23, 1994: 1.
----. "New Government Is Losing Support." Prague Post
July 6-12, 1994: 4.
Eckstein, Harry. Regarding Politics: Essays on
Political Theory, Stability and Change. Berkley:
University of California, 1992.
Economist Intelligence Unit. "Country Report: Czech
Republic and Slovakia." (1st quarter 1994) •

• "Country Report:
(4th quarter 1995).

Czech Republic and Slovakia"

Felak, James. "Slovak Considerations of the Slovak
Question: The Ludak, Agrarian, Socialist and
Communist Views in Interwar Czechoslovakia." The
Czech and Slovak Experience. John Morrison, ed. New
York: St. Martin's, 1992. 136-62.
Fisher, Sharon. "Czech-Slovak Relations Two Years After
the Election". RFE/RL Research Report July 8, 1994,
Vol. 3, No. 27: 9-17 •
• "The Slovak Economy: Signs of Recovery." RFE/RL
Research Report August 26, 1994, Vol. 3, No. 33:
58-65.

261
Foreign Economic Trends Report-Czech Republic. (June

1993) An unpublished pamphlet prepared by the
American Embassy, Prague Czech Republic.

Garver, Bruce. "The Czechoslovak Tradition: An
Overview." Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of Ages
Past. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, eds. New York:
East European Quarterly, 1979. 25-56.
Gomez, Boris. "Klaus, Meciar Thwart Opposition's
Demands." Prague Post october 13-19, 1992: 3 •
• "Czech Republic Assumes Federal Power."
Post November 25-December 1, 1992: 1 •

Prague

• "Federal Role in Economic Policies Diminishing."
Prague Post August 11-17, 1992: 6 •
• "The Currency Debate Divides Republics."
Post August 18-24, 1992: 7 •

Prague

• "Opposition Parties With New Political Clout - and
Respect." Prague Post OCtober 6-12, 1992: 3.
Gomez, Victor. "Parliament Approves the Return of Jewish
Property." Prague Post May 4-10, 1994: 1.
----. "New Level of Government Takes Shape Slowly."
Prague Post March 2-8, 1994: 4.
----. "EC Delay Sends Signal to Czech, Slovak Republics:
Keep Close Ties." Prague Post Sept. 15-21, 1992:
N.p.
----. "Delay Could Spell Death for Senate."
June 8-14, 1994: 1.

Prague Post

----, Kathlene Knox and Ross Larsen. "Slovakia's Odd
Bedfellows." Prague Post Dec. 14-20, 1994: 1.

Gottlieb, Gidon. "Nation Without State." Foreign
Affairs May/June 1994, Vol. 73, No. 3: 100-12.

Habermas, JUrgen. "Citizenship and the National
Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe."
The Nationalism Reader. Omar Dahbour and Micheline
R. Ishay, eds. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995.
333-43.

Hangley, Bill, Jr. "Federal Future Hangs on Unlikely
Compromise." Prague Post June 9-15, 1992: 3 •
•

262

"How It All Works: A Campaign Cheat Sheet.•
May 12-18, 1992: 6 •

Prague Post

• "Czechs Lead Drive Toward Division.•
August 11-17, 1992: 1.

Prague Post

Hanspach, Daniel, Tomas Kostelecky and Zdenka Vajdova.
Local Government In the Czech Republic. Prague:
Inst. of Sociology, 1993.
Havel, Vaclav.

with Karel.

Disturbing the Peace:

New York:

A Conversation

Knoff, 1990.

Hidler, James. "Too Many Jobs Not Enough: Feast or
Famine." Prague Post April 27-May 3, 1994: 1.
Hobsbawm, Eric. "Nationalism in the Late Twentieth
Century." The Nationalism Reader. Omar Dahbour and
Micheline R. Ishay, eds. New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1995. 362-71.
Hunter, Brian, ed.

The Statesman's Year-Book:
Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of
the World for the Year 1995-1996. New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1995.

Huntington, Samuel P.

The Third Wave: Democratization
in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University

of Oklahoma Press, 1991 •

• Political Order in Changing Societies.
CT: Yale UP, 1969.

New Haven,

Ignatieff, Michael. "On Civil Society: Why Eastern
Europe's Revolutions Could Succeed." Foreign Affairs
March/April 1995, Vol. 74, No. 2: 128-36.
Illner, Michal, et. al., eds.

Czech Republic Transformations After 1989 and Beyond: Scenerio of
Change Until the Year 2005. Prague: Inst. of

Sociology, Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic,
November 1993.

Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and
Democratization in Slovakia. Washington, D.C.:

Commission on
Sept. 1993.

Security and Cooperation in Europe,

Islam, Shafiqul and Michael Mandelbaum.

Making Markets:
Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and Post
Soviet States. New York: Council on Foreign

263

Relations Press, 1993.

Judt. Tony R. "Metamorphosis: The Democratic Revolution
in Czechoslovakia." Eastern Europe in Revolution.
Banac, Ivo, ed. New York: Cornell, 1992. 96-116.
Kagan, Dolald, Steven Ozment, Frank M. Turner, eds. The
Western Heritage Since 1648. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co., Inc., 1979.
Katzenstein, Peter J.

Small States in World Markets:
Industrial Policy In Europe. Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1985.

Kayal, Michele. "Gulf Between Czech Republic and
Slovakia
Growing Wider." Prague Post March 9-15,
1994:

2.

• "German and Czechs Start Getting Down to
Business." Prague Post May 4-10, 1994: 8.
Kaye, Paul.

Tongue."

"Law Forces Minorities to Suppress Mother
Prague Post Nov. 22-28, 1995: 6.

Klein, George. "The Role of Ethnic Politics in the
Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 and the Yugoslav Crisis
of 1971." Studies in Comparative Communism Winter
1975, Vol. VIII, No. 4: 339-69.

• "The Czechoslovak Economy." Czechoslovakia: The
Heritage of Ages Past. Hans Birsch and Ivan Volgyes,
New York: East European Quarterly, Boulder,
eds.
1979. 147-58.

---- and Jaroslav Krejci. "Czechoslovakia."

Survey
Research and Public Attitudes in Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union. William A. Welsh, ed. New York:

Pergamon Press, 1981.

Knox, Kathleen. "Six Years After the Revolution,
Enthusiasm is Waning." Prague Post November 15-21
1995: 3 •
•

"Bills Outstrip Incomes for Most Czech Families."
May 18-24, 1994: 1 •

Prague Post

•

"Uproar in Parliament at Historic Immunity Vote."
August 2-8, 1995: 1.

Prague Post

264

• "Social Democrats Surpass Klaus in Popularity
Poll." Prague Post August 2-8, 1995: 1 •

• "Deputies Approve System of Elections to Senate."
Prague Post Oct. 4-10, 1995: 2 •
• "Controversial Screening Law Now in Havel's
Hands." Prague Post Oct. 4-10, 1995: 2 •
• "Creation of Senate Finally on Track, Really."
Prague Post Sept. 20-16, 1995: 1 •
• "Screening Extended Despite Havel's Veto."
Post Oct. 25-31, 1995: 1 •

Prague

• "Smugglers of Illegal Aliens Ply Czech Highways."
Prague Post August 16-22, 1995: 1.
---- and Victor Gomez. "Scandal Provokes Public Concern
Over Party Funds." Prague Post March 16-22,
1994:

3.

Kobylka, Jaroslav. "If It Comes to Separation, Slovakia
Will Bear the Brunt." Prague Post July 7-13,
1992:

6.

Lansky, Egon T. Opinion.
1994: 12.

Prognosis

April 29-May 12,

Larsen, Ross. "Czechs Don't Want Detour to Division."
Prague Post July 14-20, 1992: 1 •
• "Europe Demands Slovakia Respect Political
Rights." Prague Post Nov. 22-28, 1995: 1.
Lawson, Maggie Ledford. "Lizner Handed a Seven-Year
Sentence for Accepting Bribe." Prague Post Oct. 2531, 1995: 1.
Leff, Carol Skalnik. National Conflict in
Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State,
1918-1987. New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1988 •
• "Could This Marriage Have Been Saved? The
Czechoslovak Divorce." Current History March 1996:
129-34.

Lesenarova, Hana. "Another Blow to the Body of the Czech
Good Name." Prognosis March 4-17, 1994: 4.

265

Levine, David. "The Transformation of Interests and the
State." Changes in the State: Causes and
Consequences. Edward S. Greenberg and Thomas F.
Mayer, eds. Newbury Park CA: Sage Publications,
1990.

Lijphart, Arend.

Democracy in Plural Societies: A
Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale UP, 1977.

Lipset, Seymore Martin. "Some Socia-1 Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy." American Political Science Review Vol.
LIII, No. 1, March, 1959: 69-105.
Lyman, Randall. "Building the Second Tier."
Feb. 18-March 3, 1994: 4-5.

Prognosis

Macridis, Roy C.

Contemporary Political Ideologies:
Movements and Regimes. (Fourth Edition) Glenview,

Illinois:

Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989.

Mamatey, Victor S. "The Birth of Czechoslovakia: Union
of Two Peoples." Czechoslovakia: The Heritage of
Ages Past. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes, eds. New
York: Columbia UP, 1979. 75-88.

McKay, John P., Bennett D. Hill and John Buckler, eds. A
History of Western Society: From Absolutism to the
Present. (Vol. II) Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1987.

McLean, Robert. "Klaus Tackles Labor Head On."
April 15-28, 1994:

5.

----. "What's an Investment Fund, Anyway?"
Feb. 4-17, 1994:

8.

Prognosis

Prognosis

Mihallovich, Steven. "Meciar Takes No Prisoners in Bout
With President." Prague Post Feb. 1-7, 1995: 4.
Morison, John, ed. The Czech and Slovak Experience.
York: St. Martin's, 1992.

New

Musil, Jiri. "Czech and Slovak Society: Outline of a
Comparative Study." Czech Sociological Review
(1993) Vol. 1, No. 1: 5-21.
Myant, Martin.

Transforming Socialist Economics: The
Case of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hants, England:

Edward Elgar, 1993.

Vol. 16 (macropaedia)

The New Encyclopaedia Britannica.

15th Edition, 1992:

952-82.

266

Newman, Saul. "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Political
Conflict?" World Politics April 1991, Vol. 43, No.
3: 451-78.

Olivova, Vera. "The Czechoslovak Government and its
Disloyal Opposition, 1918-1938." The Czech and
Slovak Experience. John Morison, ed. New York: St.
Martin's, 1992. 89-101.

w. Czechoslovakia: Profile of a Socialist
Republic at the Crossroads of Europe. Boulder:
Westview Press, 1981.

Paul, David

Pehe, Jiri. "Civil Society at Issue in the Czech
Republic". RFE/RL Research Report August 19, 1994,
Vol 3, No. 32: 13-18.

Perry, Marvin, Joseph R. Peden, Theodore H. Von Laue.
Sources of the Western Tradition: From the
Scientific Revolution to the Present. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987.
Petr, Jan.

"73 Years Together vs. 1,000 Years Apart."
December 6-19, 1992: 13.

Pick, Otto.

"The Czech Republic-A Stable Transition."
November 1994, Vol. so, No. 11.:

Prognosis

The World Today
206-08.

Plano, Jack C. and Milton Greenberg. The American
Political Science Dictionary. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967.
Polisensky, J. V. History of Czechoslovakia in Outline.
Prague: Bohemia International, 1980.
Ramet, Sabrina Petra.

"The Reemergence of Slovakia."
Spring 1994, Vol. 22, No. 1:

Nationalities Papers
99-117.

Reynolds, Bill. "Meciar Delivers One-Two Punch."
Post March 2-8, 1994: 3.
----. "Bratislava Crisis Hits Boiling Point."
Post Feb. 23-March 1, 1994: 1.
----. "Rebels Surround Meciar."
1994: 1.

Prague Post

Prague

Prague

Feb. 16-22,

267
• "Meciar Hand of Friendship Tightens Grip."
Post Dec. 21-27, 1994: 1.

Prague

Ritchie, William A. "Cassandra's Echo: Exclusionary
Democracy in the New Europe." The New Europe and the
World. Lawrence Ziring, ed. Western Michigan
University: Inst. of Government and Politics, 1993.
73-102.
Rothschild, Joseph. "Nationalism and Democratization in
East Central Europe: Lessons From the Past."
Nationalities Papers 1994, Vol. 22, No. 1: 27-34.
Scheer, Christopher. "Post-Revolution Haze".
Nov. 8-21, 1991: 8-9.

Prognosis

Schlotter, Peter. "Beyond the East-West Conflict:
Institutionalizing Security and Cooperation in
Europe." In From the Cold: Germany, Russia and the
Future of Europe. Vladimir Baranovsky and Hans
Joachim Spanger, eds. Boulder: Westview Press,
(1994?). 53-75.
Schneider, Joe. "One Day Strikes Drove Away More
Patients Than Doctors." Prague Post Nov. 8-14,
1995:

3.

• "Patients Face Big Bill for Reform of Health
Care." Prague Post Dec. 13-19, 1995: 1 •
• "Health Care at a Crossroads."
21-27, 1995: 1 •

Prague Post

June

• "Desperate Doctors: No Choice But Strike."
Prague Post Oct. 4-10, 1995: 1.
Sedlac, Lubomir. "Outlook Bleak for Slovak Economy."
Prague Post March 2-8, 1994: 6.
Sedlak, Petr and J.D. Juracka. "Privatization Process in
Czechoslovakia." (March 13, 1992) Unpublished
report prepared for the Ministry of Industry of the
Czech Republic.
Simoneti, Marko. "A Comparative Review of Privatization
Strategies in Four Former Socialist Countries."
Europe-Asia Studies 1993, Vol. 45, No. 1: 79-102.
Sirowy, Larry and Alex Inkeles. "The Effects of
Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality: A

•

268

Review.• Studies in Comparative International
Development Spring 1990, Vol. 25, No. 1: 126-57.

Skidmore, Max J. Ideologies: Politics in Action.
San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Publishers, 1989.

Skilling, Gordon H. •Masaryk: Religious Heretic.• The
Czech and Slovak Experience. John Morison, ed. New
York: St. Martin's, 1992. 62-88 •
•

T.G. Masaryk:

Univ. Park, Penn.:

Against the Current 1882-1914.

Penn State UP, 1994.

Skocpol, Theda.

States and Social Revolutions: A
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China.

Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 1979.

Spitkova, Timea. •secret Attempt to Oust the Slovak
President.• Prague Post May 17-23, 1995: 1 •
•

•Slovak Cabinet Demands the President Resign.•
Sept. 27-0ct. 3, 1995: 1 •

Prague Post

• •Slovak Government Just Can't Shake Its Bad
Reputation.• Prague Post July 12-18, 1995: 5 •
•

•Slovak Dragnet Called a Threat to Democracy.•
June 14-20, 1995: 1 •

Prague Post

• •Kovac Jr. Gives President's Foes Yet Another
Weapon as Political Battles Heat Up.• Prague Post
April 5-11, 1995: 6 •
•

•Plot Thickens in Slovak Kidnap Investigation.•
Oct. 18-24, 1995: 4 •

•

•Kidnappers Abduct Son of Slovak Leader.•
Sept. 6-12, 1995: 1.

Prague Post
Post

Prague

Stojaspal, Jan. •social Democrats Are Closing In On
ODS.• Prague Post May 31-June 6, 1995: 2 •
•

•state of the Union:

14-20, 1994:

5.

Perfect.•

Prague Post

Sullivan, Ben. •coupons at the Meat Market.•
Feb. 4-17, 1994:

•

8.

Prognosis

•Meciar Snubs World's Demands for Democracy.•
Nov. 1-7, 1995: 4.

Prague Post

Dec.

269

• "Night of Long Knives in Slovak Parliament."
Prague Post Nov. 9-15, 1994: 1.

Svoboda, George. "The Odd Alliance: The
Underprivileged Population of Bohemia and the
Habsburg Court, 1765-1790." The Czech and Slovak
Experience. John Morison, ed. New York: St.
Martin's, 1992. 7-20.
Szulc, Tad. Czechoslovakia Since World War II.
York: Viking Press, 1971.

New

Taborsky, Edward. "Tragedy, Triumph and Tragedy:
Czechoslovakia, 1938-1948." Czechoslovakia: The
Heritage of Ages Past. Hans Brisch and Ivan Volgyes,
eds. New York: Columbia UP, 1979. 113-34
Tilly, Charles, ed. The Formation of National States in
Western Europe. Princeton UP, 1975. 3-83.
Ulc, Otto. "The Bumpy Road of Czechoslovakia's Velvet
Revolution." Problems of Communism May-June 1992:
19-33.
Valdez, Jonathan, ed. Internationalism and the Ideology
of Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe. London:
Cambridge UP, 1993.
Vladan, Sir. "Learning to Play the Market."
April 15-28, 1994.

Prognosis

----. "Customs Unions, Like Promises, Are for Breaking."
Prognosis March 4-17, 1994: 9.
Welsh, Helga. "Political Transition Processes in Central
and Eastern Europe." Comparative Politics July
1994, Vol. 26, No. 4: 379-94.
Whipple, Tim, ed. After the Velvet Revolution.
York: Freedom House, 1991.

New

Wolchik, Sharon L. Czechoslovakia in Transition:
Politics, Economics & Society. London: Pinter,
1991 •
• "The Politics of Ethnicity in Post-Communist
Czechoslovakia". East European Politics and
Societies Winter 1994, Vol. 8, No. 1: 153-88.

The World Book or Facts.
1995.

270

Central Intelligence Agency,

Ziring, Lawrence, ed. The New Europe and the World.
Western Michigan University: Institute of Government
and Politics, 1993.

Zivnustkova, Alena and Michele Kayal. "Unions Threaten
Chaos for Czech Rail System." Prague Post
June 21-27, 1995: 1 •
• "Accountability Makes a Debut Appearance on
Political Stage." Prague Post June 21-27, 1995:

1.

